119-hr5912

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5912 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 5912

 To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
 adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
 United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 November 4, 2025

 Mr. Krishnamoorthi (for himself and Mr. Moylan) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
 and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence 
 (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
 Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
 within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government 
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of 
 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost 
 adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the 
 United States.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International Security by 
Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or ``DISRUPT 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, 
 the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea are each considered--
        (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in 

section 825
            (d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 
 U.S.C. 50309 note));
        (B) a country of risk (as defined in 

section 6432

    (a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
 Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488; 
 42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing 
 counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to 
 National Laboratories;
            (C) a foreign country of concern (as defined in 
 

section 10612

    (a) of the Research and Development, 
 Competition, and Innovation Act (Public Law 117-167; 
 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221 note));
            (D) a covered foreign country (as defined in 
 

section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
 Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for 
 Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 
 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition 
 on operation, procurement, and contracting relating to 
 foreign-made light detection and ranging technology; 
 and
        (E) a covered foreign country (as defined in 
 

section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
 for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 11781; 135 Stat. 2086; 
 10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy 
 and plan to implement certain defense intelligence 
 reforms.

    (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual 
 Threat Assessment, the United States faces an increasingly 
 contested and dangerous global landscape as the four 
 adversaries named in paragraph

    (1) deepen cooperation in a 
 manner that--
        (A) reinforces threats posed by each such adversary 
 individually; and
        (B) poses new challenges to the strength and power 
 of the United States globally.

    (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in paragraph

    (2) is 
 occurring bilaterally, as the People's Republic of China, the 
 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, 
 economic, and military ties in accordance with bilateral 
 agreements, which include--
        (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
 Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic 
 People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11, 
 1961;
        (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic 
 Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
 the People's Republic of China, issued on March 27, 
 2021;
            (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation 
 and the People's Republic of China on International 
 Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable 
 Development, issued on February 4, 2022;
            (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic 
 Partnership between the Russian Federation and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at 
 Pyongyang June 18, 2024;
        (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive 
 Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow January 17, 
 2025; and
        (F) traditional relations of friendship and 
 cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

    (4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation with 
 respect to the interests of the United States occur bilaterally 
 in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples include the 
 following:
        (A) Transfer and sharing of weapons and 
 munitions.--Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 has supplied the Russian Federation with drones and 
 ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and 
 ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation 
 has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with 
 Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.
        (B) Transfer and sharing of dual-use technologies 
 and capabilities.--Dual-use goods supplied by the 
 People's Republic of China have enabled the Russian 
 Federation to continue defense production in the face 
 of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls intended 
 to prevent the Russian Federation from accessing the 
 necessary components to fuel its defense industry. In 
 turn, reporting indicates that the Russian Federation 
 has provided technical expertise on satellite 
 technology to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 and is working closely with the People's Republic of 
 China on air defense and submarine technology.
            (C) Joint military activities and exercises.--The 
 military forces of the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea are actively participating in the Russian 
 Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and joint military 
 exercises between the People's Republic of China and 
 the Russian Federation are expanding in scope, scale, 
 and geographic reach, including in close proximity to 
 territory of the United States.
            (D) Coordination.--Coordination on disinformation 
 and cyber operations, including coordinated messaging 
 aimed at denigrating and isolating the United States 
 internationally.

    (5) Adversaries of the United States are also cooperating 
 in a manner that may circumvent United States and multilateral 
 economic tools. Examples include the following:
        (A) The continued purchase by the People's Republic 
 of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the United 
 States on oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
        (B) The veto by the Russian Federation of, and 
 abstention by the People's Republic of China in a vote 
 on, a United Nations Security Council resolution 
 relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
 levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea.

    (6) Adversaries of the United States are cooperating 
 multilaterally in international institutions such as the United 
 Nations and through expanded multilateral groupings, such as 
 the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group (commonly 
 known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the influence of the 
 United States.

    (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among the 
 People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic 
 Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of 
 Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant threat 
 to United States interests and national security.

    (8) Such increasing alignment--
        (A) allows each such adversary to modernize its 
 military more quickly than previously anticipated;
        (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in 
 capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries 
 of critical military technologies, which could erode 
 the technological edge of the United States Armed 
 Forces;
            (C) presents increasing challenges to strategies of 
 isolation or containment against such individual 
 adversaries, since the People's Republic of China, the 
 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now provide 
 critical lifelines to each other;
            (D) threatens the effectiveness of United States 
 economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to evade 
 United States sanctions and export controls and seek to 
 establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not 
 require transactions in United States dollars; and
        (E) increases the chances of United States conflict 
 or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in 
 another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United 
 States will have to contend with simultaneous threats 
 from such adversaries in one or more theaters.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

 It is the policy of the United States--

    (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous aspects of 
 cooperation between and among the People's Republic of China, 
 the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by using the 
 threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing such 
 cooperation to light, and sharing information with United 
 States allies and partners who may--
        (A) share the concerns and objectives of the United 
 States; and
        (B) have influence over such adversaries;

    (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its footprint 
 or capabilities across the world; and

    (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that the 
 United States could face simultaneous challenges or conflict 
 with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters, including 
 by bolstering deterrence across all priority theaters.

SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.

    (a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the 
 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
 Secretary of Commerce shall each--
        (A) establish a task force on adversary alignment; 
 and
        (B) designate a point of contact on adversary 
 alignment, who shall serve as the head of the task 
 force for the applicable department, office, or agency.

    (2) Requirements.--Each task force established pursuant to 
 paragraph

    (1) shall--
        (A) comprise--
            (i) subject matter experts covering each 
 of--
            (I) the People's Republic of China;
            (II) the Russian Federation;
            (III) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
 and
            (IV) the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea;
            (ii) representatives covering all core 
 functions of the department, office, or agency 
 of the Secretary or Director establishing the 
 task force; and
            (iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and 
 senior management;
        (B) ensure that the task force members have the 
 requisite security clearances and access to critical 
 compartmented information streams necessary to assess 
 and understand the full scope of adversary cooperation, 
 including how events in one theater might trigger 
 actions in another; and
            (C) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
 enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary or 
 Director who established the task force, and to the 
 appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
            (i) evaluating the impact of adversary 
 alignment on the relevant operations carried 
 out by the individual department, office, or 
 agency of the task force; and
            (ii) putting forth recommendations for such 
 organizational changes as the task force 
 considers necessary to ensure the department, 
 office, or agency of the task force is well 
 positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to 
 the rapidly evolving nature of adversary 
 cooperation and the attendant risks.

    (3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less frequently 
 than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established under 
 this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems, and next 
 steps with respect to adversary alignment.

    (b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral 
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of 
the United States.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
 Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal 
 agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the 
 President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the 
 Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees 
 of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
 among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks 
 of such cooperation.

    (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall 
 include the following:
        (A) A description of the current nature and extent 
 of bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the 
 People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
 Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's 
 Republic of Korea across the diplomatic, information, 
 military, and economic spheres, and an assessment of 
 the advantages that accrue to each adversary from such 
 cooperation.
        (B) An assessment of the trajectory for cooperation 
 among the adversaries described in subparagraph
        (A) during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which 
 the report is submitted.
            (C) An outline of the risks to the United States 
 and allied diplomatic, military, intelligence, and 
 economic operations, and broader security interests 
 around the world, including the following:
            (i) The risk of technology transfers 
 dramatically increasing the military 
 capabilities of adversaries of the United 
 States and the impact on the relative balance 
 of United States and allied capabilities as 
 compared to that of the adversary.
            (ii) The risk posed to the United States by 
 efforts made by adversaries to establish 
 alternate payment systems, in particular with 
 respect to the dominance of the United States 
 dollar and the effectiveness of United States 
 sanctions and export control tools.
            (iii) The risk that an adversary of the 
 United States might assist or otherwise enable 
 another adversary of the United States in the 
 event that one or more adversaries become party 
 to a conflict with the United States.
            (iv) The risk that adversary cooperation 
 poses a growing threat to United States 
 intelligence collection efforts.
            (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities and 
 tension points within such adversary bilateral or 
 multilateral relationships, and an assessment of the 
 likely effect of efforts by the United States to 
 separate adversaries.

    (3) Use of other reporting.--The report required by 
 paragraph

    (1) may be completed using reports submitted by the 
 Director of National Intelligence to satisfy other statutory 
 requirements.

    (4) Form.--The report submitted required by paragraph

    (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
            (c) Report on Strategic Approach.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
 Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of 
 National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate 
 committees of Congress a report outlining the strategic 
 approach of the United States to adversary alignment and the 
 necessary steps to disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare 
 for adversary cooperation during the two-year period beginning 
 on the date of the enactment of this Act.

    (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall 
 include the following:
        (A) A detailed description of the methods and tools 
 available to the United States to disrupt the most 
 dangerous elements of adversary cooperation, including 
 the growing connectivity between the defense industrial 
 bases of each adversary.
        (B) A timeline for using diplomatic engagement, 
 intelligence diplomacy, security cooperation, and 
 foreign assistance, as appropriate--
            (i) to educate allies and partners about 
 the increasing risk of adversary alignment;
            (ii) to secure the support of allies and 
 partners in combating adversary alignment; and
            (iii) to assess and help address, as 
 appropriate, the vulnerabilities and capability 
 gaps of allies and partners to counter threats 
 from adversary alignment.
            (C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of United 
 States methods of economic statecraft, including an 
 assessment of the efficiency of the United States 
 sanctions and export control enforcement apparatus and 
 any accompanying resourcing requirements.
            (D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence within the 
 priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, 
 and the Middle East by--
            (i) increasing United States and allied 
 munitions stockpiles, particularly such 
 stockpiles that are most critical for 
 supporting frontline partners such as Israel, 
 Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression 
 by a United States adversary;
            (ii) facilitating collaborative efforts 
 with allies for the co-production, co-
 maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical 
 munitions and platforms required by the United 
 States and allies and partners of the United 
 States in the event of a future conflict with 
 the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
 Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or 
 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
            (iii) more effectively using funding 
 through the United States Foreign Military 
 Financing program to support allied and partner 
 domestic defense production that can contribute 
 to deterrence in each such priority theater.
        (E) A plan for digitizing and updating war-planning 
 tools of the Department of Defense not later than 1 
 year after the date on which the report is submitted to 
 ensure that United States war planners are better 
 equipped to update and modify war plans in the face of 
 rapidly evolving information on adversary cooperation.
        (F) An assessment of the capability gaps and 
 vulnerabilities the United States would face in 
 deterring an adversary in the event that the United 
 States is engaged in a conflict with another adversary, 
 and a plan to work with allies and partners to address 
 such gaps and vulnerabilities.

    (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall be 
 submitted in classified form.
            (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

    (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 
 on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
 and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
 Transportation of the Senate; and

    (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 
 Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
 the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial 
 Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
 of Representatives.
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