119-hr4685

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4685 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 4685

 To pause development of the new Sentinel program, extend the life of 
 the Minuteman III, and redirect savings from Sentinel toward the 
 Department of Education, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 July 23, 2025

 Mr. Khanna (for himself, Mr. McGovern, Ms. Norton, and Mr. Thanedar) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Appropriations, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
 committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To pause development of the new Sentinel program, extend the life of 
 the Minuteman III, and redirect savings from Sentinel toward the 
 Department of Education, and for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Investing in Children Before 
Missiles Act of 2025'' or the ``ICBM Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
 projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States 
 nuclear arsenal, as of 2025, is ``$946 billion over the 2025-
 2034 period, or an average of about $95 billion a year'', and 
 nuclear forces account for 8.4 percent of the total 10-year 
 cost of the plans for national defense outlined in the 
 President's 2025 budget submission.

    (2) In September 2020, the Air Force awarded a sole-source 
 contract to Northrop Grumman for the ground-based strategic 
 deterrent program (now called Sentinel intercontinental 
 ballistic missile program), raising concerns that the absence 
 of competition for the award would result in higher than 
 projected costs to United States taxpayers. The program is 
 intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with 
 more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights and 
 spares.

    (3) The Sentinel program has encountered significant cost 
 growth and schedule delays in recent years, and the full extent 
 of both remains uncertain as the Department of Defense is 
 currently restructuring the program.

    (4) In January 2024, increases in the total costs of the 
 Sentinel program triggered a review under chapter 325 of title 
 10, United States Code (commonly known as the ``Nunn-McCurdy 
 Act''), which is intended to determine whether a program that 
 has experienced large cost overruns should continue, and what, 
 if any, changes should be made to control costs.

    (5) In July 2024, the Department of Defense completed that 
 review and released a new estimate of total costs for the 
 program of $141,000,000,000 in constant 2020 dollars, which is 
 81 percent (or $63,000,000,000) larger than the program's 
 baseline 2020 estimate of $78,000,000,000. The total estimated 
 life cycle cost of the Sentinel program (not including 
 warheads) was estimated by the Department of Defense to be 
 $260,000,000,000 in 2020 and is undoubtedly higher today.

    (6) In May 2025, the Air Force announced the Sentinel 
 program will likely ``predominantly'' require digging fresh 
 missile silos, a significant change from previous plans to 
 reuse existing silos and a move that would likely cause further 
 significant cost increases and schedule delays.

    (7) According to public reports, officials of the 
 Department of Defense expect the restructuring effort to delay 
 the Sentinel program by several years. The Department of 
 Defense's 2025 budget plans called for initial operating 
 capability to be achieved in May 2029, a date that, as of the 
 date of the enactment of this Act, looks unachievable. The Air 
 Force is considering contingency plans that would extend the 
 life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles by 11 
 more years to 2050 if delays continue to plague the Sentinel 
 missiles intended to replace them.

    (8) The National Nuclear Security Administration is 
 developing a replacement intercontinental ballistic missile 
 warhead, the W87-1, for the Sentinel and expanding plutonium 
 pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least 
 $14,000,000,000 and $18,000,000,000, respectively.

    (9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic 
 missile leg of the triad, the United States would have an 
 assured retaliatory capability in the form of multiple 
 ballistic missile submarines, which are virtually undetectable, 
 and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the 
 survivability of the ballistic missile submarine force. The 
 survivability of the submarine force will be enhanced as the 
 Department of Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic 
 submarine fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic missile 
 fleet.

    (10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles have 
 historically been the most responsive leg of the United States 
 nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine 
 communications to allow for the dissemination of emergency 
 action messages in wartime have negated that advantage.

    (11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles based in silos are 
 vulnerable and, once launched, cannot be recalled, leaving 
 decisionmakers with mere minutes to decide whether to launch 
 the missiles before they are destroyed, known as a posture of 
 ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under attack'' in the face of 
 a perceived nuclear attack, greatly increasing the risk of a 
 national leader initiating a nuclear war by mistake.

    (12) Under current policy, the President has the 
 authority--
        (A) to launch United States nuclear weapons first 
 and is not limited to retaliation;
        (B) to launch nuclear weapons under warning of 
 attack, rather than waiting for evidence of attack; and
            (C) to launch nuclear weapons on the President's 
 sole order.

    (13) False alarms have happened multiple times and can 
 happen again. For example, in 1980, a false alarm was reported 
 to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
 and was almost reported up to President Jimmy Carter as a real 
 attack but was luckily identified in time. Recent Pentagon 
 reports have found that, as a result of cyberattacks, the 
 President could be faced with false warnings of attack or lose 
 the ability to control nuclear weapons.

    (14) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel 
 of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false 
 warning in an early warning system that showed several United 
 States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders 
 from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov 
 the nickname ``the man who saved the world''.

    (15) Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry wrote 
 that the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad is 
 ``destabilizing because it invites an attack'' and 
 intercontinental ballistic missiles are ``some of the most 
 dangerous weapons in the world'' and ``could even trigger an 
 accidental nuclear war''.

    (16) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the 
 Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United States 
 Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry, ``[T]he 
 greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder--that we 
 might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we make 
 decisions about which weapons to buy, we should use this simple 
 rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk of accidental war 
 and is not needed to deter an intentional attack, we should not 
 build it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 
 [intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks of 
 accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We 
 are safer without these expensive weapons, and it would be 
 foolish to replace them.''.

    (17) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-
 Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-
 in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, said, ``I 
 would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 
 time ago. I'd be happy to put that mission on the submarines. 
 So, with a significant fraction of bombers having a nuclear 
 weapons capability that can be restored to alert very quickly, 
 and with even a small component of Trident submarines--with all 
 those missiles and all those warheads on patrol--it's hard to 
 imagine we couldn't get by.''.

    (18) While a sudden ``bolt from the blue'' first strike 
 from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely 
 scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the 
 purported role of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of 
 the triad to absorb such an attack.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MINUTEMAN III, SENTINEL, AND EDUCATION 
 FUNDING.

 It is the policy of the United States that--

    (1) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
 Sentinel program is significantly over budget and behind 
 schedule and should be paused and reevaluated for need and 
 technical merit;

    (2) the operational life of the Minuteman III missile 
 should be safely extended until at least 2050; and

    (3) investments in the Department of Education are a better 
 use of United States taxpayer resources than continuing with 
 the current Sentinel program.

SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR EDUCATION INSTEAD OF SENTINEL.

    (a) Transfer From Department of Defense.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall transfer all amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense 
for the research, development, test, and evaluation of the Sentinel 
program, and available for obligation as of the date of the enactment 
of this Act, to the Department of Education to carry out part A of 
title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 
U.S.C. 6311 et seq.).

    (b) Transfer From National Nuclear Security Administration.--The 
Secretary of Energy shall transfer all amounts appropriated to the 
National Nuclear Security Administration for the W87-1 warhead 
modification program, and available for obligation as of the date of 
the enactment of this Act, to the Department of Education to carry out 
part A of title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
(20 U.S.C. 6311 et seq.).

SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC 
 DETERRENT PROGRAM AND W87-1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PROGRAM.

 None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2026 may be obligated or expended for the 
Sentinel program or the W87-1 warhead modification program.

SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTEMAN III 
 INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

    (a) Independent Study.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter 
into a contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a 
study on extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missiles to 2050 or beyond.

    (b) Staffing.--

    (1) Experts.--The conduct of the study required by 
 subsection

    (a) shall include input from a wide variety of 
 technical and subject matter experts.

    (2) Prohibition on certain air force employees.--No member 
 or former member of the Air Force or employee or former 
 employee of the Department of the Air Force who is or was paid 
 for work relating to the Sentinel program may participate in 
 the conduct of the study required by subsection

    (a) .
            (c) Elements.--The study required by subsection

    (a) shall address 
the following:

    (1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
        (A) extending the life of Minuteman III 
 intercontinental ballistic missiles; and
        (B) deploying the Sentinel program.

    (2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 
 technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
 missile program as part of a service life extension program 
 that could also be incorporated in a possible future Sentinel 
 program, including, at a minimum, opportunities to increase 
 resilience against adversary missile defenses.

    (3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating 
 sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies to 
 reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the 
 service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through 2050.

    (4) An analysis and validation of the methods used to 
 estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and 
 Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch 
 experience of motors retired after the operational service life 
 of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.

    (5) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative 
 methods of estimating the operational service life of Minuteman 
 III motors, such as those methods based on fundamental physical 
 and chemical processes and nondestructive measurements of 
 individual motor properties.

    (6) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 
 configuring a Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic 
 missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.

    (7) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service 
 life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing the 
 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery vehicle 
 force from 400 to 300 or less.

    (8) An assessment of the extent to which the Columbia class 
 ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will 
 enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile 
 submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine warfare 
 threats.

    (9) An analysis of the extent to which an extension of the 
 life of the Minuteman III missiles would impact the decision of 
 the Russian Federation to target intercontinental ballistic 
 missiles of the United States in a crisis, compared to 
 proceeding with the Sentinel.

    (10) A best case estimate of what percentage of the 
 strategic forces of the United States would survive a 
 counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down by 
 intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile 
 submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.

    (11) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78 
 warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new Sentinel missile 
 as compared to proceeding with the W-87 life extension.

    (12) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional 
 launchers on submarines or uploading submarine-launched 
 ballistic missiles with additional warheads to compensate for a 
 reduced deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles of 
 the United States.
            (d) Report Required.--

    (1) Submission to department of defense.--Not later than 
 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
 National Academy of Sciences shall submit to the Secretary of 
 Defense a report containing the results of the study conducted 
 under subsection

    (a) .

    (2) Submission to congress.--Not later than 210 days after 
 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
 transmit to the appropriate congressional committees the report 
 required by paragraph

    (1) , without change.

    (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph

    (1) shall be 
 submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
 annex.

    (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
 subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
 means--
        (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
 on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
 Appropriations of the Senate; and
        (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
 on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations 
 of the House of Representatives.
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