119-s1883

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1883 Reported in Senate

    (RS) ]

<DOC>

 Calendar No. 99
119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. 1883

 To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
 adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
 United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

 May 22, 2025

 Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. McCormick, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. 
 Sullivan, Mr. Bennet, Mr. Mullin, and Ms. Slotkin) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations

 June 18, 2025

 Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
 in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
 adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
 United States.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International 
Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or 
``DISRUPT Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian 
 Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic 
 People's Republic of Korea are each considered--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in 
 

section 825
            (d) of the National Defense Authorization 
 Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 
 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 note));</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) a country of risk (as defined in 
 

section 6432

    (a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
 Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488; 
 42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing 
 counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to 
 National Laboratories;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) a foreign country of concern (as 
 defined in 

section 10612

    (a) of the Research and 
 Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (Public 
 Law 117-167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221 
 note));</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (D) a covered foreign country (as defined 
 in 

section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
 Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 1818; 
 10 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a 
 prohibition on operation, procurement, and contracting 
 relating to foreign-made light detection and ranging 
 technology; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (E) a covered foreign country (as defined 
 in 

section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization 
 Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81; 135 Stat. 
 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a 
 strategy and plan to implement certain defense 
 intelligence reforms.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community 
 Annual Threat Assessment, the United States faces an 
 increasingly contested and dangerous global landscape as the 
 four adversaries named in paragraph

    (1) deepen cooperation in a 
 manner that--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) reinforces threats posed by each such 
 adversary individually; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) poses new challenges to the strength 
 and power of the United States globally.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in 
 paragraph

    (3) is occurring bilaterally, as the People's 
 Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic 
 of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 strengthen diplomatic, economic, and military ties in 
 accordance with bilateral agreements, which include--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation 
 and Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic 
 People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11, 
 1961;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive 
 Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of 
 Iran and the People's Republic of China, issued on 
 March 27, 2021;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian 
 Federation and the People's Republic of China on 
 International Relations Entering a New Era and Global 
 Sustainable Development, issued on February 4, 
 2022;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic 
 Partnership between the Russian Federation and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at 
 Pyongyang June 18, 2024;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on 
 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow 
 January 17, 2025; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (F) traditional relations of friendship 
 and cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 and the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation 
 with respect to the interests of the United States occur 
 bilaterally in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples 
 include the following:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) The transfer and sharing of weapons 
 and munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 has supplied the Russian Federation with drones and 
 ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and 
 ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation 
 has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with 
 Su-35 fighter jets and air defense 
 assistance.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use 
 technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied 
 by the People's Republic of China have enabled the 
 Russian Federation to continue defense production in 
 the face of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls 
 intended to prevent the Russian Federation from 
 accessing the necessary components to fuel its defense 
 industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the Russian 
 Federation has provided technical expertise on 
 satellite technology to the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea and is working closely with the 
 People's Republic of China on air defense and submarine 
 technology.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) Joint military activities and 
 exercises. The military forces of the Democratic 
 People's Republic of Korea are actively participating 
 in the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and 
 joint military exercises between the People's Republic 
 of China and the Russian Federation are expanding in 
 scope, scale, and geographic reach, including in close 
 proximity to territory of the United States.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (D) Coordination on disinformation and 
 cyber operations, including coordinated messaging aimed 
 at denigrating and isolating the United States 
 internationally.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (5) Adversaries of the United States are also 
 cooperating in a manner that may circumvent United States and 
 multilateral economic tools. Examples include the 
 following:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) The continued purchase by the People's 
 Republic of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of 
 Iran despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the 
 United States on oil from the Islamic Republic of 
 Iran.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) The veto by the Russian Federation of, 
 and abstention by the People's Republic of China in a 
 vote on, a United Nations Security Council resolution 
 relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
 levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (6) Adversaries of the United States are 
 cooperating multilaterally in international institutions such 
 as the United Nations and through expanded multilateral 
 groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa 
 group (commonly known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the 
 influence of the United States.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among 
 the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
 Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic 
 of Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant 
 threat to United States interests and national 
 security.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (8) Such increasing alignment--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) allows each such adversary to 
 modernize its military more quickly than previously 
 anticipated;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in 
 capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries 
 of critical military technologies, which could erode 
 the technological edge of the United States Armed 
 Forces;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) presents increasing challenges to 
 strategies of isolation or containment against such 
 individual adversaries, since the People's Republic of 
 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of 
 Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now 
 provide critical lifelines to each other;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (D) threatens the effectiveness of United 
 States economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to 
 evade United States sanctions and export controls and 
 seek to establish alternative payment mechanisms that 
 do not require transactions in United States dollars; 
 and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (E) increases the chances of United States 
 conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries 
 drawing in another, thereby posing a greater risk that 
 the United States will have to contend with 
 simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or 
 more theaters.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous 
 aspects of cooperation between and among the People's Republic 
 of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by 
 using the threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing 
 such cooperation to light, and sharing information with United 
 States allies and partners who may--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) share the concerns and objectives of 
 the United States; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) have influence over such 
 adversaries;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its 
 footprint or capabilities across the world; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that 
 the United States could face simultaneous challenges or 
 conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters, 
 including by bolstering deterrence across all priority 
 theaters.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>

    (a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the 
 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the 
 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
 Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, 
 and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
 each--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) establish a task force on adversary 
 alignment; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) designate a point of contact on 
 adversary alignment, who shall serve as the head of the 
 task force for the applicable department, office, or 
 agency.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) Requirements.--Each task force established 
 pursuant to paragraph

    (1) shall--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) comprise--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (i) subject matter experts 
 covering each of--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (I) the People's Republic 
 of China;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (II) the Russian 
 Federation;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (III) the Islamic Republic 
 of Iran; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (IV) the Democratic 
 People's Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (ii) representatives covering all 
 core functions of the department, office, or 
 agency of the Secretary or Director 
 establishing the task force; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (iii) a mix of analysts, 
 operators, and senior management;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) ensure that the task force members 
 have the requisite security clearances and access to 
 critical compartmented information streams necessary to 
 assess and understand the full scope of adversary 
 cooperation, including how events in one theater might 
 trigger actions in another; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) not later than 180 days after the date 
 of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary 
 or Director who established the task force, and to the 
 appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
 </DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (i) evaluating the impact of 
 adversary alignment on the relevant operations 
 carried out by the individual department, 
 office, or agency of the task force; 
 and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (ii) putting forth recommendations 
 for such organizational changes as the task 
 force considers necessary to ensure the 
 department, office, or agency of the task force 
 is well positioned to routinely evaluate and 
 respond to the rapidly evolving nature of 
 adversary cooperation and the attendant 
 risks.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less 
 frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task forces 
 established under this section shall meet to discuss findings, 
 problems, and next steps with respect to adversary 
 alignment.</DELETED>
<DELETED>

    (b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral 
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of 
the United States.--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the 
 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
 Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal 
 agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the 
 President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the 
 Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees 
 of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
 among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks 
 of such cooperation.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall include the following:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) A description of the current nature 
 and extent of bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
 among the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
 Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea across the 
 diplomatic, information, military, and economic 
 spheres, and an assessment of the advantages that 
 accrue to each such adversary from such 
 cooperation.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) An assessment of the trajectory for 
 cooperation among the adversaries described in 
 subparagraph
        (A) during the 5-year period beginning on 
 the date on which the report is submitted.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) An outline of the risks to the United 
 States and allied diplomatic, military, intelligence, 
 and economic operations, and broader security interests 
 around the world, including the following:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (i) The risk of technology 
 transfer dramatically increasing the military 
 capabilities of adversaries of the United 
 States and its impact on the relative balance 
 of United States and allied capabilities as 
 compared to that of the adversary.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (ii) The risk posed to the United 
 States by efforts made by adversaries to 
 establish alternate payment systems, in 
 particular with respect to the dominance of the 
 United States dollar and the effectiveness of 
 United States sanctions and export control 
 tools.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (iii) The risk that an adversary 
 of the United States might assist or otherwise 
 enable another adversary of the United States 
 in the event that one or more adversaries 
 become party to a conflict with the United 
 States.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (iv) The risk that adversary 
 cooperation poses a growing threat to United 
 States intelligence collection 
 efforts.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities 
 and tension points within such adversary bilateral or 
 multilateral relationships, and an assessment of the 
 likely effect of efforts by the United States to 
 separate adversaries.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to 
 paragraph

    (1) shall be submitted in classified form.</DELETED>
<DELETED>
            (c) Report on Strategic Approach.--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and 
 the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 
 the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of 
 National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central 
 Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
 of Congress a report outlining the strategic approach of the 
 United States to adversary alignment and the necessary steps to 
 disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare for adversary 
 cooperation during the two-year period beginning on the date of 
 the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall include the following:</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (A) A detailed description of the methods 
 and tools available to the United States to disrupt the 
 most dangerous elements of adversary cooperation, 
 including the growing connectivity between the defense 
 industrial bases of each adversary.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (B) A timeline for using diplomatic 
 engagement and intelligence diplomacy--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (i) to educate allies and partners 
 about the increasing risk of adversary 
 alignment; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (ii) to secure the support of 
 allies and partners in combating adversary 
 alignment.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of 
 United States methods of economic statecraft, including 
 an assessment of the efficiency of the United States 
 sanctions and export control enforcement apparatus and 
 any accompanying resourcing requirements.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence 
 within the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific 
 region, Europe, and the Middle East by--</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (i) increasing United States and 
 allied munitions stockpiles, particularly such 
 stockpiles that are most critical for 
 supporting frontline partners such as Israel, 
 Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression 
 by a United States adversary;</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (ii) facilitating collaborative 
 efforts with allies for the co-production, co-
 maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical 
 munitions and platforms required by the United 
 States and allies and partners of the United 
 States in the event of a future conflict with 
 the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
 Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; 
 and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
            (iii) more effectively using 
 funding through the United States Foreign 
 Military Financing program to support allied 
 and partner domestic defense production that 
 can contribute to deterrence in each such 
 priority theater.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (E) A plan for digitizing and updating 
 war-planning tools of the Department of Defense not 
 later than 1 year after the date on which the report is 
 submitted to ensure that United States war planners are 
 better equipped to update and modify war plans in the 
 face of rapidly evolving information on adversary 
 cooperation.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>
        (F) An assessment of the capability gaps 
 and vulnerabilities the United States would face in 
 deterring an adversary in the event that the United 
 States is engaged in a conflict with another adversary, 
 and a plan to work with allies and partners to address 
 such gaps and vulnerabilities.</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall be submitted in classified form.</DELETED>
<DELETED>
            (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select 
 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
 the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, 
 Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, 
 Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and</DELETED>
 <DELETED>

    (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent 
 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 
 Financial Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
 the House of Representatives.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International Security by 
Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or ``DISRUPT 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, 
 the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea are each considered--
        (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in 

section 825
            (d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 
 U.S.C. 50309 note));
        (B) a country of risk (as defined in 

section 6432

    (a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
 Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488; 
 42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing 
 counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to 
 National Laboratories;
            (C) a foreign country of concern (as defined in 
 

section 10612

    (a) of the Research and Development, 
 Competition, and Innovation Act (Public Law 117-167; 
 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221 note));
            (D) a covered foreign country (as defined in 
 

section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
 Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 
 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition 
 on operation, procurement, and contracting relating to 
 foreign-made light detection and ranging technology; 
 and
        (E) a covered foreign country (as defined in 
 

section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
 for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 11781; 135 Stat. 2086; 
 10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy 
 and plan to implement certain defense intelligence 
 reforms.

    (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual 
 Threat Assessment, the United States faces an increasingly 
 contested and dangerous global landscape as the four 
 adversaries named in paragraph

    (1) deepen cooperation in a 
 manner that--
        (A) reinforces threats posed by each such adversary 
 individually; and
        (B) poses new challenges to the strength and power 
 of the United States globally.

    (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in paragraph

    (2) is 
 occurring bilaterally, as the People's Republic of China, the 
 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, 
 economic, and military ties in accordance with bilateral 
 agreements, which include--
        (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
 Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic 
 People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11, 
 1961;
        (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic 
 Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
 the People's Republic of China, issued on March 27, 
 2021;
            (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation 
 and the People's Republic of China on International 
 Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable 
 Development, issued on February 4, 2022;
            (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic 
 Partnership between the Russian Federation and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at 
 Pyongyang June 18, 2024;
        (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive 
 Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow January 17, 
 2025; and
        (F) traditional relations of friendship and 
 cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

    (4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation with 
 respect to the interests of the United States occur bilaterally 
 in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples include the 
 following:
        (A) The transfer and sharing of weapons and 
 munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
 supplied the Russian Federation with drones and 
 ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and 
 ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation 
 has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with 
 Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.
        (B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use 
 technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied 
 by the People's Republic of China have enabled the 
 Russian Federation to continue defense production in 
 the face of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls 
 intended to prevent the Russian Federation from 
 accessing the necessary components to fuel its defense 
 industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the Russian 
 Federation has provided technical expertise on 
 satellite technology to the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea and is working closely with the 
 People's Republic of China on air defense and submarine 
 technology.
            (C) Joint military activities and exercises. The 
 military forces of the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea are actively participating in the Russian 
 Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and joint military 
 exercises between the People's Republic of China and 
 the Russian Federation are expanding in scope, scale, 
 and geographic reach, including in close proximity to 
 territory of the United States.
            (D) Coordination on disinformation and cyber 
 operations, including coordinated messaging aimed at 
 denigrating and isolating the United States 
 internationally.

    (5) Adversaries of the United States are also cooperating 
 in a manner that may circumvent United States and multilateral 
 economic tools. Examples include the following:
        (A) The continued purchase by the People's Republic 
 of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the United 
 States on oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
        (B) The veto by the Russian Federation of, and 
 abstention by the People's Republic of China in a vote 
 on, a United Nations Security Council resolution 
 relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
 levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea.

    (6) Adversaries of the United States are cooperating 
 multilaterally in international institutions such as the United 
 Nations and through expanded multilateral groupings, such as 
 the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group (commonly 
 known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the influence of the 
 United States.

    (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among the 
 People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic 
 Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant threat 
 to United States interests and national security.

    (8) Such increasing alignment--
        (A) allows each such adversary to modernize its 
 military more quickly than previously anticipated;
        (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in 
 capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries 
 of critical military technologies, which could erode 
 the technological edge of the United States Armed 
 Forces;
            (C) presents increasing challenges to strategies of 
 isolation or containment against such individual 
 adversaries, since the People's Republic of China, the 
 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now provide 
 critical lifelines to each other;
            (D) threatens the effectiveness of United States 
 economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to evade 
 United States sanctions and export controls and seek to 
 establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not 
 require transactions in United States dollars; and
        (E) increases the chances of United States conflict 
 or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in 
 another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United 
 States will have to contend with simultaneous threats 
 from such adversaries in one or more theaters.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

 It is the policy of the United States--

    (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous aspects of 
 cooperation between and among the People's Republic of China, 
 the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by using the 
 threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing such 
 cooperation to light, and sharing information with United 
 States allies and partners who may--
        (A) share the concerns and objectives of the United 
 States; and
        (B) have influence over such adversaries;

    (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its footprint 
 or capabilities across the world; and

    (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that the 
 United States could face simultaneous challenges or conflict 
 with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters, including 
 by bolstering deterrence across all priority theaters.

SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.

    (a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the 
 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
 Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, 
 and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
 each--
        (A) establish a task force on adversary alignment; 
 and
        (B) designate a point of contact on adversary 
 alignment, who shall serve as the head of the task 
 force for the applicable department, office, or agency.

    (2) Requirements.--Each task force established pursuant to 
 paragraph

    (1) shall--
        (A) comprise--
            (i) subject matter experts covering each 
 of--
            (I) the People's Republic of China;
            (II) the Russian Federation;
            (III) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
 and
            (IV) the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea;
            (ii) representatives covering all core 
 functions of the department, office, or agency 
 of the Secretary or Director establishing the 
 task force; and
            (iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and 
 senior management;
        (B) ensure that the task force members have the 
 requisite security clearances and access to critical 
 compartmented information streams necessary to assess 
 and understand the full scope of adversary cooperation, 
 including how events in one theater might trigger 
 actions in another; and
            (C) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
 enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary or 
 Director who established the task force, and to the 
 appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
            (i) evaluating the impact of adversary 
 alignment on the relevant operations carried 
 out by the individual department, office, or 
 agency of the task force; and
            (ii) putting forth recommendations for such 
 organizational changes as the task force 
 considers necessary to ensure the department, 
 office, or agency of the task force is well 
 positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to 
 the rapidly evolving nature of adversary 
 cooperation and the attendant risks.

    (3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less frequently 
 than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established under 
 this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems, and next 
 steps with respect to adversary alignment.

    (b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral 
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of 
the United States.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
 Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal 
 agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the 
 President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the 
 Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees 
 of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
 among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks 
 of such cooperation.

    (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall 
 include the following:
        (A) A description of the current nature and extent 
 of bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the 
 People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
 Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea across the diplomatic, information, 
 military, and economic spheres, and an assessment of 
 the advantages that accrue to each adversary from such 
 cooperation.
        (B) An assessment of the trajectory for cooperation 
 among the adversaries described in subparagraph
        (A) during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which 
 the report is submitted.
            (C) An outline of the risks to the United States 
 and allied diplomatic, military, intelligence, and 
 economic operations, and broader security interests 
 around the world, including the following:
            (i) The risk of technology transfers 
 dramatically increasing the military 
 capabilities of adversaries of the United 
 States and the impact on the relative balance 
 of United States and allied capabilities as 
 compared to that of the adversary.
            (ii) The risk posed to the United States by 
 efforts made by adversaries to establish 
 alternate payment systems, in particular with 
 respect to the dominance of the United States 
 dollar and the effectiveness of United States 
 sanctions and export control tools.
            (iii) The risk that an adversary of the 
 United States might assist or otherwise enable 
 another adversary of the United States in the 
 event that one or more adversaries become party 
 to a conflict with the United States.
            (iv) The risk that adversary cooperation 
 poses a growing threat to United States 
 intelligence collection efforts.
            (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities and 
 tension points within such adversary bilateral or 
 multilateral relationships, and an assessment of the 
 likely effect of efforts by the United States to 
 separate adversaries.

    (3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph

    (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
            (c) Report on Strategic Approach.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
 Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National 
 Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
 Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
 a report outlining the strategic approach of the United States 
 to adversary alignment and the necessary steps to disrupt, 
 frustrate, constrain, and prepare for adversary cooperation 
 during the two-year period beginning on the date of the 
 enactment of this Act.

    (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall 
 include the following:
        (A) A detailed description of the methods and tools 
 available to the United States to disrupt the most 
 dangerous elements of adversary cooperation, including 
 the growing connectivity between the defense industrial 
 bases of each adversary.
        (B) A timeline for using diplomatic engagement, 
 intelligence diplomacy, security cooperation, and 
 foreign assistance, as appropriate--
            (i) to educate allies and partners about 
 the increasing risk of adversary alignment;
            (ii) to secure the support of allies and 
 partners in combating adversary alignment; and
            (iii) to assess and help address, as 
 appropriate, the vulnerabilities and capability 
 gaps of allies and partners to counter threats 
 from adversary alignment.
            (C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of United 
 States methods of economic statecraft, including an 
 assessment of the efficiency of the United States 
 sanctions and export control enforcement apparatus and 
 any accompanying resourcing requirements.
            (D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence within the 
 priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, 
 and the Middle East by--
            (i) increasing United States and allied 
 munitions stockpiles, particularly such 
 stockpiles that are most critical for 
 supporting frontline partners such as Israel, 
 Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression 
 by a United States adversary;
            (ii) facilitating collaborative efforts 
 with allies for the co-production, co-
 maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical 
 munitions and platforms required by the United 
 States and allies and partners of the United 
 States in the event of a future conflict with 
 the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
 Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
            (iii) more effectively using funding 
 through the United States Foreign Military 
 Financing program to support allied and partner 
 domestic defense production that can contribute 
 to deterrence in each such priority theater.
        (E) A plan for digitizing and updating war-planning 
 tools of the Department of Defense not later than 1 
 year after the date on which the report is submitted to 
 ensure that United States war planners are better 
 equipped to update and modify war plans in the face of 
 rapidly evolving information on adversary cooperation.
        (F) An assessment of the capability gaps and 
 vulnerabilities the United States would face in 
 deterring an adversary in the event that the United 
 States is engaged in a conflict with another adversary, 
 and a plan to work with allies and partners to address 
 such gaps and vulnerabilities.

    (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall be 
 submitted in classified form.
            (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

    (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 
 on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
 and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
 Transportation of the Senate; and

    (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 
 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
 the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial 
 Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
 of Representatives.
 Calendar No. 99

119th CONGRESS

 1st Session

 S. 1883

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
 adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
 United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

 June 18, 2025

 Reported with an amendment