119-s2684

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2684 Reported in Senate

    (RS) ]

<DOC>

 Calendar No. 242
119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. 2684

 To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the 
 People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into 
 breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, 
development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for 
 other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

 September 2, 2025

Mr. Merkley (for himself, Mr. Curtis, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Ricketts, and Mr. 
 Bennet) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
 referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

 October 30, 2025

 Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
 in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the 
 People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into 
 breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, 
development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for 
 other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan 
Partnership in the Americas Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED> Congress finds the following:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) Taiwan is a democratic partner of the United 
 States, and countries that maintain ties with Taiwan often 
 share our Nation's commitment to transparency, good governance, 
 and human rights.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) The People's Republic of China has pressured 
 Taiwan's remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin America and the 
 Caribbean to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan by 
 leveraging opaque development deals and backroom 
 pressure.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) The United States has an interest in ensuring 
 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean can make sovereign 
 foreign policy decisions free from coercion or financial 
 manipulation by the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) to support countries in Latin America and the 
 Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with 
 Taiwan;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) to counter efforts by the People's Republic of 
 China to coerce or pressure governments in the region into 
 breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its 
 development and economic engagement in the Western 
 Hemisphere.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 4. MONITORING THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S 
 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

    (a) Infrastructure Influence Risk Mechanism.--The 
Secretary of State shall establish a mechanism to track and respond to 
infrastructure and development projects by the People's Republic of 
China in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>

    (b) Functions.--The mechanism required under subsection

    (a) shall--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) identify projects referred to in such 
 subsection that carry strategic risks or involve non-
 transparent financing;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) coordinate appropriate United States 
 diplomatic or technical responses to such projects; 
 and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) share relevant information with Congress and 
 with United States allies.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

    (a) Semiannual Status Report.--The Secretary of State 
shall submit semiannual status reports to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives regarding governments in Latin America that 
have taken steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>

    (b) Diplomatic Engagement Plan.--If the Secretary of State 
determines that a government in a country referred to in subsection

    (a) is taking steps to terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the 
Secretary, not later than 30 days after such determination, shall 
submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
includes a detailed plan to support the maintenance of official 
diplomatic relations between such government and Taiwan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>
            (c) Annual Report.--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
 the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a 
 report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
 Representatives that includes--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) an assessment of the goals, 
 investments, and interests of the People's Republic of 
 China in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 diplomatic relations with Taiwan;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) an overview of the pressure tactics 
 and influence campaigns carried out by the People' s 
 Republic of China in countries in Latin America and the 
 Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with 
 Taiwan; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) the actions taken by the Department of 
 State during the most recent 12-month period to 
 implement this Act by--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (i) supporting Taiwan's diplomatic 
 partners in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
 and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (ii) countering the efforts of the 
 People's Republic of China to isolate Taiwan 
 from its Latin American and Caribbean 
 allies.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph

    (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
 classified annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 6. TAIWAN-AMERICAS STRATEGIC COORDINATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED> The Secretary of State should take steps to expand United 
States coordination with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
with respect to Taiwan by--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) coordinating joint programming and technical 
 cooperation with United States allies;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) aligning public diplomacy efforts; 
 and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) encouraging collaboration between United 
 States embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in Latin 
 America and the Caribbean.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``United States - Taiwan Partnership 
in the Americas Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) Taiwan is a democratic partner of the United States, 
 and countries that maintain ties with Taiwan often share our 
 Nation's commitment to transparency, good governance, and human 
 rights.

    (2) The People's Republic of China has pressured Taiwan's 
 remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin America and the 
 Caribbean to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan by 
 leveraging opaque development deals and backroom pressure.

    (3) The United States has an interest in ensuring countries 
 in Latin America and the Caribbean can make sovereign foreign 
 policy decisions free from coercion or financial manipulation 
 by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

 It is the policy of the United States--

    (1) to support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;

    (2) to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to 
 coerce or pressure governments in the region into breaking 
 diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and

    (3) to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its development 
 and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 4. MONITORING THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
 CHINA.

    (a) Infrastructure Influence Risk Mechanism.--The Secretary of 
State shall establish a mechanism to track and respond to 
infrastructure and development projects by the People's Republic of 
China in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

    (b) Functions.--The mechanism required under subsection

    (a) shall--

    (1) identify projects referred to in such subsection that 
 carry strategic risks or involve non-transparent financing;

    (2) coordinate appropriate United States diplomatic or 
 technical responses to such projects; and

    (3) share relevant information with Congress and with 
 United States allies.

SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Semiannual Status Report.--The Secretary of State shall submit 
semiannual status reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives regarding governments in Latin America that have taken 
steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

    (b) Diplomatic Engagement Plan.--If the Secretary of State 
determines that a government in a country referred to in subsection

    (a) is taking steps to terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the 
Secretary, not later than 30 days after such determination, shall 
submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
includes a detailed plan to support the maintenance of official 
diplomatic relations between such government and Taiwan.
            (c) Annual Report.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
 following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report 
 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
 that includes--
        (A) an assessment of the goals, investments, and 
 interests of the People's Republic of China in Latin 
 America and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic 
 relations with Taiwan;
        (B) an overview of the pressure tactics and 
 influence campaigns carried out by the People' s 
 Republic of China in countries in Latin America and the 
 Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations with 
 Taiwan; and
            (C) the actions taken by the Department of State 
 during the most recent 12-month period to implement 
 this Act by--
            (i) supporting Taiwan's diplomatic partners 
 in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
            (ii) countering the efforts of the People's 
 Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its 
 Latin American and Caribbean allies.

    (2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph

    (1) shall 
 be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
 annex.

SEC. 6. TAIWAN-AMERICAS STRATEGIC COORDINATION.

 The Secretary of State should take steps to expand United States 
coordination with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with 
respect to Taiwan by--

    (1) coordinating joint programming and technical 
 cooperation with United States allies;

    (2) aligning public diplomacy efforts; and

    (3) encouraging collaboration between United States 
 embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in Latin America 
 and the Caribbean.

SEC. 7. BRIEFING ON EFFORTS TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S RESPONSE TO MALIGN 
 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the 
appropriate congressional committees by--

    (1) describing existing United States efforts supporting 
 the Taiwan government's efforts in countering the malign 
 influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic 
 of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and

    (2) providing recommendations, developed in coordination 
 with the heads of relevant Federal agencies and international 
 partners, for identifying, and providing targeted assistance to 
 address, remaining vulnerabilities in the Taiwan government's 
 efforts to counter such malign influence operations.

    (b) Briefing Elements.--The briefing required under subsection

    (a)

    (1) shall include the response of the United States to the People's 
Republic of China malign influence campaigns and cyber-intrusions 
targeting Taiwan, including--

    (1) United States assistance in building the capacity of 
 Taiwanese officials, media entities, and private-sector 
 entities to document and expose propaganda and malign foreign 
 influence supported by the Government of the People's Republic 
 of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

    (2) United States assistance to the Taiwan government's 
 efforts to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to 
 malign influence operations, including election interference;

    (3) exchanges and other technical assistance through which 
 the United States has collaborated with Taiwan to strengthen 
 Taiwan's legal system's ability to respond to malign influence 
 operations; and

    (4) the extent to which like-minded governments have 
 collaborated with the Taiwan government on ways to address 
 malign influence operations supported by the Government of the 
 People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party.
            (c) === Definitions. ===
-In this section:

    (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
 ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs of the House of Representatives.

    (2) Malign influence operations.--The term ``malign 
 influence operations'' means the coordinated and often 
 concealed application of media manipulation, economic coercion, 
 cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship 
 that is intended--
        (A)
            (i) to corrupt businesses and political and 
 nongovernmental institutions;
            (ii) to interfere in democratic elections; and
            (iii) to encourage self-censorship of views at odds 
 with those of the Government of the People's Republic 
 of China or the Chinese Communist Party;
        (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or 
 outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the 
 interests of the Government of the People's Republic of 
 China or the Chinese Communist Party; or
            (C) to undermine the administrative activities or 
 daily operations of the Taiwan government.

SEC. 8. BRIEFING ON DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.

 Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant 
Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives by providing--

    (1) an assessment of the military posture of Taiwan and the 
 United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of 
 military conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait; 
 and

    (2) an analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States 
 policies sufficiently deter the People's Republic of China's 
 efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
 peaceful means, taking into account the changing military 
 balance in the Taiwan Strait.
 Calendar No. 242

119th CONGRESS

 1st Session

 S. 2684

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain 
 official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the 
 People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into 
 breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, 
development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for 
 other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 October 30, 2025

 Reported with an amendment