119-s2142

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2142 Introduced in Senate

    (IS) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. 2142

 To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and 
 for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

 June 23, 2025

 Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mr. Cramer) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed 
 Services

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and 
 for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Ground and Orbital Launched Defeat 
of Emergent Nuclear Destruction and Other Missile Engagements Act of 
2025'' or the ``GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF THE SENATE.

    (a) 

=== Findings ===
-

    (1) Missile defense review.--Congress finds that the 2022 
 Missile Defense Review found the following:
        (A) Since the release of the 2019 Missile Defense 
 Review, missile-related threats have rapidly expanded 
 in quantity, diversity, and sophistication.
        (B) United States national security interests are 
 increasingly at risk from wide-ranging missile arsenals 
 that include offensive ballistic, cruise, and 
 hypersonic weapons.
            (C) In support of the homeland missile defense 
 mission, continued modernization and expansion of all 
 current deployed systems with capabilities guarding 
 against the homeland threat, including the Ground-based 
 Midcourse Defense

    (GMD) system, will remain essential 
 to our comprehensive missile defeat approach. In 
 addition, the United States will also continue to 
 improve defensive capabilities to address the threat of 
 evolving hypersonic missile, cruise missile, and 
 unmanned system strikes by any adversary against the 
 homeland.
            (D) The continued evolution and progress of 
 missiles and unmanned systems as a principal means by 
 which adversaries seek to project conventional or 
 nuclear military power makes missile and unmanned 
 system defense a core deterrence-by-denial component of 
 an integrated deterrence strategy.
        (E) Missile and unmanned system defense 
 capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary 
 confidence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into 
 strike planning and execution, reducing the incentive 
 to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the 
 probability of attack success, and raising the 
 threshold of conflict.
        (F) Should deterrence fail, missile defense 
 capabilities sufficient to negate long-range missile 
 threats of any type are among the most critical 
 national security capabilities for the United States.

    (2) Congressional commission on the strategic posture of 
 the united states.--Congress finds that, in its October 2023 
 report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 
 of the United States recommended the following:
        (A) The United States should develop and field 
 homeland integrated air and missile defense

    (IAMD) that 
 can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and 
 China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay 
 ahead of the North Korean and Iranian threat.
        (B) The Secretary of Defense should direct 
 research, development, test and evaluation into 
 advanced integrated air and missile defense 
 capabilities leveraging all domains, including land, 
 sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on 
 sensor architectures, integrated command and control, 
 interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses, 
 unmanned systems, and area or point defenses. The 
 Department of Defense should urgently pursue deployment 
 of any capabilities that prove feasible.

    (3) Commission on the national defense strategy.--Congress 
 finds the following:
        (A) In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the 
 National Defense Strategy found the following:
            (i) There is an increasing threat from 
 expanding ability of China, Russia, and North 
 Korea to deliver nuclear weapons against the 
 United States, including the territories of the 
 United States.
            (ii) The military planners of the 
 Department of Defense and United States 
 Northern Command need to prepare for a worst-
 case scenario in which nuclear and other 
 strikes are launched against the United States, 
 which could be done in large numbers with 
 specialized delivery systems.
        (B) In the report described in subparagraph
        (A) , 
 the Commission shared the same threat assessment about 
 missile attacks as the Commission on the Strategic 
 Posture of the United States and agreed with the 
 recommendation that the United States should enhance 
 missile defense for the homeland.

    (4) === Policy ===
-Congress finds that it is the policy of the 
 Federal Government that--
        (A) the Federal Government will provide for the 
 common defense of the citizens of the United States and 
 the United States by deploying and maintaining a next-
 generation missile defense shield;
        (B) the Federal Government will deter and defend 
 the citizens and critical infrastructure of the United 
 States against any foreign attack on the United States 
 homeland; and
            (C) the Federal Government will guarantee the 
 secure second-strike capability of the Federal 
 Government.

    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--

    (1) as the advanced long-range missile and unmanned system 
 threat continues to evolve, the threat of attack by ballistic, 
 cruise missile, hypersonic missile, and unmanned system remains 
 a significant threat to the United States with potentially 
 catastrophic consequences;

    (2) China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its 
 conventional forces to include ballistic missile systems posing 
 an increasing threat to citizens, forces, and allies of the 
 United States;

    (3) over the past 40 years, the sophistication and quantity 
 of threats, including ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and 
 unmanned systems has become substantial;

    (4) contending only with rogue nation threats and 
 accidental or unauthorized missile launches is no longer 
 sufficient in the current and reasonably foreseeable future 
 threat environment;

    (5) by empowering the United States with a second-strike 
 capability, the Golden Dome will deter adversaries from attacks 
 on the homeland;

    (6) to improve capabilities to defend adequately against 
 increasing numbers and sophistication of threats to the 
 homeland, rapid development and deployment of space-based 
 sensors and interceptors which take advantage of lower cost and 
 technical commercial advances in recent years must be among the 
 Defense Department's highest priorities;

    (7) there is a need to fully integrate undersea, ground, 
 air, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and command nodes 
 through a secure and redundant communications architecture;

    (8) there is a need to clearly delineate and appropriately 
 empower the leaders and agencies responsible for development, 
 integration, and execution of the Golden Dome;

    (9) the United States must make achieving total domain 
 awareness, from the seafloor to Outer Space to cyberspace, to 
 provide early warning and defeat of missile threats from both 
 the northern and southern hemispheres across all warfighting 
 domains a top priority;

    (10) a central component of Golden Dome will be the network 
 and command and control systems;

    (11) substantial command and control and fire control 
 capabilities exist now, but require investment to support any 
 Golden Dome reference architecture;

    (12) a flexible, open-architecture approach for the Golden 
 Dome will support spiral development;

    (13) Golden Dome prioritizes the defense of United States 
 citizens in the homeland against all air and missile threats 
 from all countries and requires prioritization of critical 
 assets to inform the Commander of United States Northern 
 Command and the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific 
 Command; and

    (14) significant additional missile defense modeling and 
 simulation tools that measure friendly and adversary effects, 
 such as kinetic, non-kinetic, directed energy, are required.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

 In this Act:

    (1) Commercial solution.--
        (A) In general.--The term ``commercial solution'' 
 means a product, other than real property, that--
            (i) is of a type customarily used by the 
 general public or by nongovernmental entities 
 for purposes other than governmental purposes; 
 and
            (ii) 
            (I) has been sold, leased, or licensed 
 to the general public; or
            (II) has been offered for sale, lease, or 
 license to the general public.
        (B) Inclusion of commercial products, components, 
 and services.--The term ``commercial solution'' 
 includes commercial products, components, and services 
 in alignment with the Federal Government's preference 
 for the acquisition of commercial products and 
 commercial services, as set forth in sections 1906, 
 1907, and 3307 of title 41, United States Code, and 
 sections 3451 through 3453 of title 10, United States 
 Code, which establish acquisition policies more closely 
 resembling those of the commercial marketplace and 
 encourage the acquisition of commercial products and 
 commercial services.

    (2) Congressional defense committees.--The term 
 ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given such 
 term in 

section 101

    (a) of title 10, United States Code.

    (3) Golden dome.--The term ``Golden Dome'' shall means the 
 holistic missile defense architecture described in this Act.

    (4) Missile.--The term ``missile'' means a ballistic, 
 hypersonic, cruise, hypersonic cruise, or loitering munition.

    (5) Program manager.--The term ``Program Manager'' means 
 the Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager appointed under 
 

section 4

    (a)

    (4)
        (A) .

    (6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
 of Defense.

    (7) Unmanned system.--The term ``unmanned system'' means a 
 remote-operated or autonomous unmanned system of any size 
 maneuvering in land, sea, air, or space that is capable of 
 single attacks, swarm attacks, or sensor and data collection 
 and reconnaissance.

SEC. 4. IMPROVING UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

    (a) Development of a Holistic Missile Defense Strategy; Golden Dome 
Administration.--

    (1) Development of a holistic missile defense strategy.--
 Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
 Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a holistic missile 
 defense strategy informed by discussions with and suggestions 
 from such other government agencies as the Secretary deems 
 necessary to determine which critical infrastructure must be 
 defended, against which adversaries, and from which specific 
 capabilities, including from both missiles and unmanned 
 systems.

    (2) All-domain awareness.--The strategy developed pursuant 
 to paragraph

    (1) shall include plans for a system of layered 
 sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide 
 persistent all-domain awareness.

    (3) Integrated, redundant command and control.--The 
 strategy developed pursuant to paragraph

    (1) shall include 
 plans for integrated, secure, open, and redundant command and 
 control software and technology architecture for the nationwide 
 missile defense system and shall designate a clear human chain 
 of command for control of such systems and responses.

    (4) Leadership.--
        (A) Establishment of a golden dome direct report 
 program manager.--There is established a Golden Dome 
 Direct Report Program Manager, who shall be appointed 
 by the Secretary from among the general officers of the 
 Army, Air Force, Space Force, or flag officers of the 
 Navy and Marine Corps.
        (B) Grade.--The individual serving as the Program 
 Manager, while so serving, shall have the grade of 
 general without vacating the permanent grade of the 
 officer and will be placed directly under the Chairman 
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of 
 Defense order of precedence.
            (C) Responsibilities.--The Program Manager shall be 
 responsible for the acquisition, contracting, 
 development, testing, and initial operations and 
 sustainment of Golden Dome.
            (D) Reporting and authority.--Subject to the 
 authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the 
 Program Manager shall--
            (i) report directly to the Deputy Secretary 
 of Defense;
            (ii) have the acquisition authorities 
 equivalent to Defense Acquisition Executives, 
 including milestone decision authority, 
 contracting authority, direct hiring authority, 
 direct liaison authority with congressional 
 oversight committees, original classification 
 authority, expedited military construction 
 authority, and technical authority for missile 
 defense of the homeland;
            (iii) have full authority to budget for 
 Golden Dome and perform oversight of funds 
 identified to be in support of Golden Dome 
 across all categories of budget authority, 
 regardless of reprogramming thresholds; and
            (iv) establish Golden Dome program elements 
 and programs consistent with the format used by 
 the President for submittal of the budget of 
 the President pursuant to 

section 1105

    (a) of 
 title 31, United States Code, to facilitate 
 oversight by Congress.
        (E) Exception from certain manual and directive.--
 Programs or projects carried out under the authority of 
 this section shall not be subject to the Joint 
 Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual 
 and Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, or 
 successor manuals and directives. The Program Manager 
 shall use all lawful acquisition and procurement 
 methods necessary outside of this process to carry out 
 the accelerated implementation and execution of Golden 
 Dome.
        (F) Protection from intervention.--Unless otherwise 
 directed by the President, the Secretary, or statute, 
 no officer other than the Secretary of Defense may 
 intervene to exercise, authority, direction, 
 interference, including unreasonable delays in 
 answering requests for information or other requests 
 relating to the implementation or execution of Golden 
 Dome or its subsystems, or control over the Program 
 Manager in the discharge of responsibilities specified 
 in subparagraph
            (C) and authority specified in 
 subparagraph
            (D) .
        (G) Authority to work with other federal 
 agencies.--
            (i) In general.--The Program Manager may 
 work with other Federal agencies, including the 
 Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 
 Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation 
 Administration, and the various elements of the 
 intelligence community, to expedite research, 
 testing, and execution of any Golden Dome-
 related systems.
            (ii) Priority for decision requests.--In 
 any case in which a Federal agency receives a 
 decision request under clause
            (i) relating to 
 the planning and implementation of Golden Dome, 
 the head of the Federal agency shall prioritize 
 the decision request.

    (5) Leveraging distributed, advanced, additive 
 manufacturing.--The Secretary shall develop and implement a 
 plan for leveraging distributed, advanced, or additive 
 manufacturing to rapidly develop technologies and munitions 
 critical for the strategy required by paragraph

    (1) .

    (6) Leveraging commercial solutions.--To the maximum extent 
 practicable, the architectures developed by the Department of 
 Defense as part of Golden Dome shall use commercial solutions, 
 including subcontracting by prime contractors at all tiers to 
 incorporate commercial items or nondevelopmental items as 
 components of items, supplied to the Department of Defense for 
 rapid deployment.

    (7) Testing requirements.--
        (A) In general.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
 Program Manager shall ensure that a robust testing 
 regime is established for all kinetic and nonkinetic 
 interceptors or similar systems throughout the system's 
 lifecycle. To the maximum extent practicable, testing 
 shall include execution of end-to-end missile defense 
 detection, tracking, and destruction techniques that 
 exercise multiple components of the Golden Dome system.
        (B) Testing schedule.--
            (i) In general.--In carrying out 
 subparagraph
        (A) , the Secretary and the Program 
 Manager shall ensure that, not later than 540 
 days after the date of the enactment of this 
 Act, a demanding testing cadence begins, 
 commencing with a virtual exercise commencing 
 on or before the date that is 540 days after 
 the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (ii) Test plans.--Not later than 90 days 
 before carrying out a test under this 
 paragraph, the Secretary and the Program 
 Manager shall present to the congressional 
 defense committees a detailed plan for the 
 test.
            (iii) Briefings.--In any case in which the 
 Program Manager fails to conduct a test under 
 this paragraph in accordance with a timeline 
 specified in this paragraph, the Program 
 Manager shall provide the applicable 
 subcommittees of the congressional defense 
 committees an in-person briefing in each month 
 for with the test is delayed.
            (C) Live-fire exercise requirement.--At a minimum, 
 kinetic and nonkinetic systems deemed to be mission 
 essential by the Secretary to the capabilities of 
 Golden Dome shall be tested on a semiannual basis in a 
 live-fire exercise, starting after the virtual test 
 described in clause
            (i) .
            (D) Participants.--
            (i) Required participation.--Each exercise 
 under this paragraph shall include the 
 following participants:
            (I) The Program Manager.
            (II) A representative from the 
 Office of the Secretary of Defense.
            (III) A representative from each of 
 the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and 
 Space Force.
            (IV) A representative from the 
 National Security Agency.
            (V) Representative from North 
 American Aerospace Defense Command

    (NORAD) or United States Northern 
 Command

    (USNORTHCOM) .
            (VI) A representative from Indo-
 Pacific Command.
            (ii) Invited for participation.--For each 
 exercise under this paragraph, the Program 
 Manager shall invite the participation of the 
 following:
            (I) A representative from the Coast 
 Guard.
            (II) A representative from the 
 Federal Aviation Administration.
            (III) A representative from the 
 congressional defense committees.
        (E) Waivers.--
            (i) In general.--Pursuant to a request 
 submitted to the Secretary under clause
            (ii) , 
 the Secretary may waive the requirement in 
 subparagraph
        (B) for an individual system.
            (ii) Requests.--The Program Manager may 
 submit to the Secretary a request for a waiver 
 of the requirement in subparagraph
        (B) for an 
 individual system.
            (iii) Congressional notification.--Not 
 later than 14 days after granting a waiver 
 under clause
            (i) , the Secretary shall provide 
 the congressional defense committees an in-
 person briefing of the waiver with a detailed 
 explanation of the reasons for the decision of 
 the Secretary to grant the waiver.
        (F) Annual reports.--Not later than 90 days after 
 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less 
 frequently than once each year thereafter, the 
 Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of such 
 government agencies as the Secretary considers 
 relevant, submit to the congressional defense 
 committees a report detailing key regulations 
 preventing rapid, iterative testing of systems vital to 
 Golden Dome.

    (b) Accelerating Development of Non-Kinetic Capabilities.--The 
Secretary shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to 
accelerate development of non-kinetic capabilities to negate missile or 
unmanned system threats prior to launch or after launch. Such 
capabilities may include cyber (offense and defense), supply chain 
interdiction, artificial intelligence-driven battle management, 
electromagnetic spectrum, directed energy weapons, and high-power 
microwave defense options capable of defeating large-scale missile or 
unmanned system attacks.
            (c) Accelerating Development of Information Fusion Platform Using 
Artificial Intelligence To Detect Threats.--The Secretary shall use all 
authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development and 
rapid prototyping of high technology readiness level

    (TRL) capabilities 
in order to acquire and field an information fusion, software-centric 
platform that utilizes machine learning and artificial intelligence 
technologies capable of delivering air, land, space, and maritime 
domain awareness and early warning capabilities for homeland defense 
across disparate novel and legacy systems. Such platform shall employ a 
common data layer that can support the rapid integration of new sensors 
and effectors across all tiers of the integrated air and missile 
defense system.
            (d) Acceleration of Development for Proliferated Warfighter Space 
Architecture of Space Development Agency.--

    (1) In general.--In support of Golden Dome, the Director of 
 the Space Development Agency shall use all authorities 
 available to the Director to accelerate development and rapid 
 fielding of satellites and associated systems for tranches 3, 
 4, and 5 of the proliferated warfighter space architecture of 
 the Agency.

    (2) Status of space development agency.--The Space 
 Development Agency shall remain an independent element of the 
 United States Space Force, and shall be exempt from the Joint 
 Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements 
 process.

    (e) Accelerating Space Sensor Layer for Golden Dome.--The Secretary 
of Defense shall, acting through the Program Manager and in 
coordination with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the 
Director of the Space Development Agency, use all the authorities 
available to the Secretary to accelerate the deployment of the 
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor by procuring, not later 
than December 1, 2025, at least 40 space vehicles with Hypersonic and 
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor payloads.

    (f) Requirement for Next Generation Interceptor Fielding and Silo 
Construction.--The Program Manager shall, with support from the Missile 
Defense Agency, take such actions as may be necessary to expand Next 
Generation Interceptor production and silo construction at Fort Greely, 
Alaska, to field up to 80 interceptors at Fort Greely for defense of 
the United States. Interceptor testing and initial fielding shall be 
completed not later than January 1, 2028.

    (g) Requirement for Combatant Commands To Account for Missile 
Defense Interceptors and Sensor Requirements in Their Annual 
Requests.--For each fiscal year beginning after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, each commander of a combatant command shall 
include the missile defense interceptor requirements, terrestrial-based 
sensor requirements, space-based sensor requirements, and counter-
unmanned system requirements of the combatant command of the commander 
in the supporting information for the Department of Defense submitted 
along with the budget of the President to Congress for such fiscal year 
pursuant to 

section 1105

    (a) of title 31, United States Code.

    (h) Accelerating Development of Glide Phase Interceptor.--

    (1) Use of authorities to accelerate development.--The 
 Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the 
 Secretary to accelerate development of the Glide Phase 
 Interceptor to defend against hypersonic threats to the United 
 States homeland.

    (2) Report on potential for parallel development.--Not 
 later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
 the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the 
 Secretary and the Program Manager a report on the potential for 
 parallel development of capabilities, revised program schedule, 
 and the risk associated with pursuing only one alternative for 
 the Glide Phase Interceptor.
            (i) Accelerating Production and Fielding of Ground Mobile 
Interceptors.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available 
to the Program Manager to accelerate the production and fielding of 
ground mobile interceptors and radars for forward deployment and 
homeland defense as the Secretary and President consider appropriate.

    (j) Accelerating Development of Resilient Positioning, Navigation, 
and Timing for Missile Defense Systems.--The Program Manager shall use 
all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate 
development and fielding of resilient positioning, navigation, and 
timing

    (PNT) solutions that can operate effectively in ground 
positioning system

    (GPS) -denied environments. Such solutions may 
include the following:

    (1) Quantum-enhanced inertial navigation and atomic clock 
 technologies to maintain continuous positioning, navigation, 
 and timing functionality in ground positioning system-degraded 
 or denied scenarios.

    (2) Enhanced terrestrial-based navigation systems for 
 greater assured positioning in ground positioning system-
 contested environments.

    (3) Robust data fusion techniques that integrate multiple 
 positioning, navigation, and timing sources, such as radar-
 based tracking, vision-aided navigation, and low-Earth orbit

    (LEO) signals, to sustain operational effectiveness during 
 electronic warfare

    (EW) attacks or cyber intrusions.

    (4) Commercially available, field-proven alternative 
 positioning, navigation, and timing solutions that leverage 
 advanced sensor fusion, artificial intelligence-driven error 
 correction, and resilient positioning, navigation, and timing 
 processing to provide assured navigation for mobile and fixed 
 defense platforms, including those currently deployed in 
 hypersonic tracking and integrated air and missile defense 
 applications.

    (k) Accelerating Development of Autonomous Agents To Defend Against 
Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Systems.--The Program Manager shall use 
all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate 
development of autonomous agents to cost-effectively defend the United 
States homeland and forward-deployed armed forces against raids of both 
large cruise missiles and unmanned systems as the Secretary considers 
appropriate.
            (l) Accelerating Development and Fielding of Low-Cost Scalable 
Interceptor.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available 
to the Program Manager to accelerate development, test, and fielding of 
a low-cost scalable interceptor that can augment existing production 
lines and provide resiliency to the integrated air and missile defense 
system.
            (m) Accelerating Development and Deployment of Space-Based Sensors 
and Interceptors.--

    (1) In general.--The Program Manager shall use all 
 authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate 
 development and deployment of proliferated space-based sensors 
 and interceptors capable of ballistic and hypersonic missile 
 intercept.

    (2) Requirement.--The Program Manager shall ensure that 
 development and deployment described in paragraph

    (1) will--
        (A) substantially avail itself of commercial space 
 capabilities to reduce cost and time to deploy;
        (B) ensure that space-based interceptors and 
 ground-based interceptors are fully integrated; and
            (C) provide an autonomy layer that supports time-
 critical targeting through advancements in information 
 technology and mitigates latency issues.

    (n) Report To Reduce Cost Savings Per Round for Space-Based 
Interceptors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit a feasibility study to 
the congressional defense committees outlining multiple methods for 
reducing the cost per round of various space-based interceptors 
including kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and informed by 
traditional and nontraditional defense technology companies.

    (o) Accelerating Modernization of Certain Terrestrial Domain 
Capabilities.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available 
to the Program Manager to accelerate modernization of terrestrial-based 
radar capabilities, including those located at or known as Cobra Dane, 
Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

    (BMEWS) , Upgraded Early 
Warning Radar

    (UEWR) in Greenland and Cape Cod, Homeland Defense Radar 
and Maui Space Surveillance Complex in Hawaii, and the Alaska Radar 
System.

    (p) Modernization of Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack 
Characterization System.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities 
available to the Program Manager to accelerate the modernization and 
digitization of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization 
System

    (PARCS) to improve detection of intercontinental and sea-
launched missile threats, as well as improve space domain awareness 
capabilities.

    (q) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Southern 
Hemisphere-Facing Early Warning Radar System.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall 
submit to Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed 
program execution plan for a southern hemisphere-facing early warning 
radar system capable of detecting threats from next generation complex 
missile attacks.

    (r) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Highly Flexible 
Missile Defense Sites.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to Congress a 
report detailing a plan for a highly flexible, and if necessary mobile, 
terrestrial missile defense network capable of defending critical nodes 
across the United States, including noncontiguous States and 
territories, from likely attack vectors.

    (s) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Construction of 
Alaska-Based Aegis Ashore System.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to 
Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed program 
execution plan for an Alaska-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system.

    (t) Completion and Certification of Aegis Ashore System in 
Hawaii.-- The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to 
the Program Manager to accelerate completion and certification of an 
Aegis Ashore system based in Hawaii.

    (u) Acceleration of Munitions Production for Missile Defense.--The 
Program Manager, working with the Services, shall use all authorities 
available to the Program Manager to accelerate production of critical 
munitions used for missile interception, including Standard Missile 3 
Blocks IB and IIA and PAC-2 and PAC-3 munitions, to ensure their 
availability as an additional sub-layer of the Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense system.
            (v) Expedited Military Construction Authority.--

    (1) Waiver of regulations.--Notwithstanding any other 
 provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may waive all legal 
 requirements the Secretary, in such Secretary's sole 
 discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious 
 construction, deployment, testing, and operation of Golden 
 Dome, including mission and life support. Any such decision by 
 the Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the 
 Federal Register.

    (2) Federal court review.--
        (A) In general.--The district courts of the United 
 States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all 
 causes of action or claims arising from any action 
 undertaken, or any decision made, by the Secretary 
 pursuant to paragraph

    (1) . A cause of action or claim 
 may only be brought alleging a violation of the 
 Constitution of the United States. The court shall not 
 have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in 
 this subparagraph.
        (B) Time for filing of complaint.--Any cause or 
 claim brought pursuant to subparagraph
        (A) shall be 
 filed not later than 60 days after the date of the 
 action or decision made by the Secretary. A claim shall 
 be barred unless it is filed within the time specified.
            (C) Ability to seek appellate review.--An 
 interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of 
 the district court may be reviewed only upon petition 
 for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the 
 United States.

    (w) Acceleration of Integrated Air and Missile Defense Technology 
Exchanges.--

    (1) In general.--The Secretary shall, in collaboration with 
 the Secretary of State, look for and exploit opportunities to 
 accelerate technology exchanges and transfers of integrated 
 missile defense technology, including over the horizon radar 
 with trusted allies under current defense agreements and 
 arrangements.

    (2) Utilizing partner technology.--The Secretary may 
 utilize the technology of trusted partners to fill capability 
 gaps in Golden Dome that are identified as an urgent need by 
 the Program Manager.

    (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
 be construed to require the Secretary to exchange technology 
 with a foreign country if the President or the Secretary 
 determines that doing so would present a grave national 
 security threat to the United States.
            (x) Development and Securing of Supply Chains Critical to Missile 
Defense.--

    (1) In general.--The Secretary shall, in collaboration with 
 the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 
 Secretary of the Interior, identify critical shortages and 
 vulnerabilities in supply chains critical to missile and 
 unmanned system defense component production and shall use all 
 authorities available to the Secretaries to develop and secure 
 such supply chains.

    (2) Advanced data analytics techniques and artificial-
 intelligence-driven supply chain mapping tools.--In carrying 
 out paragraph

    (1) , the Secretary may leverage advanced data 
 analytics techniques and artificial-intelligence-driven supply 
 chain mapping tools to assess supply chain vulnerabilities 
 related to missile defense and unmanned systems defense 
 systems, and other critical technologies.

    (y) Authorization for Procurement and Fielding of Dirigibles To 
Support Missile Defense.--

    (1) In general.--The Secretary of the Army may procure and 
 field such dirigibles, including airships and aerostats, in 
 support of the missile defense of the United States homeland 
 from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and unmanned 
 systems as the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to 
 the defense of the United States from long-range missile 
 threats.

    (2) Requirements.--The requirements of paragraph

    (1) cover--
        (A) high altitude air defense systems to detect, 
 characterize, track, and engage current and emerging 
 advanced missile and unmanned system threats; and
        (B) both short-term and long-term solutions that 
 leverage the innovative dirigible and associated sensor 
 development that the Armed Forces, partners of the 
 United States, such as Israel, and United States 
 industry have undertaken during the 30-year period 
 ending on the date of the enactment of this Act.

    (3) Consideration.--In carrying out paragraph

    (1) , the 
 Secretary of the Army shall consider the use of dirigibles in 
 supporting resilient military and emergency communication 
 networks in a crisis.

    (z) Requirement for Acceleration of Procurement and Fielding of Air 
Moving Target Indicator Systems.--The Program Manager shall use all the 
authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the 
procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator

    (AMTI) systems 
capable of detecting, tracking, and distinguishing airborne moving 
targets from stationary or cluttered backgrounds.

    (aa) Requirement for Accelerated Development and Expansion of 
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System.--The Program Manager shall use 
all the authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the 
development and expansion of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance 
System to detect and track undersea threats like submersibles that 
carry missiles near United States shorelines.

SEC. 5. PROTECTION OF THE SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE.

    (a) 

=== Finding ===
-Congress finds that robust competition in the space 
industrial base is essential to assuring United States space 
superiority and the ability of the United States Space Force to provide 
national security mission-critical space warfighting systems and 
operations across the joint force.

    (b) Requirement To Maximize Competition.--Chapter 382 of title 10, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
``

Sec. 4821. Preservation of space industrial base
 ``

    (a) In General.--The head of an agency shall, to the maximum 
extent practicable--
 ``

    (1) ensure that space acquisitions employ procedures that 
 maximize competition;
 ``

    (2) ensure that mission-critical national security space-
 based systems that deliver tactical data from low Earth orbit 
 within a program and across the Armed Forces shall be procured 
 from an open competition allowing for competition between 
 multiple vendors, and those vendors' products shall comply with 
 interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and 
 interoperability with Department of Defense systems; and
 ``

    (3) ensure that a contract or other agreement for a 
 mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery system 
 acquired or contracted as-a-service must require the 
 performance, cost, and speed of delivery of the capability to 
 be demonstrably competitive to any existing program currently 
 delivering that capability which it seeks to replace or 
 substitute, and use reasonable best efforts to avoid the as-a-
 service contract if the agency head believes in good faith that 
 it will result in a major contraction in the space an 
 industrial base available to support the Department of Defense.
 ``

    (b) Implementation.--The head of an agency shall, to the maximum 
extent possible, ensure that acquisition, contracting, and other 
procurement officials develop guidance--
 ``

    (1) to achieve and act in accordance with the 
 requirements of subsection

    (a) and with the intent to deliver 
 mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery systems in 
 accordance with government standards and interfaces; and
 ``

    (2) to prevent the major reduction and consolidation of 
 the space industrial base.''.

SEC. 6. PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES ASSETS FROM INCURSIONS.

 

Section 130i of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in subsection

    (a) --
        (A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting 
 ``

    (1) Notwithstanding'';
        (B) by striking ``any provision of title 18'' and 
 inserting ``sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 
 119 and 206 of title 18''; and
            (C) by adding at the end the following new 
 paragraph:
 ``

    (2) The Secretary of Defense shall delegate the authority under 
paragraph

    (1) to take actions described in subsection

    (b)

    (1) to the 
commander of a combatant command, the Secretary concerned, or such 
other official of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense 
considers appropriate.'';

    (2) in subsection

    (b)

    (1)
        (B) , by inserting before the period 
 at the end the following: ``, including through the use of 
 remote identification broadcast or other means'';

    (3) in subsection

    (e)

    (4) --
        (A) in subparagraph
        (B) , by striking ``; or'' and 
 inserting a semicolon;
        (B) by redesignating subparagraph
            (C) as 
 subparagraph
            (D) ; and
            (C) by inserting after subparagraph
        (B) the 
 following new subparagraph:
 ``
            (C) would support another Federal agency with 
 authority to mitigate the threat of unmanned aircraft 
 systems or unmanned aircraft in mitigating such 
 threats; or'';

    (4) by redesignating subsections

    (g) ,

    (h) ,
            (i) , and

    (j) as 
 subsections

    (h) ,

    (j) ,

    (k) , and
            (l) , respectively;

    (5) by inserting after subsection

    (f) the following new 
 subsection:
 ``

    (g) Exemption From Disclosure.--Information pertaining to the 
technology, procedures, and protocols used to carry out this section, 
including any regulations or guidance issued to carry out this section, 
shall be exempt from disclosure under 

section 552

    (b)

    (3) of title 5 and 
any State or local law requiring the disclosure of information.'';

    (6) by inserting after subsection

    (h) , as redesignated by 
 paragraph

    (4) , the following new subsection:
 ``
            (i) Applicability of Other Laws to Activities Related to the 
Mitigation of Threats From Unmanned Aircraft Systems or Unmanned 
Aircraft.--Sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of 
title 18, and 

section 46502 of title 49, may not be construed to apply 
to activities of the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard, whether 
under this section or any other provision of law, that--
 ``

    (1) are conducted outside the United States; and
 ``

    (2) are related to the mitigation of threats from 
 unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft.'';

    (7) in subsection

    (k) , as so redesignated--
        (A) in paragraph

    (1) --
            (i) by striking ``subsection

    (j)

    (3)
            (C) '' 
 and inserting ``subsection
            (l) (3)
            (C) ''; and
            (ii) by striking ``December 31, 2026'' and 
 inserting ``December 31, 2030''; and
        (B) in paragraph

    (2) --
            (i) by striking ``180 days'' and inserting 
 ``one year''; and
            (ii) by striking ``November 15, 2026'' and 
 inserting ``November 15, 2030''; and

    (8) in subsection
            (l) , as so redesignated--
        (A) in paragraph

    (1) --
            (i) in subparagraph
        (B) , by inserting ``the 
 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
 Affairs,'' after ``the Committee on the 
 Judiciary,''; and
            (ii) in subparagraph
            (C) , by inserting 
 ``the Committee on Homeland Security,'' after 
 ``the Committee on the Judiciary,'';
        (B) by redesignating paragraphs

    (3) through

    (6) as 
 paragraphs

    (4) through

    (7) , respectively;
            (C) by inserting after paragraph

    (2) the following 
 new paragraph

    (3) :
 ``

    (3) The term `combatant command' has the meaning given 
 that term in 

section 161 of this title.''; and
            (D) in paragraph

    (4) , as redesignated by 
 subparagraph
        (B) --
            (i) in clause
            (viii) , by striking ``; or'' 
 and inserting a semicolon;
            (ii) in clause
            (ix) , by striking the period 
 at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
            (iii) by adding at the end the following 
 new clauses:
 ``
            (x) protection of the buildings, grounds, 
 and property to which the public are not 
 permitted regular, unrestricted access and that 
 are under the jurisdiction, custody, or control 
 of the Department of Defense and the persons on 
 that property pursuant to 

section 2672 of this 
 title;
 ``
            (xi) assistance to Federal, State, or 
 local officials in responding to incidents 
 involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or 
 chemical weapons, high-yield explosives, or 
 related materials or technologies, including 
 pursuant to 

section 282 of this title or the 
 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
 Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et 
 seq);
 ``
            (xii) activities permitted by 

section 2692

    (b) of this title; or
 ``
            (xiii) emergency response that is limited 
 to a specified timeframe and location.''.

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

 There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act 
$23,023,100,000 for fiscal year 2026, of which--

    (1) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to SM-3 Block 1B;

    (2) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to SM-3 Block IIA;

    (3) $1,000,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to development, testing, and additional 
 procurement of ground mobile interceptors and radars;

    (4) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to PAC-2 and PAC-3 Munitions and MM-104 
 Patriot batteries;

    (5) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to Alaska-based Aegis Ashore station 
 construction;

    (6) $460,000,000 shall be available for Next Generation 
 Interceptor production and expansion of missile interceptor 
 fields available at Fort Greely, Alaska, to up to 80 units with 
 the Next Generation Interceptor;

    (7) $260,000,000 shall be available for construction of an 
 additional Next Generation Interceptor site in the continental 
 United States as the Secretary deems necessary;

    (8) $250,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to completion and certification of Hawaii 
 Aegis Ashore system and upgrades to the Maui Space Surveillance 
 Complex;

    (9) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to Space Development Agency satellite 
 sensors;

    (10) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to modernization of terrestrial-based domain 
 awareness radars;

    (11) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to research and development relating to non-
 kinetic missile defense capabilities across the military 
 departments;

    (12) $5,900,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to research and development and deployment of 
 space-based missile defense and sensor networks;

    (13) $3,100,000,000 shall be available for the requirements 
 of this Act relating to procurement of Hypersonic and Ballistic 
 Tracking Space Sensor space vehicles;

    (14) $63,100,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to Missile Defense Complex
            (MDC) and Fire 
 Team Readiness Facility

    (FTRF) ;

    (15) $50,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to procurement and fielding of dirigibles;

    (16) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to innovation and modernization of all domain 
 sensor capabilities, of which $76,000,000 shall be available to 
 procure and rapidly field a high technology readiness level 
 machine learning and artificial intelligence information and 
 data fusion platform;

    (17) $450,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to counter-hypersonic programs for advanced 
 glide phase interceptors;

    (18) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to research, development, and deployment of 
 positioning, navigation, and timing systems;

    (19) $90,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to procurement and fielding of the Integrated 
 Undersea Sensor System;

    (20) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of 
 this Act relating to procurement and fielding of air moving 
 target indicator systems;

    (21) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements 
 relating to integrated command and control software and 
 technology architecture;

    (22) $75,000,000 shall be available for the development and 
 fielding of a new low-cost, highly scalable ground interceptor; 
 and

    (23) $125,000,000 shall be available for the development 
 and fielding of autonomous agents to defend against cruise 
 missile threats and unmanned systems.
 <all>