119-hr5499

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Fed Integrity and Independence Act of 2025

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Introduced:
Sep 18, 2025

Bill Statistics

3
Actions
3
Cosponsors
0
Summaries
0
Subjects
1
Text Versions
Yes
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Latest Action

Sep 18, 2025
Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.

Actions (3)

Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Type: IntroReferral | Source: House floor actions | Code: H11100
Sep 18, 2025
Introduced in House
Type: IntroReferral | Source: Library of Congress | Code: Intro-H
Sep 18, 2025
Introduced in House
Type: IntroReferral | Source: Library of Congress | Code: 1000
Sep 18, 2025

Cosponsors (3)

Text Versions (1)

Introduced in House

Sep 18, 2025

Full Bill Text

Length: 4,033 characters Version: Introduced in House Version Date: Sep 18, 2025 Last Updated: Nov 13, 2025 6:28 AM
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5499 Introduced in House

(IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 5499

To amend the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit dual appointments of
certain employees of the Federal Reserve System, and for other
purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

September 18, 2025

Mr. Vargas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

A BILL

To amend the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit dual appointments of
certain employees of the Federal Reserve System, and for other
purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.

This Act may be cited as the ``Fed Integrity and Independence Act
of 2025''.
SEC. 2.

(a)
=== Findings === -Congress finds the following: (1) The independence of the Federal Reserve System from political interference from the President is fundamental to the effective operation of the central bank. (2) Congress structured the Federal Reserve System to ensure that its monetary policy decisions focus on achieving long-run goals and do not become subject to political pressures from the President that could lead to undesirable outcomes. (3) To protect this independence, Congress made it so members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are appointed for staggered 14-year terms, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors is appointed for a four-year term. (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that it is not appropriate for any employee appointed by the President--whether they are on leave or not--to serve as a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
SEC. 3.

(a) Board of Governors.--The fourth sentence of the first
undesignated paragraph of
section 10 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.
U.S.C. 241) is amended by striking ``business of the Board and shall
each receive'' and inserting ``business of the Board, may not
simultaneously hold any other office, position, or employment for which
the member is appointed by the President, including under a leave of
absence from such other office, position, or employment, and shall each
receive''.

(b) Federal Reserve Bank Presidents; First Vice President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.--The fifth subparagraph of the fourth
undesignated paragraph of
section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.
U.S.C. 341) is amended--

(1) by inserting after the second sentence (relating to
presidents of Federal reserve banks) the following: ``A
president of the bank may not simultaneously hold any other
office, position, or employment for which the president is
appointed by the President, including under a leave of absence
from such other office, position, or employment.''; and

(2) by inserting after the third sentence (relating to
first vice presidents of Federal reserve banks) the following:
``The first vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York may not simultaneously hold any other office, position, or
employment for which the first vice president is appointed by
the President, including under a leave of absence from such
other office, position, or employment.''.
(c) Rule of Application.--An individual serving as a governor of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the president of
a Federal reserve bank, or the first vice president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York on the date of enactment of this Act and who
is ineligible to serve in such position due to the amendments made by
this section are hereby terminated from such position on the date of
enactment of this Act.
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