119-hr5274

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5274 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 5274

 To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States 
 and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 September 10, 2025

Mr. Keating (for himself, Ms. Malliotakis, and Mr. Goldman of New York) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
 committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States 
 and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Balkans 
Democracy and Prosperity Act''.

    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 4. Definitions.

Sec. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans.

Sec. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives.

Sec. 7. Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement.

Sec. 8. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans.

Sec. 9. Young Balkan Leaders Initiative.

Sec. 10. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western 
 Balkans.

Sec. 11. Sense of Congress regarding an interim agreement.

Sec. 12. Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and 
 campaigns in the Western Balkans.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic 
 of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the 
 Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in 
 the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, 
 and prosperity of that continent.

    (2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the 
 Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for 
 democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens 
 and residents of those seven countries.

    (3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and 
 the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable 
 and sustainable economic growth and development in the region.

    (4) The reforms and integration with the European Union 
 pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to 
 significant democratic and economic progress in the region.

    (5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and 
 unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in 
 neighboring European Union countries.

    (6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting 
 demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in 
 population decline in all seven countries.

    (7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms 
 could help enable investment and employment opportunities in 
 the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide 
 powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging 
 broader participation in a political process that increases 
 trade and prosperity for all.

    (8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common 
 Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan 
 Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic 
 conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion 
 and transparency.

    (9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign 
 Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and 
 facilitating opportunities for United States trade and 
 investment.

    (10) Corruption, including among key political leaders, 
 continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of 
 the greatest impediments to further economic and political 
 development in the region.

    (11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans 
 undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions, 
 including the integrity of its elections.

    (12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on 
 information and communication technology infrastructure 
 increases risks to the functioning of government and the 
 delivery of public services.

    (13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State, 
 and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending 
 the national security interests of the United States, including 
 by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner 
 nations to reinforce their cyber defenses.

    (14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and 
 ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the 
 United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs 
 across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity.

    (15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political 
 environments marked by autocratic control or partisan conflict.

    (16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and 
 natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their 
 economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits 
 their aspirations for European integration.

    (17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on 
 Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the 
 national interest of the United States.

    (18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans 
 could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, 
 democracy, and economic integration with Europe.

    (19) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European 
 Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic 
 resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human 
 rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia's war 
 of aggression.

    (20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia 
 on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause 
 for deep concern about the State of Serbia's democracy, 
 including due to the final report of the Organization for 
 Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic 
 Institutions and Human Rights, which--
        (A) found ``unjust conditions'' for the election;
        (B) found ``numerous procedural deficiencies, 
 including inconsistent application of safeguards during 
 voting and counting, frequent instances of 
 overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and 
 numerous instances of group voting''; and
            (C) asserted that ``voting must be repeated'' in 
 certain polling stations.

    (21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
 Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily 
 peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of 
 ``attempting to destabilize the government'', a concerning 
 allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of 
 Serbian society.

    (22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment 
 with the United States make for stronger and more durable 
 partnerships.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

 It is a sense of Congress that the United States should--

    (1) encourage increased trade and investment between the 
 United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans;

    (2) expand United States assistance to regional integration 
 efforts in the Western Balkans;

    (3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in 
 the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and 
 employing women and youth;

    (4) work with allies and partners committed to improving 
 the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic 
 and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the 
 Western Balkans;

    (5) increase United States trade and investment with the 
 Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries' 
 efforts--
        (A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy 
 sources and fossil fuels;
        (B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, 
 and conservation; and
            (C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and 
 more reliable sources of energy, including renewables, 
 as appropriate;

    (6) continue to assist in the development, within the 
 Western Balkans, of--
        (A) strong civil societies;
        (B) public-private partnerships;
            (C) independent media;
            (D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive 
 governance, including equal representation for women 
 and youth;
        (E) political stability; and
        (F) modern, free-market based economies;

    (7) support the expeditious accession of those Western 
 Balkans countries that are not already members to the European 
 Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred 
 to in this section as ``NATO'') for countries that desire and 
 are eligible for such membership;

    (8) support--
        (A) maintaining the full European Union Force

    (EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in 
 the national security interests of the United States;
        (B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to 
 review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role 
 in establishing a safe and secure environment, 
 particularly in the realm of defense;
            (C) working within NATO to encourage contingency 
 planning for an international military force to 
 maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks 
 reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations; 
 and
            (D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo;

    (9) continue to support the European Union membership 
 aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North 
 Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the 
 benchmarks required for their accession;

    (10) continue to support the overarching mission of the 
 Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are 
 inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned 
 with the objectives and standards laid out by the European 
 Union as requirements for accession to the European Union;

    (11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and 
 recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;

    (12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United 
 Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions 
 designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align 
 efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment 
 to upholding democratic values;

    (13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO 
 member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused 
 on regional integration and cooperation, including through the 
 Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003;

    (14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence 
 campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities 
 targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with 
 government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, 
 civil society organizations, and industry leaders;

    (15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, 
 consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness 
 Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North 
 Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with 
 partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on 
 cybersecurity and ICT infrastructure;

    (16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States 
 commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for 
 international law as the sole path forward for the countries of 
 the Western Balkans; and

    (17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western 
 Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward 
 strengthening their democracies and show respect for human 
 rights.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

 In this Act:

    (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
 ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
        (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
 Senate;
        (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
 of Representatives; and
            (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
 Representatives.

    (2) ICT.--The term ``ICT'' means information and 
 communication technology.

    (3) Western balkans.--The term ``Western Balkans'' means 
 the region comprised of the following countries:
        (A) The Republic of Albania.
        (B) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
            (C) The Republic of Croatia.
            (D) The Republic of Kosovo.
        (E) Montenegro.
        (F) The Republic of North Macedonia.
        (G) The Republic of Serbia.

    (4) Western balkans country.--The term ``Western Balkans 
 country'' means any country listed in subparagraphs
        (A) through
        (G) of paragraph

    (3) .

SEC. 5. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN BALKANS.

    (a) In General.--Each person listed or designated for the 
imposition of sanctions under an executive order described in 
subsection
            (c) as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain 
so designated, except as provided in subsections
            (d) and

    (e) .

    (b) Continuation of Sanctions Authorities.--Each authority to 
impose sanctions provided for under an executive order described in 
subsection
            (c) shall remain in effect.
            (c) Executive Orders Specified.--The executive orders specified in 
this subsection are--

    (1) Executive Order 13219, as amended by Executive Order 
 13304 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of 
 persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the 
 Western Balkans); and

    (2) Executive Order 14033 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
 blocking property and suspending entry into the United States 
 of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation 
 in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date of 
 enactment.
            (d) Termination of Sanctions.--The President may terminate the 
application of a sanction described in subsection

    (a) with respect to a 
person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that such person--

    (1) has not engaged in the activity that was the basis for 
 such sanctions, if applicable, during the two-year period 
 immediately preceding such termination date; or

    (2) otherwise no longer meets the criteria that was the 
 basis for such sanctions.

    (e) Waiver.--

    (1) In general.--The President may waive the application of 
 sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to 
 exceed 180 days if the President--
        (A) determines that such a waiver is in the 
 national security interests of the United States; and
        (B) not less than 15 days before the granting of 
 the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional 
 committees a notice of and justification for the 
 waiver.

    (2) Form.--The waiver described in paragraph

    (1) may be 
 transmitted in classified form.

    (f) Exceptions.--

    (1) Humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this Act 
 shall not apply to--
        (A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction 
 for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, 
 medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or 
 for humanitarian purposes; or
        (B) transactions that are necessary for, or related 
 to, the activities described in subparagraph
        (A) .

    (2) Compliance with international obligations and law 
 enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this Act shall not 
 apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling such 
 alien is necessary--
        (A) to comply with United States obligations 
 under--
            (i) the Agreement between the United 
 Nations and the United States of America 
 regarding the Headquarters of the United 
 Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
 and entered into force November 21, 1947;
            (ii) the Convention on Consular Relations, 
 done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into 
 force March 19, 1967; or
            (iii) any other international agreement; or
        (B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity 
 in the United States.

    (3) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under 
 this Act shall not apply to--
        (A) any activity subject to the reporting 
 requirements under title V of the National Security Act 
 of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.); or
        (B) any authorized intelligence activities of the 
 United States.

    (4) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
        (A) In general.--The requirement to block and 
 prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
 in property under this Act shall not include the 
 authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the 
 importation of goods.
        (B) Defined term.--In this paragraph, the term 
 ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade 
 substance, material, supply or manufactured product, 
 including inspection and test equipment, and excluding 
 technical data.

    (g) Rulemaking.--The President is authorized to promulgate such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this section (which may include regulatory exceptions), including 
under 

section 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1704).

    (h) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect 
beginning on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.

SEC. 6. DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY INITIATIVES.

    (a) Anti-Corruption Initiative.--The Secretary of State, through 
ongoing and new programs, shall develop an initiative that--

    (1) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western 
 Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and 
 contingent on the agreement of the host country government to 
 develop new national anti-corruption strategies;

    (2) seeks to share best practices with, and provide 
 training to, civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial 
 institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the 
 Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency, 
 transparency, and accountability of such agencies and 
 institutions;

    (3) strengthens existing national anti-corruption 
 strategies--
        (A) to combat political corruption, particularly in 
 the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, 
 and public procurement processes; and
        (B) to strengthen regulatory and legislative 
 oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom 
 of information and public procurement, including by 
 strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure 
 networks;

    (4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European 
 Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or 
 any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western 
 Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such 
 initiative; and

    (5) seeks to promote the important role of an independent 
 media in countering corruption through engagements with 
 governments of Western Balkan countries and providing training 
 opportunities for journalists on investigative reporting.

    (b) Prioritizing Cyber Resilience, Regional Trade, and Economic 
Competitiveness.--

    (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
        (A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and 
 political relationships among Western Balkans countries 
 will enable countries to better utilize existing 
 resources and maximize their economic security and 
 democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and 
 increasing trade in goods and services among other 
 countries in the region; and
        (B) United States investments in and assistance 
 toward creating a more integrated region ensures 
 political stability and security for the region.

    (2) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic 
 resilience in western balkans.--Not later than 180 days after 
 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
 and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
 International Development, in coordination with the heads of 
 other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit 
 to the appropriate congressional committees a regional economic 
 development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western 
 Balkans that complements the efforts of the European Union, 
 European nations, and other multilateral financing 
 institutions--
        (A) to consider the full set of tools and resources 
 available from the relevant agencies;
        (B) to include efforts to ensure coordination with 
 multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the 
 European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant 
 assistance frameworks;
            (C) to include an initial public assessment of--
            (i) economic opportunities for which United 
 States businesses, or those of other like-
 minded partner countries, would be competitive;
            (ii) legal, economic, governance, 
 infrastructural, or other barriers limiting 
 United States trade and investment in the 
 Western Balkans;
            (iii) the effectiveness of all existing 
 regional cooperation initiatives, such as the 
 Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans 
 Common Regional Market; and
            (iv) ways to increase United States trade 
 and investment within the Western Balkans;
            (D) to develop human and institutional capacity and 
 infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, 
 including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, 
 small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, 
 and cybersecurity;
        (E) to assist with the development and 
 implementation of regional and international trade 
 agreements;
        (F) to support women-owned enterprises;
        (G) to promote government and civil society 
 policies and programs that combat corruption and 
 encourage transparency (including by supporting 
 independent media by promoting the safety and security 
 of journalists), free and fair competition, sound 
 governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship, 
 and business environments conducive to sustainable and 
 inclusive economic growth; and
        (H) to include a public diplomacy strategy that 
 describes the actions that will be taken by relevant 
 agencies to increase support for the United States 
 relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries.

    (3) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a 
 briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that 
 describes the progress made towards developing the strategy 
 required under paragraph

    (2) .
            (c) Regional Trade and Development Initiative.--

    (1) Authorization.--The Secretary of State and the 
 Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
 Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant 
 Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional 
 trade and development initiative for the region comprised of 
 each Western Balkans country and any European Union member 
 country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country 
 (referred to in this subsection as the ``Western Balkans 
 region'') in accordance with this subsection.

    (2) Initiative elements.--The initiative authorized under 
 paragraph

    (1) shall--
        (A) promote private sector growth and 
 competitiveness and increase the capacity of 
 businesses, particularly small and medium-sized 
 enterprises, in the Western Balkans region;
        (B) aim to increase intraregional exports to 
 countries in the Balkans and European Union member 
 states;
            (C) aim to increase United States exports to, and 
 investments in, countries in the Balkans;
            (D) support startup companies, including companies 
 led by youth or women, in the Western Balkans region 
 by--
            (i) providing training in business skills 
 and leadership; and
            (ii) providing opportunities to connect to 
 sources of capital;
        (E) encourage and promote inward and outward trade 
 and investment through engagement with the Western 
 Balkans diaspora communities in the United States and 
 abroad;
        (F) provide assistance to the governments and civil 
 society organizations of Western Balkans countries to 
 develop--
            (i) regulations to ensure fair and 
 effective investment; and
            (ii) screening tools to identify and deter 
 malign investments and other coercive economic 
 practices;
        (G) review existing assistance programming relating 
 to the Western Balkans across Federal agencies--
            (i) to eliminate duplication; and
            (ii) to identify areas of potential 
 coordination within the Western Balkans region;
        (H) identify areas where application of additional 
 resources could expand successful programs to 1 or more 
 countries in the Western Balkans region by building on 
 the existing experience and program architecture;
            (I) compare existing single-country sector analyses 
 to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a 
 regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans 
 region; and
        (J) promote intraregional trade throughout the 
 Western Balkans region through--
            (i) programming, including grants, 
 cooperative agreements, and other forms of 
 assistance;
            (ii) expanding awareness of the 
 availability of loans and other financial 
 instruments from the United States Government; 
 and
            (iii) coordinating access to existing trade 
 instruments available through allies and 
 partners in the Western Balkans region, 
 including the European Union and international 
 financial institutions.

    (3) Support for regional infrastructure projects.--The 
 initiative authorized under paragraph

    (1) should facilitate and 
 prioritize support for regional infrastructure projects, 
 including--
        (A) transportation projects that build roads, 
 bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to 
 facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the 
 Western Balkans region;
        (B) technical support and investments needed to 
 meet United States and European Union standards for air 
 travel, including screening and information sharing;
            (C) the development of telecommunications networks 
 with trusted providers;
            (D) infrastructure projects that connect Western 
 Balkans countries to each other and to countries with 
 which they share a border;
        (E) the effective analysis of tenders and 
 transparent procurement processes;
        (F) investment transparency programs that will help 
 countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and 
 establish institutional and regulatory reforms 
 necessary--
            (i) to create an enabling environment for 
 trade and investment; and
            (ii) to strengthen protections against 
 suspect investments through public procurement 
 and privatization and through foreign direct 
 investments;
        (G) sharing best practices learned from the United 
 States and other international partners to ensure that 
 institutional and regulatory mechanisms for addressing 
 these issues are fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and 
 free from corruption;
        (H) projects that support regional energy security 
 and reduce dependence on Russian energy;
            (I) technical assistance and generating private 
 investment in projects that promote connectivity and 
 energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region;
        (J) technical assistance to support regional 
 collaboration on environmental protection that includes 
 governmental, political, civic, and business 
 stakeholders; and
        (K) technical assistance to develop financing 
 options and help create linkages with potential 
 financing institutions and investors.

    (4) Requirements.--All programming under the initiative 
 authorized under paragraph

    (1) shall--
        (A) be open to the participation of Albania, Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, 
 and Serbia;
        (B) be consistent with European Union accession 
 requirements;
            (C) be focused on retaining talent within the 
 Western Balkans;
            (D) promote government policies in Western Balkans 
 countries that encourage free and fair competition, 
 sound governance, environmental protection, and 
 business environments that are conducive to sustainable 
 and inclusive economic growth; and
        (E) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform 
 local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans 
 region about the initiative, including specific 
 programs and projects.
            (d) United States International Development Finance Corporation.--

    (1) Appointments.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, subject to the availability of 
 appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United 
 States International Development Finance Corporation, in 
 collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider 
 including a regional office with responsibilities for the 
 Western Balkans within the Corporation's plans to open new 
 regional offices.

    (2) Joint report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
 of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of 
 the United States International Development Finance Corporation 
 and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
 International Development shall submit a joint report to the 
 appropriate congressional committees that includes--
        (A) an assessment of the benefits of providing 
 sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western 
 Balkans to support infrastructure and energy 
 diversification projects;
        (B) an outline of additional resources, such as 
 tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to 
 offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; 
 and
            (C) an assessment of how the United States 
 International Development Finance Corporation can 
 deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or 
 other instruments issued to raise capital through 
 United States financial markets in the Western Balkans.

SEC. 7. PROMOTING CROSS-CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

    (1) promoting partnerships between United States 
 universities and universities in the Western Balkans, 
 particularly universities in traditionally under-served 
 communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and 
 requires a whole-of-government approach, including the 
 utilization of public-private partnerships;

    (2) such university partnerships would provide 
 opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical 
 expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit 
 of the United States; and

    (3) the seven countries in the Western Balkans meet the 
 requirements under 

section 105
            (c) (4) of the Foreign Assistance 
 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c
            (c) (4) ).

    (b) University Partnerships.--The President, working through the 
Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, consistent 
with 

section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151c), to promote the establishment of partnerships between United 
States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, 
including--

    (1) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy, 
 cyber resilience, and disinformation;

    (2) working with partner governments to reform policies, 
 improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and 
 students, including English language teaching, and to provide 
 quality, inclusive learning materials;

    (3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide 
 individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with 
 disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or 
 underserved communities, with relevant education, training, and 
 skills for meaningful employment;

    (4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between 
 institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in 
 the United States; and

    (5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded 
 institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the 
 larger European continent.

SEC. 8. PEACE CORPS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Peace 
Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship, in part 
by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for 
trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect 
the people of the United States with the people of the Western Balkans.

    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps should submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an 
analysis of current opportunities for Peace Corps expansion in the 
Western Balkans region.

SEC. 9. YOUNG BALKAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that regular 
people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, 
journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals 
from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing 
relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in 
the Western Balkans region.

    (b) BOLD Leadership Program for Young Balkans Leaders.--

    (1) Sense of congress.--The Department of State, through 
 BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western 
 Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young 
 leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development 
 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.

    (2) Expansion.--BOLD should be expanded, subject to the 
 availability of appropriations, to the entire Western Balkans 
 region.
            (c) Authorization.--The Secretary of State should further develop 
and implement BOLD, which shall hereafter be known as the ``Young 
Balkan Leaders Initiative'', to promote educational and professional 
development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western 
Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued 
development of the Western Balkans region.
            (d) Conduct of Initiative.--The goals of the Young Balkan Leaders 
Initiative shall be--

    (1) to further build the capacity of young Balkan leaders 
 in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information 
 technology, cybersecurity and digitization, agriculture, civic 
 engagement, and public administration;

    (2) to support young Balkan leaders by offering 
 professional development, training, and networking 
 opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, 
 innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, 
 entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and 
 journalism;

    (3) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic 
 Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related 
 to good governance, environmental protection, government 
 ethics, and minority inclusion;

    (4) to provide increased economic and technical assistance 
 to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and 
 strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and 
 entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans 
 countries;

    (5) to tailor such assistance to advance the particular 
 objectives of each United States mission in the Western Balkans 
 within the framework outlined in this subsection; and

    (6) to secure funding for such assistance from existing 
 funds available to each United States Mission in the Western 
 Balkans.

    (e) Fellowships.--Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the 
Secretary of State shall award fellowships to young leaders from the 
Western Balkans who--

    (1) are between 18 and 35 years of age;

    (2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in 
 entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership;

    (3) have had a positive impact in their communities, 
 organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-
 regional and multiethnic cooperation; and

    (4) represent a cross-section of geographic, gender, 
 political, and cultural diversity.

    (f) Public Engagement and Leadership Center.--Under the Young 
Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall take advantage 
of existing and future public diplomacy facilities (commonly known as 
``American Spaces'') to hire staff and develop programming for the 
establishment of a flagship public engagement and leadership center in 
the Western Balkans that seeks--

    (1) to counter disinformation and malign influence;

    (2) to promote cross-cultural engagement;

    (3) to provide training for young leaders from Western 
 Balkans countries described in subsection

    (e) ;

    (4) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout 
 Western Balkans countries established by the Office of American 
 Spaces; and

    (5) to annually bring together participants from the Young 
 Balkans Leaders Initiative to provide platforms for regional 
 networking.

    (g) Briefing on Certain Exchange Programs.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide 
 a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that 
 describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western 
 Balkans region.

    (2) Elements.--The briefing required under paragraph

    (1) shall--
        (A) assess the factors constraining the number and 
 frequency of participants from Western Balkans 
 countries in the International Visitor Leadership 
 Program of the Department of State;
        (B) identify the resources that are necessary to 
 address the factors described in subparagraph
        (A) ; and
            (C) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and 
 participants of professional development exchange 
 programs of the Department of State in the Western 
 Balkans with alumni and participants from other 
 countries in Europe, to enhance inter-region and intra-
 region people-to-people ties.

SEC. 10. SUPPORTING CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER RESILIENCE IN THE WESTERN 
 BALKANS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

    (1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber 
 resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans 
 countries will strengthen the region's ability to defend itself 
 from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by 
 nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, 
 that seek to influence the region;

    (2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to 
 manipulation can increase opportunities for--
        (A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, 
 including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and 
 software systems; and
        (B) the use of online information operations by 
 adversaries and malign actors to undermine United 
 States allies and interests; and

    (3) it is in the national security interest of the United 
 States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of 
 Western Balkans countries.

    (b) Interagency Report on Cybersecurity and the Digital Information 
Environment in Western Balkans Countries.--Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
contains--

    (1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen 
 cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans 
 countries;

    (2) a review of the information environment in each Western 
 Balkans country;

    (3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and 
 digital initiatives that--
        (A) counter influence operations and safeguard 
 elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans 
 countries;
        (B) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cybersecurity 
 capacity in the Western Balkans;
            (C) support democracy and internet freedom in 
 Western Balkans countries; and
            (D) build cyber capacity of governments who are 
 allies or partners of the United States;

    (4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing 
 between the United States and Western Balkans countries;

    (5) an assessment of--
        (A) options for the United States to better support 
 cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans 
 countries through changes to current assistance 
 authorities; and
        (B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding 
 or office space, of posting cyber professionals from 
 other Federal departments and agencies to United States 
 diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and 
 providing relevant training to Foreign Service 
 Officers; and

    (6) any additional support needed from the United States 
 for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following 
 NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia.

SEC. 11. RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

    (1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of 
 Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February 
 27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a 
 positive step forward in advancing normalization between the 
 two countries;

    (2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate 
 progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred 
 to in paragraph

    (1) ;

    (3) once sufficient progress has been made on the 
 Implementation Annex, the United States should consider 
 advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with 
 both countries, which could include--
        (A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with 
 Kosovo and Serbia; and
        (B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade 
 and investment with both countries; and

    (4) the United States should continue to support a 
 comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based 
 on mutual recognition.

    (b) Statement of 

=== Policy ===
-It is the policy of the United States 
Government that--

    (1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land 
 swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along 
 ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to arbitrate 
 disputes between nation states in the region; and

    (2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries 
 in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the 
 ethnic strife that once characterized the region.

SEC. 12. REPORTS ON RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND 
 CAMPAIGNS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.

    (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every two years thereafter, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the 
Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal 
departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees regarding Russian and Chinese 
malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to 
Balkan countries that seek--

    (1) to undermine democratic institutions;

    (2) to promote political instability; and

    (3) to harm the interests of the United States and North 
 Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the 
 Western Balkans.

    (b) Elements.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection

    (a) shall include--

    (1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian 
 Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding malign 
 influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to 
 Western Balkans countries--
        (A) to undermine democratic institutions, including 
 the planning and execution of democratic elections;
        (B) to promote political instability; and
            (C) to manipulate the information environment;

    (2) the activities and roles of the Department of State and 
 other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and 
 Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns;

    (3) a comprehensive list identifying--
        (A) each network, entity and individual, to the 
 extent such information is available, of Russia, China, 
 or any other country with which Russia or China may 
 cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese 
 malign influence operations or campaigns, including the 
 provision of financial or operational support to 
 activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit 
 freedom of speech or create barriers of access to 
 democratic processes, including exercising the right to 
 vote in a free and fair election; and
        (B) the role of each such entity in providing such 
 support;

    (4) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and 
 procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence 
 operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries;

    (5) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or 
 Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that targeted 
 alliances and partnerships of the United States Armed Forces in 
 the Western Balkans, including the effectiveness of such 
 operations and campaigns in achieving the objectives of Russia 
 and China, respectively;

    (6) the identification of each Western Balkans country with 
 respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted to 
 conduct a malign influence operation or campaign;

    (7) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and 
 of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian 
 or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried 
 out with respect to Western Balkans countries;

    (8) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign 
 influence operations in the Western Balkans, including through 
 the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the Countering 
 People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund;

    (9) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and 
 procedures that the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
 the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
 Defense, determines are likely to be used in future Russian or 
 Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out 
 with respect to Western Balkans countries; and

    (10) recommended authorities or activities that the 
 Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies could 
 enact to increase the United States Government's capacity to 
 counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and 
 campaigns in Western Balkans countries.
            (c) Form.--Each report required under subsection

    (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
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