119-hr4458

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4458 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 4458

 To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to 
 develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the 
 People's Republic of China.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 July 16, 2025

 Mr. Krishnamoorthi (for himself and Mr. LaHood) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for 
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
 committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to 
 develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the 
 People's Republic of China.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful 
Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025'' or the 
``COUNTER Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual report to 
Congress, titled ``Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People's Republic of China'' and known informally as the ``China 
Military Power Report''--

    (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and 
 basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain 
 military power at greater distances;

    (2) a global PLA logistics network could give the PRC 
 increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt United States 
 military operations;

    (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first 
 overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of Doraleh 
 in Djibouti;

    (4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire 
 strategically important port infrastructure at Subic Bay in the 
 Philippines, but was stopped by the Government of the United 
 States, the Philippines, and Japan, and by private investors;

    (5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and Cambodia 
 officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base Joint 
 Support and Training Center and celebrated the expansion of 
 port facilities at Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to 
 have been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have been 
 continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base since December 2023; 
 and

    (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's 
 access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the PRC 
 is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to 
 support naval, air, and ground forces projection in many 
 countries.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

 While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case efforts to 
forestall the establishment of new PRC permanent military presence in 
several countries, it is the sense of Congress that future efforts to 
counter the PRC's global basing intentions must--

    (1) proceed with the urgency required to address the 
 strategic implications of the PRC's actions;

    (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with 
 respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government 
 approach;

    (3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a 
 proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to 
 maximize strategic decision space;

    (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be 
 influential in shaping a partner's decision making regarding 
 giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory;

    (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's 
 global basing intentions within the context of the overall 
 United States strategic competition with the PRC;

    (6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and scientific 
 cooperation as a guise for establishing access for the PLA and 
 other PRC security forces in foreign countries;

    (7) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and 
 partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global basing, 
 many of which--
        (A) have historic ties and influence in many of the 
 geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential 
 future bases; and
        (B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to 
 form our baseline understanding of the PRC's global 
 intentions;

    (8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring 
 organizational structures and security and foreign assistance 
 and cooperation efforts to effectively address the issue of PRC 
 global basing intentions; and

    (9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement, 
 and other interests of the United States and our allies are not 
 jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

 In this Act:

    (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
 ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
        (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
 Senate;
        (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
 Senate;
            (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
        (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
 of Representatives;
        (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
 Representatives;
        (G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
 of the House of Representatives; and
        (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
 Representatives.

    (2) PLA.--The term ``PLA'' means the People's Liberation 
 Army of the PRC.

    (3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of 
 China.

    (4) PRC global basing.--The term ``PRC global basing'' 
 means the establishment of physical locations outside the 
 geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some 
 element of the People's Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or 
 security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the 
 presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, for 
 the purposes of potential power projection.

SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S C-PRC GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.

    (a) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, if needed, to 
the appropriate congressional committees. The assessment shall analyze 
the risk posed by PRC global basing to the United States or to any 
United States allies with respect to their ability to project power, 
maintain freedom of movement, and protect other interests as a function 
of the PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to 
subsection

    (b)

    (2)
        (A) .

    (b) Strategy.--

    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
 coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other 
 appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy 
 to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the 
 information described in paragraph

    (2) .

    (2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph

    (1) shall--
        (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that pose 
 the greatest potential risks, as identified in the 
 assessment required under subsection

    (a) , where the PRC 
 maintains a physical presence, or is suspected to be 
 seeking a physical presence, which could ultimately 
 transition into a PRC global base;
        (B) include a comprehensive listing of executive 
 branch entities currently involved in addressing 
 aspects of PRC global basing, including estimated 
 programmatic and personal resource requirements on an 
 agency-by-agency basis to effectively address the issue 
 of PRC global basing intentions, and any relevant 
 resource constraints;
            (C) describe in detail all executive branch efforts 
 to mitigate the impacts to the national interests of 
 the United States and partner countries of the 
 locations referred to in subparagraph
        (A) and prevent 
 the PRC from establishing new global bases, including 
 with resources described in subparagraph
        (B) ; and
            (D) for each of the locations referred to in 
 subparagraph
        (A) , identify the actions by the United 
 States or its allies that would be most effective in 
 ensuring the respective foreign governments terminate 
 plans for hosting a PRC base.
            (c) Task Force.--Not later than 90 days after submitting the 
strategy described in subsection

    (b) , the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior 
Federal officials, shall establish an interagency task force--

    (1) to implement the strategy described in section

    (b) to 
 counter the PRC's efforts at the locations of chief concern; 
 and

    (2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the 
 PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the 
 locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection

    (b)

    (2)
        (A) .
            (d) Quadrennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 4 years after 
the submission of the strategy required under subsection

    (b) , and not 
less frequently than once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of 
National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials, 
shall--

    (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's strategy and 
 overall approach in response to the PRC global basing 
 intentions; and

    (2) submit the results of such review, including the 
 information described in subsection

    (b)

    (2) , to the appropriate 
 congressional committees.
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