119-hr3452

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3452 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 3452

To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of 
 the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other 
 purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 May 15, 2025

Mr. Krishnamoorthi (for himself, Mr. Meeks, Mr. Stanton, Mrs. Kim, Mr. 
Nunn of Iowa, and Ms. Malliotakis) introduced the following bill; which 
 was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to 
 the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by 
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
 within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of 
 the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other 
 purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Six Assurances to Taiwan Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy of more than 
 23,000,000 people and an important economic partner to the 
 United States.

    (2) The People's Republic of China

    (PRC) has long sought to 
 subjugate Taiwan and has not renounced the use of force to do 
 so.

    (3) The United States longstanding One-China Policy, which 
 is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three United States-
 China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has guided 
 United States-Taiwan relations across successive 
 administrations and contributed to peace and stability in the 
 Indo-Pacific.

    (4) From July to August 1982, before and immediately after 
 the release of the United States-China Joint Communique on 
 United States Arms Sales to Taiwan (``the 1982 Joint 
 Communique'') on August 17, 1982, the Reagan Administration 
 articulated six key foreign policy principles regarding United 
 States-Taiwan relations.

    (5) On July 10, 1982, then-Under Secretary of State 
 Lawrence Eagleburger sent a cable to James Lilley, then-
 director of the American Institute in Taiwan, detailing what 
 the United States had not agreed to in its negotiations with 
 the People's Republic of China over the 1982 Joint Communique. 
 He wrote--
        (A) ``We have not agreed to set a date certain for 
 ending arms sales to Taiwan'';
        (B) ``We have not agreed to prior consultation on 
 arms sales'';
            (C) ``We have not agreed to any mediation role for 
 the U.S.'';
            (D) ``We have not agreed to revise the Taiwan 
 Relations Act'';
        (E) ``We have not agreed to take any position 
 regarding sovereignty over Taiwan''; and
        (F) ``The PRC has at no time urged us to put 
 pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC; however, 
 we can assure you that we will never do so''.

    (6) On August 17, 1982, then-Secretary of State Geroge 
 Shultz provided Lilley with a version of the Six Assurances for 
 Taiwan's government to release, stating that the United 
 States--
        (A) ``has not agreed to set a date for ending arms 
 sales to Taiwan'';
        (B) ``has not agreed to consult with the PRC on 
 arms sales to Taiwan'';
            (C) ``will not play any mediation role between 
 Taipei and Beijing'';
            (D) ``has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations 
 Act'';
        (E) ``has not altered its position regarding 
 sovereignty over Taiwan''; and
        (F) ``will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter 
 into negotiations with the PRC''.

    (7) On August 17, 1982, then-Assistant Secretary of State 
 for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdridge testified 
 on behalf of the executive branch before the Senate Committee 
 on Foreign Relations about the 1982 Joint Communique that--
        (A) ``[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for 
 ending arms sales to Taiwan'';
        (B) ``[The 1982 Joint Communique] should not be 
 read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior 
 consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan'';
            (C) ``[W]e see no mediation role for the United 
 States'';
            (D) ``We have no plans to seek any such revisions 
 [to the Taiwan Relations Act]'';
        (E) ``[T]here has been no change in our 
 longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over 
 Taiwan''; and
        (F) ``[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on 
 Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC''.

    (8) On August 18, 1982, Holdridge testified on behalf of 
 the executive branch before the House Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs about the 1982 Joint Communique that--
        (A) ``[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for 
 ending arms sales to Taiwan'';
        (B) ``[The 1982 Joint Communique] should not be 
 read that we have agreed to engage in prior 
 consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan'';
            (C) ``[W]e see no mediation role for the United 
 States'';
            (D) ``We have no plans to seek any such revisions 
 [to the Taiwan Relations Act]'';
        (E) ``[T]here has been no change in our 
 longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over 
 Taiwan''; and
        (F) ``[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on 
 Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's 
 Republic of China''.

    (9) These six foreign policy principles, as articulated by 
 Eagleburger, Shultz, and Holdridge, have collectively come to 
 be known as the Six Assurances.

    (10) The House of Representatives and Senate passed a 
 concurrent resolution ``reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act 
 and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan 
 relations'' on May 16, 2016, and July 6, 2016, respectively.

    (11) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public 
 Law 115-409) states that it is the policy of the United States 
 ``to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government 
 commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act 
 of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the [three Joint Communiques], and 
 the Six Assurances''.

    (12) The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal 
 Years 2019 through 2025 (Public Laws 115-232, 116-283, 116-92, 
 117-81, 117-263, 118-31, and 118-159) each recognized the 
 importance of the Six Assurances to United States-Taiwan 
 relations.

    (13) The Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-260) 
 states that ``[i]t is the policy of the United States to 
 reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations 
 Act in a manner consistent with the `Six Assurances' and in 
 accordance with the United States `One China' policy''.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

 It is the sense of Congress that--

    (1) the maintenance of peace and stability across the 
 Taiwan Strait is in the political, security, and economic 
 interests of the United States and is a matter of international 
 concern;

    (2) any unilateral change to the status quo from either 
 side or negotiated settlement of the question of Taiwan's 
 status without the consent of both sides of the Strait is 
 unacceptable;

    (3) the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful 
 means; and

    (4) the maintenance of the Six Assurances constitutes a 
 stabilizing and necessary component of United States policy 
 toward Taiwan.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

 It is the policy of the United States to reaffirm that, in the 
context of the 1982 Joint Communique, the United States--

    (1) did not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to 
 Taiwan;

    (2) did not agree to consult with the People's Republic of 
 China on arms sales to Taiwan;

    (3) did not and will not agree to play any mediation role;

    (4) did not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;

    (5) did not take any position regarding the issue of 
 sovereignty over Taiwan; and

    (6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into 
 negotiations with the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO THE SIX 
 ASSURANCES TO TAIWAN.

    (a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--

    (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
 law, before taking any action described in paragraph

    (2) , the 
 President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
 committees and leadership a notification that describes the 
 proposed action and the reasons for that action.

    (2) Actions described.--
        (A) In general.--An action described in this 
 paragraph is an action--
            (i) to pause or terminate the provision of 
 arms of a defensive character to Taiwan;
            (ii) to negotiate with the People's 
 Republic of China about the provision of arms 
 of a defensive character to Taiwan;
            (iii) to mediate between Taiwan and the 
 People's Republic of China regarding the issue 
 of sovereignty over Taiwan;
            (iv) to change the United States 
 longstanding position on the issue of the 
 sovereignty over Taiwan; or
            (v) to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter 
 into negotiations with the People's Republic of 
 China.

    (3) Description of type of action.--Each notification 
 submitted under paragraph

    (1) with respect to an action 
 described in paragraph

    (2) shall include a description of 
 whether the action is or is not intended to significantly alter 
 United States foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the 
 People's Republic of China.

    (4) Inclusion of additional matter.--Each notification 
 submitted under paragraph

    (1) that relates to an action that is 
 intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy 
 with respect to Taiwan or the People's Republic of China shall 
 include a description of--
        (A) the significant alteration to United States 
 foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the People's 
 Republic of China;
        (B) the anticipated effect of the action on the 
 economic and national security interests of the United 
 States; and
            (C) the anticipated effect of the action on the 
 issue of the sovereignty over Taiwan.

    (b) Period for Review by Congress.--

    (1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
 beginning on the date on which the President submits a 
 notification under subsection

    (a)

    (1) , the appropriate 
 congressional committees should hold hearings and briefings and 
 otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the 
 notification.

    (2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under 
 paragraph

    (1) of a notification required to be submitted under 
 subsection

    (a)

    (1) shall be 60 calendar days if the notification 
 is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 
 in any calendar year.

    (3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional 
 review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
 during the period for congressional review provided for under 
 paragraph

    (1) of a notification submitted under subsection

    (a)

    (1) proposing an action described in subsection

    (a)

    (2) , 
 including any additional period for such review as applicable 
 under the exception provided in paragraph

    (2) , neither the 
 President nor any other officer or employee of the United 
 States may expend any appropriated funds in furtherance of that 
 action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to 
 that action is enacted in accordance with subsection
            (c) .

    (4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration 
 of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any 
 other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval 
 relating to a notification submitted under subsection

    (a)

    (1) proposing an action described in subsection

    (a)

    (2) passes both 
 Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection
            (c) , neither 
 the President nor any other officer or employee of the United 
 States may expend any appropriated funds in furtherance of that 
 action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of 
 passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

    (5) Limitation on actions during congressional 
 reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint 
 resolution of disapproval relating to a notification submitted 
 under subsection

    (a)

    (1) proposing an action described in 
 subsection

    (a)

    (2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance 
 with subsection
            (c) , and the President vetoes the joint 
 resolution, neither the President nor any other officer or 
 employee of the United States may take that action or expend 
 any appropriated funds in furtherance of that action for a 
 period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President's 
 veto.

    (6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of 
 disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a 
 joint resolution of disapproval relating to a notification 
 submitted under subsection

    (a)

    (1) proposing an action described 
 in subsection

    (a)

    (2) is enacted in accordance with subsection
            (c) , neither the President nor any other officer or employee of 
 the United States may take that action or expend any 
 appropriated funds in furtherance of that action.
            (c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval.--

    (1) === Definitions. ===
-In this subsection:
        (A) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint 
 resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution 
 of either House of Congress--
            (i) the title of which is as follows: ``A 
 joint resolution approving the President's 
 proposal to take an action relating to the Six 
 Assurances to Taiwan.''; and
            (ii) the sole matter after the resolving 
 clause of which is the following: ``Congress 
 approves of the action relating to the action 
 with respect to the Six Assurances to Taiwan 
 proposed by the President in the notification 
 submitted to Congress under 

section 2

    (a)

    (1) of 
 the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act on _______ 
 relating to ________.'', with the first blank 
 space being filled with the appropriate date 
 and the second blank space being filled with a 
 short description of the proposed action.
        (B) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term 
 ``joint resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint 
 resolution of either House of Congress--
            (i) the title of which is as follows: ``A 
 joint resolution disapproving the President's 
 proposal to take an action relating to the Six 
 Assurances to Taiwan.''; and
            (ii) the sole matter after the resolving 
 clause of which is the following: ``Congress 
 disapproves of the action relating to the Six 
 Assurances to Taiwan proposed by the President 
 in the notification submitted to Congress under 
 

section 2

    (a)

    (1) of the Six Assurances to Taiwan 
 Act on _______ relating to ________.'', with 
 the first blank space being filled with the 
 appropriate date and the second blank space 
 being filled with a short description of the 
 proposed action.

    (2) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
 provided for under subsection

    (b)

    (1) , including any additional 
 period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection

    (b)

    (2) , a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of 
 disapproval may be introduced--
        (A) in the House of Representatives, by the 
 majority leader or the minority leader; and
        (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the 
 majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or 
 the minority leader's designee).

    (3) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If 
 the appropriate congressional committee of the House of 
 Representatives has not reported the joint resolution within 10 
 legislative days after the date of referral, that committee 
 shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint 
 resolution.

    (4) Consideration in the senate.--
        (A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of 
 approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced 
 in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations.
        (B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to 
 which a joint resolution of approval or joint 
 resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported 
 the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the 
 date of referral of the joint resolution, that 
 committee shall be discharged from further 
 consideration of the joint resolution and the joint 
 resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
            (C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding 
 Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in 
 order at any time after the Committee on Foreign 
 Relations reports a joint resolution of approval or 
 joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has 
 been discharged from consideration of such a joint 
 resolution (even though a previous motion to the same 
 effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the 
 consideration of the joint resolution, and all points 
 of order against the joint resolution (and against 
 consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The 
 motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not 
 subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider 
 the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed 
 to shall not be in order.
            (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals 
 from the decisions of the Chair relating to the 
 application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may 
 be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of 
 approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be 
 decided without debate.
        (E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the 
 Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint 
 resolution of approval or joint resolution of 
 disapproval, including all debatable motions and 
 appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall 
 be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, 
 and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority 
 leader or their designees.

    (5) Rules relating to senate and house of 
 representatives.--
        (A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in 
 house.--In the House of Representatives, the following 
 procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of 
 approval or a joint resolution of disapproval received 
 from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a 
 joint resolution relating to the same proposed action):
            (i) The joint resolution shall be referred 
 to the appropriate committee.
            (ii) If a committee to which a joint 
 resolution has been referred has not reported 
 the joint resolution within 5 legislative days 
 after the date of referral, that committee 
 shall be discharged from further consideration 
 of the joint resolution.
            (iii) Beginning on the third legislative 
 day after each committee to which a joint 
 resolution has been referred reports the joint 
 resolution to the House or has been discharged 
 from further consideration thereof, it shall be 
 in order to move to proceed to consider the 
 joint resolution in the House. All points of 
 order against the motion are waived. Such a 
 motion shall not be in order after the House 
 has disposed of a motion to proceed on the 
 joint resolution. The previous question shall 
 be considered as ordered on the motion to its 
 adoption without intervening motion. The motion 
 shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider 
 the vote by which the motion is disposed of 
 shall not be in order.
            (iv) The joint resolution shall be 
 considered as read. All points of order against 
 the joint resolution and against its 
 consideration are waived. The previous question 
 shall be considered as ordered on the joint 
 resolution to final passage without intervening 
 motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided 
 and controlled by the sponsor of the joint 
 resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A 
 motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the 
 joint resolution shall not be in order.
        (B) Treatment of house joint resolution in 
 senate.--
            (i) Receipt before passage.--If, before the 
 passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of 
 approval or joint resolution of disapproval, 
 the Senate receives an identical joint 
 resolution from the House of Representatives, 
 the following procedures shall apply:
            (I) That joint resolution shall not 
 be referred to a committee.
            (II) With respect to that joint 
 resolution--

    (aa) the procedure in the 
 Senate shall be the same as if 
 no joint resolution had been 
 received from the House of 
 Representatives; but

    (bb) the vote on passage 
 shall be on the joint 
 resolution from the House of 
 Representatives.
            (ii) Receipt after passage.--If, following 
 passage of a joint resolution of approval or 
 joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, 
 the Senate receives an identical joint 
 resolution from the House of Representatives, 
 that joint resolution shall be placed on the 
 appropriate Senate calendar.
            (iii) No companion measure.--If a joint 
 resolution of approval or a joint resolution of 
 disapproval is received from the House, and no 
 companion joint resolution has been introduced 
 in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this 
 subsection shall apply to the House joint 
 resolution.
            (C) Application to revenue measures.--The 
 provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the 
 House of Representatives to a joint resolution of 
 approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a 
 revenue measure.

    (6) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
 subsection is enacted by Congress--
        (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
 Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, 
 and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each 
 House, respectively, and supersedes other rules only to 
 the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
        (B) with full recognition of the constitutional 
 right of either House to change the rules (so far as 
 relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, 
 in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the 
 case of any other rule of that House.
            (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--

    (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
 Representatives; and

    (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 6. SEVERABILITY.

 If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof, is held 
invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Act and the application 
of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be 
affected thereby.
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