119-s417

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 417 Introduced in Senate

    (IS) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. 417

To develop a strategy for increasing access to independent information 
 for Chinese citizens, to establish an interagency task force to carry 
 out such strategy, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

 February 5, 2025

 Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
 Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

To develop a strategy for increasing access to independent information 
 for Chinese citizens, to establish an interagency task force to carry 
 out such strategy, and for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Titles.--This Act may be cited as the ``Informing a 
Nation with Free, Open, and Reliable Media Act of 2025'' or the 
``INFORM Act''.

    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short titles; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Findings.

Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 5. Statement of policy.

Sec. 6. Strategy for increasing access to independent information for 
 citizens of the People's Republic of China.

Sec. 7. Establishment of the Global News Service.

Sec. 8. Increasing coordination and resources for censorship 
 circumvention, secure sharing, and content 
 creation initiatives.

Sec. 9. Addressing the lack of reciprocity between the United States 
 and the People's Republic of China in the 
 information space.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

 In this Act:

    (1) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist 
 Party.

    (2) Coordinator.--The term ``Coordinator'' means the 
 coordinator of the interagency task force appointed by the 
 President pursuant to 

section 8

    (b) .

    (3) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the 
 Department of State.

    (4) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of 
 China.

    (5) RFA.--The term ``RFA'' means Radio Free Asia.

    (6) USAGM.--The term ``USAGM'' means the United States 
 Agency for Global Media.

    (7) VOA.--The term ``VOA'' means Voice of America.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) Since the advent and proliferation of the internet, the 
 Chinese Communist Party has viewed the global, cross-border, 
 and open information environment the internet created as an 
 existential threat to its legitimacy, its effective 
 indoctrination and control of its citizens, and its 
 authoritarian political system.

    (2) Despite brief periods of increased openness in the 
 internet ecosystem of the People's Republic of China during the 
 early 2000s, the CCP has since expended billions of dollars to 
 develop a digital information control regime (commonly known as 
 the ``Great Firewall of China'') that is a wholescale 
 substitution of the global internet with compelling, nearly 
 universally used domestic platforms with built-in censorship 
 and surveillance features as alternatives, which has 
 fundamentally reshaped its population's behavior.

    (3) Through this system in the PRC, the ``Great Firewall'' 
 blocks foreign internet search providers, independent news and 
 media websites, circumvention and secure messaging tools, and 
 other content deemed undesirable by the CCP.

    (4) The PRC also engages in meta-level censorship to 
 obscure the possibility of circumvention and surveillance 
 evasion by criminalizing VPNs, blocking discussion of anti-
 censorship methods, widespread app removal from app stores, and 
 related techniques.

    (5) Chinese internet users must contend with expansive 
 repressive digital surveillance that often results in real-
 world consequences and leads to significant self-censorship.

    (6) Under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, the CCP 
 and government organs have prioritized--
        (A) the censorship and surveillance of their 
 citizens' online behavior; and
        (B) the indoctrination of the CCP's--
            (i) authoritarian worldview;
            (ii) anti-American and anti-West 
 propaganda; and
            (iii) intent to undermine and redefine the 
 United States-led global order.

    (7) The PRC's internet censorship regime systematically--
        (A) amplifies the voices of nationalistic internet 
 users;
        (B) silences the voices of moderate or dissenting 
 voices;
            (C) suppresses information that threatens the 
 credibility of the CCP, including reports of corruption 
 and of unexplained wealth held by CCP and People's 
 Liberation Army officials and their families; and
            (D) creates an echo chamber on the PRC domestic 
 internet that makes it challenging for international 
 observers to decipher--
            (i) the prevailing beliefs, values, and 
 perspectives of different segments of PRC 
 society; and
            (ii) their views on the domestic and 
 foreign policies of the PRC government.

    (8) Concurrent with the increased sophistication and 
 refinement of the PRC's censored and restricted information 
 space, the CCP has expended billions of dollars to build an 
 asymmetric advantage by reengineering its population's online 
 norms concurrent with--
        (A) exploiting the open and uncensored online 
 information environment in the United States and many 
 countries globally to advance its pro-CCP and anti-
 United States propaganda and disinformation; and
        (B) highly restricting the United States online and 
 public diplomacy activities in the PRC.

    (9) The United States Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, 
 recently stated that the PRC's Ministry of State Security has 
 interrupted and effectively cancelled 61 public in-person and 
 online events organized by the United States mission in China 
 since November 2023.

    (10) Despite a comprehensive censorship and surveillance 
 regime, the relentless indoctrination by CCP and PRC government 
 organs, and the highly coordinated, systematized, and 
 repressive structure of the PRC censorship and propaganda 
 apparatus, PRC citizens have begun to demonstrate--
        (A) a lack of confidence and satisfaction in their 
 government's policies, conduct, and the information 
 available to them within the PRC's censored and 
 restrictive online information space; and
        (B) a growing willingness to express dissent 
 online, seek alternative sources of information and 
 engagement, and call for greater economic and political 
 freedoms.

    (11) In a recent Stanford University study, researchers 
 discovered that PRC university students who were exposed to 
 foreign news and independent content changed their knowledge, 
 beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors suggesting that demand for 
 uncensored information can persist and may generate pressure on 
 the PRC censorship apparatus.

    (12) In 2021, during a period when the Clubhouse 
 application was briefly uncensored in the People's Republic of 
 China, downloads and engagement on Clubhouse rapidly increased 
 and provided an opportunity for PRC internet users to openly 
 discuss sensitive topics, including--
        (A) the reeducation camps in Xinjiang;
        (B) the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre; and
            (C) the future of Taiwan.

    (13) One Clubhouse user penned a hashtag, which was viewed 
 more than 50,000,000 times, calling the discussions the 
 ``Renaissance of China''.

    (14) In 2022, during the multi-city ``White Paper'' 
 protests in defiance of the Government of the PRC's zero-COVID-
 19 policy, internet users in the PRC expressed solidarity and 
 organized the protests through a variety of online platforms.

    (15) Information technology news outlet Techopedia released 
 a report and data indicating that, despite being largely 
 blocked and criminalized, the usage of VPNs in the PRC doubled 
 during 2023.

    (16) In February 2024, after the United States Embassy in 
 Beijing posted information on China's popular Weibo social 
 media platform discussing scientists' use of satellite data to 
 track and monitor the movement of giraffes, the platform was 
 inundated with comments from PRC internet users lamenting the 
 state of the PRC economy and recent turmoil in its stock, bond, 
 and real estate markets, with many users expressing a desire 
 for help from the United States.

    (17) The demand among PRC citizens for independent and 
 alternative sources of information is growing, while the level 
 of United States Government funding to disseminate 
 circumvention tools to PRC citizens so they can access 
 independent information has remained at consistently low 
 levels, especially compared to the billions of renminbi 
 (Chinese yuan) the PRC is spending to censor and monitor its 
 internet ecosystem.

    (18) Publicly-funded VPNs supported through the Open 
 Technology Fund are used by millions of monthly active users in 
 China and have proven to be resilient. Traditional 
 circumvention tools, such as VPNs, are necessary but are not 
 sufficient to address the unique challenge of China's socio-
 technological information control system.

    (19) Increasing access to independent information for PRC 
 citizens will aid broader United States efforts--
        (A) to engage PRC citizens;
        (B) to provide credible and reliable alternative 
 sources of information for PRC citizens regarding 
 events occurring within the PRC and globally;
            (C) to promote a balanced understanding of the 
 United States among PRC citizens; and
            (D) to support PRC citizens in their efforts to 
 advance their individual freedoms and human rights and 
 hold their government accountable.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

 It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government 
should--

    (1) prioritize the development of a vision and strategy for 
 engaging with PRC citizens through the development and delivery 
 of Mandarin Chinese-language content that is timely, 
 compelling, and pertinent to--
        (A) the issues and challenges they face in their 
 daily lives;
        (B) the domestic and foreign policy decisions of 
 the PRC government; and
            (C) the governance failures and corruption of the 
 CCP, including unexplained wealth held by CCP and PLA 
 officials and their families;

    (2) increase the level of coordination among Federal 
 agencies to develop and disseminate timely, compelling, and 
 pertinent Mandarin Chinese-language content that is otherwise 
 blocked by the PRC government's highly censored and restrictive 
 internet ecosystem;

    (3) dually prioritize--
        (A) access to independent information through 
 circumvention and other tools for PRC citizens; and
        (B) the secure sharing of such content in the PRC's 
 highly censored internet ecosystem;

    (4) optimize the impact of circumvention and secure content 
 sharing tools by more effectively pairing such tools with 
 timely, compelling, and pertinent Mandarin Chinese-language 
 content; and

    (5) seek to counter the lack of reciprocity with the PRC in 
 the online information and public diplomacy space.

SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

 It is the policy of the United States--

    (1) to make increasing access to independent information 
 for and engagement with the roughly 1,400,000,000 PRC citizens 
 a national security priority of the United States that benefits 
 broader United States priorities to promote human rights, the 
 rule of law, and good governance in the PRC and globally;

    (2) to prioritize the expansion and improvement of the 
 development and dissemination of independent information to PRC 
 citizens inside and outside the People's Republic of China, 
 including by more effectively pairing independent information 
 with the circumvention and other tools needed to access such 
 content;

    (3) to prioritize and coordinate Mandarin Chinese-language 
 content development and content dissemination, and develop 
 technical solutions to address the PRC's digital information 
 controls; and

    (4) to work with like-minded partners and allies--
        (A) to develop coordinated and complementary 
 strategies for increasing access to independent 
 information for PRC citizens; and
        (B) to address the lack of reciprocity in the 
 information and media environments between the PRC and 
 the United States and its partners and allies.

SEC. 6. STRATEGY FOR INCREASING ACCESS TO INDEPENDENT INFORMATION FOR 
 CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) President's Strategy.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives for increasing access 
to independent information for citizens of the PRC who are within or 
outside the PRC.

    (b) Strategy Elements.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall include--

    (1) a plan for increasing the accessibility and adoption of 
 circumvention and secure communications tools within the PRC, 
 which may include--
        (A) an assessment of the technical challenges of 
 the PRC's information control regime; and
        (B) an evaluation of research, technological, and 
 other gaps that may affect strategy implementation;

    (2) an assessment of Mandarin Chinese-language content 
 creation and distribution capabilities within the Department, 
 across the interagency task force established pursuant to 
 

section 8, and among other Federal departments and agencies, as 
 appropriate, including--
        (A) whether United States Government-produced, 
 Mandarin Chinese-language content is accessible either 
 inside or outside the PRC;
        (B) the uptake of, and engagement with, various 
 types of content among citizens of the PRC within or 
 outside the PRC;
            (C) the use of survey tools and other data sources 
 to assess the areas of interest and concern, whether 
 domestic or international, among different segments of 
 PRC citizens; and
            (D) where gaps or duplication of effort exist in 
 the efficacy of the Mandarin Chinese-language content 
 developed and disseminated by the Department or the 
 interagency task force, and how such gaps or 
 duplication will be addressed through the strategy;

    (3) a description of how the Department plans to improve 
 coordination between components of the Department, and across 
 the interagency task force, in--
        (A) developing and disseminating compelling, 
 accessible Mandarin Chinese-language content within and 
 outside the PRC's information control regime while 
 avoiding duplication; and
        (B) funding outside organizations to develop 
 circumvention and secure content sharing tools;

    (4) a description of how the Department plans to promote 
 greater convergence and pairing between the development and 
 dissemination of effective and high quality content and the 
 circumvention tools used to access and share such content;

    (5) a description of how the Department plans to develop 
 networks with known and emerging Mandarin Chinese-language 
 content developers and social media influencers through 
 initiatives such as media and internet freedom programs based 
 outside of the PRC;

    (6) an assessment of the current efficacy of content 
 generated by the Department that is disseminated within the 
 PRC, including by United States embassies and consulates within 
 the PRC, and how Department plans to improve the efficacy and 
 use of content disseminated within the PRC;

    (7) a plan for increasing digital engagement with citizens 
 of the PRC who are living or traveling outside of the PRC by 
 providing them with temporary access to an uncensored internet 
 environment; and

    (8) a description of any additional resources, including 
 additional funding or authorities, needed to further the 
 objectives outlined in the strategy.
            (c) Classification.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.

    (a) Establishment.--The United States International Broadcasting 
Act of 1994 (title III of Public Law 103-236; 22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after 

section 309A the following:

``

SEC. 309B. GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.

 ``

    (a) Authority.--
 ``

    (1) In general.--Grants authorized under 

section 305

    (a) shall be available to award annual grants for the purpose of 
 curating, translating, distributing, and making available 
 content created or disseminated by the Voice of America, Radio 
 Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East 
 Broadcasting Networks, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, or any 
 entity funded by or partnering with the United States Agency 
 for Global Media, including news and information related to the 
 People's Republic of China.
 ``

    (2) Establishment.--There is established a grantee 
 entity, which--
 ``
        (A) shall be known as the 'Global News Service'; 
 and
 ``
        (B) shall carry out the functions set forth in 
 subsection

    (b) .
 ``

    (b) Functions.--ln furtherance of the mission described in 
subsection

    (a)

    (1) , the Global News Service--
 ``

    (1) shall seek to curate, translate, distribute, and make 
 available content about or related to the People's Republic of 
 China and the People's Republic of China's malign activities 
 globally, in coordination with Voice of America's and Radio 
 Free Asia's Mandarin Chinese language news service;
 ``

    (2) shall offer the content described in paragraph

    (1) in 
 Mandarin Chinese and in English for the purpose of making fact-
 based, uncensored China-related news available to news 
 organizations, independent journalists, and online content 
 creators around the world;
 ``

    (3) should prioritize making available the content 
 described in paragraph

    (1) to media outlets in countries that 
 are influenced by Chinese Communist Party controlled media;
 ``

    (4) shall ensure that--
 ``
        (A) its Mandarin Chinese-language news service 
 targets the Chinese diaspora abroad; and
 ``
        (B) its English-language news service targets 
 foreign media outlets seeking China-related stories in 
 English or other local languages; and
 ``

    (5) shall carry out any other effort consistent with the 
 purposes of this Act if such effort is requested or approved by 
 the United States Agency for Global Media.
 ``
            (c) Grant Agreement.--
 ``

    (1) In general.--Any grant agreement with, or grants made 
 to, the Global News Service under this section shall be subject 
 to the limitations and restrictions set forth in paragraphs

    (2) through

    (7) .
 ``

    (2) Headquarters.--The headquarters of the Global News 
 Service and its senior administrative and managerial staff 
 shall be in a location that ensures economy, operational 
 effectiveness, and accountability to the United States Agency 
 for Global Media.
 ``

    (3) Use of funds.--Grant funds may only be used for 
 activities that are consistent with this section. Failure to 
 comply with such requirement shall constitute a breach of 
 contract and termination of the grant without further fiscal 
 obligation by the United States.
 ``

    (4) Assumption of obligations by grantee.--Any contract 
 entered into by the Global News Service shall specify that all 
 obligations are assumed by the grantee and not by the United 
 States Government.
 ``

    (5) Lease agreements.--Any lease agreements entered into 
 by the Global News Service shall be, to the maximum extent 
 possible, assignable to the United States Government.
 ``

    (6) Administrative costs.--Administrative and managerial 
 costs for operation of the Global News Service should be kept 
 to a minimum and, to the maximum extent feasible, should not 
 exceed the costs that would have been incurred if the Global 
 News Service had been operated as a Federal entity.
 ``

    (7) Limitation.--Grant funds may not be used for any 
 activity the purpose of which is influencing the passage or 
 defeat of legislation considered by Congress.
 ``
            (d) Relationship to the United States Agency for Global Media.--
 ``

    (1) In general.--The Global News Service shall be subject 
 to the same oversight and governance by the United States 
 Agency for Global Media as other grantees in accordance with 
 

section 305.
 ``

    (2) Assistance.--The United States Agency for Global 
 Media, its broadcast entities, and the Global News Service 
 should render assistance to each other to the extent necessary 
 to carry out the purposes of this section or any other 
 provision of this Act.
 ``

    (3) Not a federal agency or instrumentality.--Nothing in 
 this section may be construed to designate the Global News 
 Service as an agency or instrumentality of the Federal 
 Government.
 ``

    (e) Audit Authorities.--
 ``

    (1) In general.--Financial transactions of the Global 
 News Service relating to functions carried out under this 
 section may be audited by the Government Accountability Office 
 in accordance with such principles and procedures, and under 
 such rules and regulations, as may be prescribed by the 
 Comptroller General of the United States. Any such audit shall 
 be conducted at the place or places at which accounts of the 
 Global News Service are normally retained.
 ``

    (2) Access by the government accountability office.--The 
 Government Accountability Office shall have access to all 
 books, accounts, records, reports, files, papers, and property 
 belonging to or in use by the Global News Service pertaining to 
 financial transactions as may be necessary to facilitate an 
 audit. The Government Accountability Office shall be afforded 
 full facilities for verifying transactions with any assets held 
 by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians. All such books, 
 accounts, records, reports, files, papers, and property of the 
 Global News Service shall remain in the possession and custody 
 of the Global News Service.
 ``

    (3) Exercise of authorities.--Notwithstanding any other 
 provision of law, the Inspector General of the Department of 
 State and the Foreign Service is authorized to exercise the 
 authorities set forth in chapter 4 of part I of title 5, United 
 States Code (formerly known as the `Inspector General Act of 
 1978') with respect to the Global News Service.''.

    (b) Conforming Amendments.--The United States International 
Broadcasting Act of 1994 (title III of Public Law 103-236; 22 U.S.C. 
6201 et seq.) is amended--

    (1) in 

section 304
            (d) (22 U.S.C. 6203
            (d) ), by inserting 
 ``the Global News Service,'' before ``the Middle East 
 Broadcasting Networks'';

    (2) in 

section 305 (22 U.S.C. 6204)--
        (A) by moving subsection
            (c) so that it appears 
 immediately after subsection

    (b) ; and
        (B) in subsection
            (c) , by inserting ``the Global 
 News Service,'' before ``or the Middle East 
 Broadcasting Networks''; and

    (3) in 

section 310
            (d) (22 U.S.C. 6209
            (d) ), by inserting 
 ``the Global News Service,'' before ``and the Middle East 
 Broadcasting Networks''.

SEC. 8. INCREASING COORDINATION AND RESOURCES FOR CENSORSHIP 
 CIRCUMVENTION, SECURE SHARING, AND CONTENT CREATION 
 INITIATIVES.

    (a) Establishment of Interagency Task Force.--The President shall 
establish an interagency task force composed of representatives from 
the Department, National Security Council staff, and representatives 
from other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, as 
designated by the President.

    (b) Task Force Coordinator.--

    (1) Establishment.--The President shall appoint a 
 coordinator for the interagency task force established pursuant 
 to subsection

    (a) .

    (2) Duties.--The Coordinator shall--
        (A) convene and coordinate the work of the 
 interagency task force established pursuant to 
 subsection

    (a) ;
        (B) oversee the development and execution of the 
 strategy described in 

section 6; and
            (C) oversee the efforts of the Department described 
 in subsection
            (d) , in consultation, as appropriate, 
 with relevant Department officials, including officials 
 reporting to--
            (i) the Under Secretary of State for Public 
 Diplomacy and Public Affairs;
            (ii) the Assistant Secretary of State for 
 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor;
            (iii) the Ambassador at Large for 
 Cyberspace and Digital Policy; and
            (iv) the Assistant Secretary of State for 
 East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
            (c) Functions.--The interagency task force shall--

    (1) develop and execute the strategy described in 

section 6

    (a) ; and

    (2) increase the coordination, within the Department and 
 between relevant Federal departments and agencies, as 
 appropriate, of Mandarin Chinese-language content development 
 and dissemination, internet circumvention, and secure content-
 sharing tools specific to the PRC's censorship regime.
            (d) Department of State.--

    (1) In general.--The Department, in consultation with 
 relevant members of the interagency task force, shall oversee 
 the development of compelling, timely, and relevant Mandarin 
 Chinese-language content for a variety of audiences within the 
 PRC and the dissemination of such content through a variety of 
 tools and platforms within and outside the PRC.

    (2) Internet circumvention and secure content sharing.--The 
 Department, in coordination with relevant entities, other 
 Federal departments and agencies, and external experts, as 
 appropriate, shall seek to increase funding for programs and 
 open source software that expand upon and develop new tools for 
 internet circumvention and secure content sharing that are 
 specifically tailored to evade the PRC censorship apparatus, 
 including within the PRC, and improve immediate access to 
 independent information for the end users of such tools.

    (3) Media freedom, investigative journalism, and content 
 development.--The Department shall seek to increase funding for 
 media freedom, investigative journalism, and content 
 development initiatives, including by establishing and 
 expanding a network of individual and independent journalists 
 or media companies and social media influencers that 
 investigate and produce articles, reports, and other content 
 related to real-time social, political, and economic events in 
 the PRC--
        (A) in which citizens of the PRC are directly 
 interested; and
        (B) which can be accessed and amplified through a 
 variety of tools and platforms within and outside the 
 PRC digital ecosystem.

    (4) Increasing mandarin chinese-language content within the 
 great firewall and for citizens of the prc living abroad.--The 
 Department shall seek to increase the volume of--
        (A) effective and high-quality Mandarin Chinese-
 language content for dissemination through Mission 
 China's social media and other content sharing 
 platforms;
        (B) material that can be disseminated to citizens 
 of the PRC residing outside of the PRC and the PRC 
 censorship apparatus; and
            (C) content that focuses on quality of life issues 
 in the United States that are directly relatable to 
 issues in the PRC, including issues related to food 
 safety, environmental sustainability, health care 
 delivery, economic security and the jobs market, the 
 investment climate, treatment of women, the treatment 
 of marginalized populations, and government 
 transparency.

    (5) Content development and surveying.--The Department 
 shall--
        (A) increase and refine Mandarin Chinese-language 
 content directed towards citizens of the PRC residing 
 within or outside the PRC; and
        (B) work with external organizations, as 
 appropriate, to regularly conduct credible, periodic 
 surveys to gauge and assess issues of domestic and 
 international importance to citizens of the PRC to 
 inform the work of the interagency task force 
 established pursuant to subsection

    (a) and the ongoing 
 iteration by the Department of effective, high-quality 
 Mandarin Chinese-language content.

    (e) United States Agency for Global Media.--

    (1) In general.--The USAGM and relevant Federal and non-
 Federal entities shall--
        (A) carry out the actions described in paragraphs

    (2) through

    (5) ; and
        (B) work with independent content creators, citizen 
 journalists, and media organizations, as appropriate, 
 to curate, disseminate, and amplify the highest-impact 
 Mandarin Chinese-language content across USAGM entities 
 to citizens of the PRC.

    (2) Radio free asia.--
        (A) In general.--Radio Free Asia, consistent with 
 its congressional mandate, shall--
            (i) deliver independent, uncensored, PRC-
 specific news and information in local 
 languages to audiences in the PRC and in other 
 countries; and
            (ii) increase coverage and digital Mandarin 
 Chinese-language programming on political, 
 economic, and social issues in the PRC, 
 including by--
            (I) expanding RFA's Mandarin 
 Chinese-language platforms;
            (II) prioritizing instances of PRC 
 disinformation about PRC-internal 
 topics directed towards Chinese 
 citizens through its bilingual Asia 
 Fact Check Lab; and
            (III) providing insights to the 
 interagency task force established 
 pursuant to subsection

    (a) regarding--

    (aa) content development 
 strategies;

    (bb) priority topic areas 
 salient to citizens of the PRC; 
 and
            (cc) data about access to 
 and engagement with Mandarin 
 Chinese-language RFA content 
 among citizens of the PRC.
        (B) Topics.--Topic areas at RFA's editorial 
 discretion referred to in subparagraph
        (A)
            (ii) 
            (III) (bb) should include--
            (i) quality of life in the PRC; and
            (ii) human rights, the rule of law, and 
 good governance issues in the PRC that are 
 relevant and important to broad segments of the 
 population of the PRC.

    (3) Voice of america.--Voice of America shall, to the 
 extent appropriate--
        (A) increase content of interest to citizens of the 
 PRC; and
        (B) provide insights to the interagency task force 
 established pursuant to subsection

    (a) regarding--
            (i) content development strategies;
            (ii) priority topic areas salient to 
 citizens of the PRC; and
            (iii) data about access to and engagement 
 with Mandarin Chinese-language VOA content 
 among citizens of the PRC.

    (4) Open technology fund.--The Open Technology Fund shall--
        (A) support the development and adoption of open 
 source circumvention and secure communications tools 
 that are tailored for use in the PRC;
        (B) increase engagement with private sector 
 technology companies, universities, and other relevant 
 stakeholders to develop the next generation of internet 
 circumvention and secure content sharing tools that--
            (i) are specifically tailored to the PRC's 
 censorship regime; and
            (ii) can rapidly increase access to and 
 secure sharing of independent information;
            (C) issue regular public solicitations for students 
 and other civil society groups in the United States and 
 in like-minded countries specializing in the 
 cybersecurity and technology fields to research and 
 develop the next generation of internet circumvention 
 and secure content sharing tools that directly target 
 the PRC censorship regime; and
            (D) regularly consult with the interagency task 
 force established pursuant to subsection

    (a) regarding 
 matters related to the development and adoption of 
 circumvention and secure content sharing tools among 
 citizens of the PRC, and inform about research and 
 other technical needs related to circumvention of the 
 PRC censorship regime and secure content sharing.

    (5) Global news service.--The Global News Service shall--
        (A) seek to curate, translate, distribute, and make 
 available content about or related to the People's 
 Republic of China and the People's Republic of China's 
 malign activities globally, in coordination with Voice 
 of America's and Radio Free Asia's Mandarin Chinese 
 language news service;
        (B) offer such content in Mandarin Chinese and 
 English for the purpose of making fact-based, 
 uncensored China-related news available to news 
 organizations, independent journalists, and online 
 content creators around the world;
            (C) prioritize making available such content to 
 media outlets in the countries that are influenced by 
 CCP state media; and
            (D) target the Chinese diaspora abroad, through its 
 Mandarin Chinese language news service.

    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--

    (1) Department of state.--There is authorized to be 
 appropriated to the Department, for each of the fiscal years 
 2025 through 2029, $25,000,000, which--
        (A) shall be expended for ongoing and new programs 
 in furtherance of the strategy required under 

section 6

    (a) and the functions and objectives set forth in 
 subsections
            (c) and
            (d) ; and
        (B) may be expended to contract with an external 
 organization with expertise in surveying populations in 
 the PRC and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

    (2) United states agency for global media.--There is 
 authorized to be appropriated to the USAGM, for each of the 
 fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $50,000,000, which shall be 
 expended--
        (A) to carry out the functions of the Global News 
 Service, as set forth in 

section 309B of the United 
 States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, as added 
 in 

section 7

    (a) ; and
        (B) for ongoing and new programs in pursuing the 
 objectives set forth in subsection

    (e) .

SEC. 9. ADDRESSING THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE INFORMATION 
 SPACE.

    (a) Diplomatic Engagement.--In pursuing diplomatic engagement with 
the PRC, the Secretary of State should prioritize addressing the lack 
of reciprocity in access to the PRC internet and broader information 
space for United States Government, private sector, and nongovernmental 
stakeholders, particularly journalists, diplomats, researchers, 
academics, internet technology, and social media companies and 
nongovernmental organizations within the PRC.

    (b) Available Tools.--The President, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, should consider all tools available to address the 
lack of reciprocity in access to the PRC internet and broader 
information space for United States Government, private sector, and 
nongovernmental stakeholders.
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