119-hr5900

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5900 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 5900

To direct the Department of Defense to establish a joint task force to 
 investigate transnational cybercrimes, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 October 31, 2025

Mr. Vindman (for himself and Mr. Baird) introduced the following bill; 
 which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

To direct the Department of Defense to establish a joint task force to 
 investigate transnational cybercrimes, and for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Stopping Cross-border Attacks and 
Manipulation Act'' or the ``SCAM Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) According to estimates from the United States Institute 
 of Peace, China-linked transnational organized crime

    (TOC) groups operating ``fraud farms'' in Southeast Asia are stealing 
 nearly $43,800,000,000 annually through digital scams.

    (2) These scams increasingly affect Americans, 
 disproportionately targeting populations such as the elderly 
 and socially isolated.

    (3) According to the Federal Trade Commission

    (FTC) , in 
 2024 alone--
        (A) 246,783 scam text messages were reported, 
 resulting in $469,000,000 in losses to Americans;
        (B) 371,664 scam emails were reported, leading to 
 $502,000,000 in losses to Americans; and
            (C) 284,651 scam phone calls were reported, causing 
 $948,000,000 in losses to Americans.

    (4) Transnational organized crime

    (TOC) groups maintain 
 documented ties to the Chinese Communist Party

    (CCP) . Chinese 
 officials and state-owned enterprises

    (SOEs) have provided 
 direct support for the construction and operation of TOC-linked 
 facilities, raising serious concerns about a coordinated 
 campaign of foreign interference and sabotage.

    (5) The CCP's involvement in TOC networks presents an 
 urgent national security threat. These networks funnel 
 financial assets and sensitive personal information of U.S. 
 citizens to a hostile foreign power, undermining both American 
 economic security and individual privacy.

    (6) These criminal networks have deeply embedded themselves 
 into Southeast Asian economies, exerting destabilizing 
 influence across the region.

    (7) Proceeds from these scams are used to fund warlords and 
 fuel ongoing civil conflicts, compounding regional instability.

    (8) TOC networks have trafficked an estimated 300,000 
 individuals into cyber scam operations across Southeast Asia. 
 Victims, including United States citizens, are forced to work 
 under conditions that the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission compares to modern slavery. The United 
 Nations has warned that human trafficking tied to these scam 
 centers has reached the level of a humanitarian and human 
 rights crisis.

    (9) The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
 has acknowledged credible reports linking scam compounds in the 
 Philippines to Chinese espionage activity. These facilities are 
 being constructed near air bases strategically important to 
 U.S. operations, including Clark Air Base and Basa Air Base, 
 which is part of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. 
 The Philippine intelligence community has provided compelling 
 evidence that these compounds have been used for surveillance 
 and cyber intrusions.

    (10) The Chinese government has used the presence of 
 Chinese TOC networks in Southeast Asia to pressure regional 
 governments to allow a greater role for Chinese security 
 forces. This effort threatens national sovereignty and regional 
 stability.

    (11) TOC networks endanger American defense priorities as 
 well as democracy, good governance, and stability around the 
 world by co-opting local elites, undermining law enforcement, 
 weakening state authority, and threatening the United States' 
 strategic interest in building a free and open Indo-Pacific.

    (12) An effective response by the United States Government 
 will require a coordinated, whole-of-government effort that 
 draws on the competencies of Federal agencies in information 
 collection, financial enforcement, diplomatic engagement, 
 defense and intelligence preparedness, and law enforcement.

SEC. 3. JOINT TASK FORCE TO INVESTIGATE TRANSNATIONAL CYBERCRIMES.

    (a) Establishment.--

    (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, acting through 
 the head of U.S. Cyber Command and in coordination with the 
 heads of other appropriate agencies, shall establish a joint 
 task force to coordinate efforts to investigate, disrupt, and 
 protect citizens of the United States from transnational 
 cybercrimes and foreign-operated scam networks, including 
 fraudulent text and direct messing centers and other digital 
 fraud schemes targeting citizens of the United States.

    (2) Membership.--The task force shall, at a minimum, be 
 composed of--
        (A) an official of the Department of State, 
 including--
            (i) the Assistant Secretary for Emerging 
 Threats;
            (ii) the Assistant Secretary for 
 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; 
 and
            (iii) the Assistant Secretary for 
 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor;
        (B) officials of the Department of Defense, 
 including U.S. Cyber Command and the National Mission 
 Force;
            (C) an official of the Office of the Director of 
 National Intelligence;
            (D) an official of the Federal Trade Commission;
        (E) an official of the Federal Communications 
 Commission;
        (F) officials of the Office of Foreign Assets 
 Control and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of 
 the Department of the Treasury;
        (G) officials of the Department of Justice, 
 including officials from--
            (i) the Criminal Division, including the 
 International Unit of the Money Laundering and 
 Asset Recovery Section;
            (ii) the Office of International Affairs;
            (iii) the National Security Division; and
            (iv) the Office of the Cyber Ambassador;
        (H) an official of the Federal Bureau of 
 Investigation's Internet Crime Complaint Center;
            (I) representatives of State and local governments 
 that--
            (i) are leading efforts to counter 
 cybercrimes; or
            (ii) are disproportionately affected by 
 cybercrimes; and
        (J) representatives of relevant expert non-profit 
 organizations.

    (3) Leadership.--The members of the task force, in 
 consultation with the leadership of the Department of Defense, 
 may assign responsibility to an appropriate office within the 
 Department of Defense to serve as the lead for the task force 
 to coordinate the preparation and submission of the report 
 required by subsection
            (c) and hold offices and agencies 
 responsible for implementation.

    (b) Priority.--In carrying out its duties under subsection

    (a) and 
in preparing the report under subsection
            (c) , the task force shall 
prioritize work related to scam operations with ties to the Chinese 
Communist Party in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the task force established under subsection

    (a) shall submit 
to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 
of the Senate a report--

    (1) identifying emerging trends related to the scam 
 operations described in subsection

    (a) that are tied to 
 international criminal organizations, including efforts to--
        (A) scam and steal data from United States persons;
        (B) cultivate relationships with adversarial 
 governments and foreign intelligence services;
            (C) acquire land in proximity to United States 
 military installations and United States treaty allies' 
 and partners' military installations;
            (D) leverage, collaborate with, or place foreign 
 nationals of concern in sensitive positions within 
 Indo-Pacific regional governments;
        (E) undermine United States diplomatic engagement, 
 peacekeeping operations, and security cooperation 
 efforts throughout the world, with a priority on the 
 Indo-Pacific region;
        (F) acquire territory or influence around critical 
 waterways; and
        (G) construct militarily-capable infrastructure 
 such as airports;

    (2) recommending policy options for the Federal Government, 
 Congress, and nongovernmental industry leaders to prevent and 
 penalize the scam operations described in subsection

    (a) that 
 are tied to international criminal organizations, which may 
 include the use of sanctions, civil asset forfeiture, and 
 action in cyberspace in defense of the United States, its 
 persons, assets, and interests against the scam networks 
 described in subsection

    (a) , including--
        (A) protecting Americans' personal data and 
 financial assets;
        (B) safeguarding the sovereignty of United States 
 allies and partners; and
            (C) securing United States military installations 
 and United States treaty allies' and partners' military 
 installations located near known or suspected scam 
 compounds;

    (3) proposing a framework for a whole-of-society approach 
 to support disproportionately affected demographic groups, 
 communications platforms, States, and localities impacted by 
 the scam networks described in subsection

    (a) , including 
 methods for timely dissemination of scam-related information 
 and protective guidance through publicly accessible Federal 
 facilities (including United States Postal Service locations, 
 Social Security Administration field offices, military 
 installations, and Department of Veterans Affairs facilities) 
 and comparable State and local venues;

    (4) including an assessment and updates of the overall 
 scale of scam centers in Southeast Asia and recent trendlines;

    (5) information about how the Chinese Government is 
 exploiting the problem of scam centers to expand its security 
 presence and influence in the region; and

    (6) information about government bodies, individual 
 government officials, militias, and corporations in Southeast 
 Asia that have ties to transnational criminal organizations or 
 profit from scam centers.
            (d) Implementation.--The task force shall assist in the 
implementation of any recommendations or proposals contained in the 
report submitted under subsection
            (c) .

    (e) Sunset.--The authority under this section shall sunset on the 
date that is 5 years after the date on which the task force submits the 
report under subsection
            (c) .
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