119-hr2614

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2614 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 2614

 To establish a program and strategy to support internet freedom and 
 counter censorship efforts in Iran, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 April 2, 2025

 Mr. Wilson of South Carolina (for himself and Mr. Panetta) introduced 
 the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial 
 Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
 of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
 concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

 To establish a program and strategy to support internet freedom and 
 counter censorship efforts in Iran, and for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Maximum Support Act''.

SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

 It is the policy of the United States to provide maximum support to 
the people of Iran in their desire to bring about a new political 
system in Iran based upon democracy, human rights, and rule of law for 
all citizens of Iran.

SEC. 3. PROGRAM AND STRATEGY TO SUPPORT INTERNET FREEDOM AND COUNTER 
 CENSORSHIP EFFORTS IN IRAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global 
Media, shall establish a new interagency task force to support internet 
freedom and counter censorship efforts in Iran. In addition the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury and CEO of the U.S. Agency 
for Global Media, acting as part of this task force, shall develop and 
submit to Congress a strategy to support the Iranian people in 
countering state and non-state actors' efforts to create deliberate 
barriers to internet access, including shutting down or slowing 
connectivity and blocking online content protected by international 
human rights standards.

    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall 
include the following:

    (1) A description of efforts to establish a Virtual Private 
 Network

    (VPN) service specifically designed to enable the 
 Iranian people to bypass government censorship and access the 
 internet freely. The objectives of this VPN service shall 
 include--
        (A) ensuring secure and uncensored internet access 
 for users in Iran;
        (B) providing robust protection against 
 surveillance and data interception by Iranian 
 authorities and others;
            (C) maintaining high standards of speed and 
 reliability to ensure usability; and
            (D) regularly updating and adapting the service to 
 respond to new security challenges and censorship 
 techniques employed by the Iranian government, IRGC and 
 Iranian judiciary.

    (2) A description of the use of enhanced satellite 
 communications through direct-to-cell technology and eSIM and 
 eSIM device distribution, including--
        (A) the incorporation of services such as services 
 that provide seamless internet access directly to 
 cellular devices and other technology to facilitate 
 seamless internet access in Iran; and
        (B) a program for the distribution of eSIMs and 
 eSIM devices to individuals in Iran, enabling them to 
 connect to satellite internet services quickly and 
 securely.

    (3) A description of Iranian regime restrictions on the 
 import of cell phones--
        (A) detailing Iranian government, IRGC, and Iranian 
 judiciary restrictions on iPhone 14, iPhone 15, and 
 iPhone 16 devices out of fear of satellite internet 
 technology including requirements that such phones be 
 registered with the government and the impact of past 
 bans on such phones;
        (B) outlining steps to counter the regime's efforts 
 to restrict access to devices capable of utilizing 
 satellite-based internet services; and
            (C) describing measures by the Secretary of State 
 to curb any efforts by the regime to create secondary 
 or black markets that would allow the Iranian 
 government, IRGC, or Iranian judiciary or their 
 affiliates to profit from the sale of these devices 
 through controlled channels.

    (4) A detailed vetting plan for technology companies or 
 individuals contracted to expand internet access in Iran, 
 ensuring that no companies or individuals affiliated with the 
 Iranian regime are involved in initiatives to promote internet 
 freedom.

    (5) A description of which VPNs in Iran are built by the 
 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

    (IRGC) and other entities 
 controlled by the Government of Iran or its Supreme Leader and 
 how such VPNs are used by the regime to surveil and monitor 
 users, as well as a plan to counter these deceptive tactics and 
 raise public awareness about the risks associated with regime-
 affiliated VPNs.

    (6) A detailed plan to support satellite-to-cell internet 
 technology in Iran, ensuring that--
        (A) such technology cannot be censored or jammed by 
 the regime; and
        (B) access does not require the transfer or sale of 
 hardware that could be controlled by the IRGC or sold 
 on secondary markets.

    (7) providing secure communication tools, encryption 
 technology, and cybersecurity software designed specifically 
 for high-risk users;

    (8) cybersecurity training programs for Iranian activists, 
 dissidents, and journalists focused on identifying regime-
 sponsored cyberattacks, phishing schemes, and digital 
 surveillance tactics;

    (9) rapid response technical support for individuals and 
 organizations experiencing cyber threats or attacks; and

    (10) a system of regular evaluation and reporting to 
 Congress detailing cybersecurity threats encountered and 
 measures undertaken to mitigate such threats.
            (c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form.
            (d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date on 
which the strategy required by subsection

    (a) is developed, the task 
force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.

SEC. 4. CONFISCATION OF THE ASSETS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND PUPPET 
 TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--The President shall--

    (1) confiscate, through instructions or licenses or in such 
 other manner as the President determines appropriate, funds of 
 the Government of Iran and all agents or instrumentalities of 
 the Government of Iran that are subject to the jurisdiction of 
 the United States; and

    (2) deposit funds confiscated under paragraph

    (1) in the 
 general fund of the Treasury to be used for purposes described 
 in subsection
            (c) .

    (b) Vesting.--All right, title, and interest in funds confiscated 
under subsection

    (a) shall vest in the Government of the United States.
            (c) === Purposes ===
-Funding may be provided to provide maximum support 
to persons and entities within Iran which are working for a transition 
to a democratic government based upon human rights and rule of law. To 
the extent practicable, funding must be provided to persons and 
entities with transparent measurable results, including through 
providing detailed annual information on expenditures and outcomes. In 
particular, funding may be provided to:

    (1) Establish a strikers fund to provide assistance to 
 vetted Iranians engaged in nonviolent strikes and other forms 
 of nonviolent opposition to the regime in Iran done in a way 
 which does not materially benefit the regime in Iran.

    (2) Providing humanitarian assistance and medical supplies 
 to the people of Iran delivered through partners that uphold 
 internationally recognized humanitarian principles with robust 
 monitoring to ensure assistance is reaching intended 
 beneficiaries in a way which does not materially benefit the 
 regime in Iran.

    (3) Establish a fund to support efforts to document and 
 publicize gross violations of internationally recognized human 
 rights and international humanitarian law in Iran, including 
 efforts related to extrajudicial killings, torture, severe 
 forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor, 
 and sexual exploitation, and to hold perpetrators accountable.

    (4) The funding of efforts of the task force to promote 
 internet freedom in Iran described in 

section 3

    (a) of this Act.
            (d) Audit.--The Comptroller of the United States, and the Inspector 
Generals of the Department of State, Department of Treasury, and USAID 
shall report to Congress annually after engaging in annual audits of 
funds expended based upon subsection
            (c) , including whether or not the 
regime in Iran materially benefitted from any expenditure of funds. If 
the Comptroller of the United States, or any of the Inspector Generals, 
determine that the regime in Iran has benefited from any expenditure 
such expenditures must be immediately terminated, and any 
recommendations to prevent future diversion of funds must be 
immediately implemented.

SEC. 5. STRATEGY TO ENSURE SANCTIONS DO NOT IMPEDE INTERNET FREEDOM FOR 
 THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop and submit to Congress a 
strategy to ensure that sanctions imposed on the regime in Iran do not 
inadvertently prevent Iranian civilians from accessing technology and 
tools necessary for internet freedom and open communication.

    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall 
include--

    (1) An examination of existing sanctions and their impact 
 on the availability of internet freedom tools for the people of 
 Iran, including--
        (A) an assessment of any unintended restrictions 
 that limit access to Virtual Private Networks

    (VPNs) , 
 secure messaging applications, satellite communication 
 technology, cloud-based services, and other tools 
 necessary for circumventing government censorship; and
        (B) an analysis of how sanctions may affect the 
 ability of technology companies and non-governmental 
 organizations to provide services and support to the 
 Iranian people without materially benefiting the 
 regime.

    (2) The issuance of specific licenses and waivers that 
 facilitate internet freedom in Iran while ensuring that such 
 measures do not enable or provide financial benefit to the 
 regime, including--
        (A) the development of clear guidelines for private 
 sector entities on how they can provide internet-
 related services to Iranian civilians without violating 
 U.S. sanctions;
        (B) a streamlined process for approving waivers and 
 licenses that support internet access and digital 
 communication tools for the Iranian people; and
            (C) measures to prevent the misuse of such licenses 
 and waivers by entities affiliated with the Iranian 
 government or Iranian judiciary or the Islamic 
 Revolutionary Guard Corps

    (IRGC) , or other affiliated 
 of the Iranian government including a regular review 
 process to ensure that waivers are not being misused by 
 regime-aligned groups.

    (3) A plan to work with technology companies, civil society 
 organizations, and international partners to expand access to 
 censorship-resistant communication technologies in Iran, 
 including--
        (A) identifying key stakeholders capable of 
 providing secure and effective internet access 
 solutions;
        (B) ensuring companies seeking to provide such 
 services are properly vetted to prevent inadvertent 
 assistance to the Iranian regime; and
            (C) enhancing public awareness campaigns within 
 Iran about the availability of secure internet access 
 tools.

    (4) A detailed mechanism for continuously monitoring and 
 assessing the effectiveness of these measures, including--
        (A) regular reporting to Congress on the impact of 
 licenses and waivers issued to facilitate internet 
 freedom in Iran;
        (B) recommendations for further actions to improve 
 access to open and secure communication technologies; 
 and
            (C) an evaluation of the Iranian regime's attempts 
 to counteract these measures and strategies to mitigate 
 such efforts.
            (c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form.
            (d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date on 
which the strategy required by subsection

    (a) is developed, the task 
force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.

SEC. 6. STRATEGY TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN 
 THEIR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM BASED 
 ON THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit to 
Congress a strategy detailing steps to provide maximum support to the 
Iranian people in their efforts to bring about a transition to a new 
political system and government based on the rule of law, democracy, 
and human rights.

    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall 
include--

    (1) Diplomatic efforts of the department of state.--A 
 description of how the Secretary of State will--
        (A) use diplomatic efforts to support the Iranian 
 protest movements in their pursuit of democratic 
 governance; and
        (B) establish a Special Representative for Maximum 
 Support including an Office for the Special 
 Representative to coordinate U.S. Government efforts to 
 assist the Iranian people in their democratic 
 aspirations and to serve as a key liaison with 
 international partners in support of this objective.

    (2) Maximum economic pressure by the department of the 
 treasury.--A description of how the Secretary of the Treasury 
 will--
        (A) implement and enforce sanctions targeting key 
 sectors of the Iranian economy that sustain the 
 regime's oppressive activities;
        (B) disrupt the financial networks that facilitate 
 the Iranian regime's terrorist activities and human 
 rights abuses; and
            (C) coordinate with international partners to 
 maximize the effectiveness of economic measures aimed 
 at weakening the regime's ability to suppress its 
 people.

    (3) Intelligence support for the iranian protest 
 movement.--A description of how the Intelligence Community 
 will--
        (A) use intelligence-gathering capabilities to 
 monitor and expose the Iranian regime's efforts to 
 suppress dissent and target protestors;
        (B) provide support to Iranian civil society actors 
 and opposition groups to enhance their security and 
 operational capabilities; and
            (C) assist in identifying and countering 
 disinformation campaigns initiated by the Iranian 
 regime to delegitimize democratic movements.

    (4) Media freedom and information campaigns.--A description 
 of how the United States Agency for Global Media

    (USAGM) will--
        (A) expand and enhance broadcasting efforts to 
 provide the Iranian people with accurate and unbiased 
 news coverage on the situation in Iran;
        (B) utilize social media platforms to expose and 
 highlight the Iranian regime's crimes against its own 
 people, including human rights abuses, corruption, and 
 acts of violence against protestors; and
            (C) support independent Iranian journalists and 
 media outlets in their efforts to report freely and 
 counter the regime's propaganda.

    (5) Interagency coordination.--A plan for ensuring 
 coordination between relevant agencies, including the 
 Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the 
 Intelligence Community, and USAGM, to ensure a comprehensive 
 and unified approach in supporting the Iranian people's pursuit 
 of democracy.
            (c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex if 
necessary.
            (d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date on 
which the strategy required by subsection

    (a) is developed, the task 
force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.

SEC. 7. DESIGNATION OF THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND 
 SECURITY AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

    (a) 

=== Findings ===
-Congress finds the following:

    (1) The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security

    (MOIS) is the primary intelligence apparatus of the Government 
 of Iran, responsible for espionage, covert operations, 
 surveillance, cyberattacks, kidnappings, assassinations of 
 dissidents abroad, and direct support for terrorist proxies.

    (2) MOIS provides financial, logistical, and operational 
 support to terrorist groups already designated as Foreign 
 Terrorist Organizations by the United States, including 
 Hezbollah and designated militias operating in the Middle East.

    (3) MOIS poses a direct and ongoing threat to the national 
 security of the United States, American citizens abroad, and 
 U.S. allies through continued support for terrorism, espionage 
 operations, and acts of violence.

    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--

    (1) the activities of MOIS satisfy the statutory criteria 
 for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under 
 

section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
 1189); and

    (2) formally designating MOIS as an FTO would advance the 
 national security interests of the United States, strengthen 
 enforcement against its global operations, and enhance 
 international efforts to isolate its terrorist networks.
            (c) Determination and Report.--

    (1) Requirement for determination.--Not later than 90 days 
 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
 State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and 
 the Attorney General, shall determine, pursuant to the criteria 
 specified in 

section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
 (8 U.S.C. 1189), whether MOIS meets the criteria to be 
 designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

    (2) Designation.--If the Secretary of State determines that 
 MOIS meets such criteria, consistent with 

section 219 of the 
 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), the Secretary 
 shall designate MOIS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and 
 promptly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
 detailed justification for such designation, including an 
 assessment of threats posed by MOIS.

SEC. 8. STRATEGY TO ENCOURAGE DEFECTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and 
submit to Congress a strategy aimed at encouraging and facilitating 
defections by Iranian officials and members of security forces who seek 
to support democratic change in Iran.

    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall 
include--

    (1) identification of mechanisms to securely communicate 
 with potential defectors, including secure digital channels 
 utilizing encryption technologies and private intermediaries;

    (2) measures providing assurances of safety and security to 
 defectors and their families;

    (3) establishment of a dedicated interagency working group 
 tasked with managing defections, ensuring defector safety, 
 verifying information provided by defectors, and mitigating 
 potential intelligence risks;

    (4) incentives for defectors who can significantly 
 contribute to democratic change or who provide actionable 
 intelligence about regime operations, including potential 
 financial assistance, employment support, and housing 
 assistance in coordination with relevant domestic agencies;

    (5) measures for publicizing successful defections, when 
 appropriate and consistent with security protocols, to 
 encourage additional defections within the regime; and

    (6) coordination with international partners to share best 
 practices, jointly facilitate defections, and ensure defectors 
 receive international protection, as needed.
            (c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex if 
necessary.
            (d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the 
submission of the strategy, the interagency working group shall submit 
to Congress a detailed implementation plan for the strategy.

SEC. 9. CYBERSECURITY ASSISTANCE TO IRANIAN DISSIDENTS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a cybersecurity 
support program specifically tailored to assist Iranian dissidents, 
journalists, and civil society organizations in countering cyber 
threats posed by the Iranian regime.

    (b) Elements.--The cybersecurity support program shall include--

    (1) providing secure communication tools, encryption 
 technology, and cybersecurity software designed specifically 
 for high-risk users;

    (2) cybersecurity training programs for Iranian activists, 
 dissidents, and journalists focused on identifying regime-
 sponsored cyberattacks, phishing schemes, and digital 
 surveillance tactics;

    (3) rapid response technical support for individuals and 
 organizations experiencing cyber threats or attacks; and

    (4) a system of regular evaluation and reporting to 
 Congress detailing cybersecurity threats encountered and 
 measures undertaken to mitigate such threats.

SEC. 10. STRATEGY TO ENCOURAGE DEFECTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and 
submit to Congress a strategy aimed at encouraging defections by 
Iranian officials and members of security forces who seek to support 
democratic change in Iran.

    (b) Strategy Described.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall include--

    (1) identification of mechanisms to securely communicate 
 with potential defectors, including secure digital channels 
 utilizing encryption technologies and private intermediaries;

    (2) measures providing assurances of safety and security to 
 defectors and their families;

    (3) establishment of a dedicated interagency working group 
 tasked with managing defections, ensuring defector safety, 
 verifying information provided by defectors, and mitigating 
 potential intelligence risks;

    (4) incentives for defectors who can significantly 
 contribute to democratic change or who provide actionable 
 intelligence about regime operations, including potential 
 financial assistance, employment support, and housing 
 assistance in coordination with relevant domestic agencies;

    (5) measures for publicizing successful defections, when 
 appropriate and consistent with security protocols, to 
 encourage additional defections within the regime; and

    (6) coordination with international partners to share best 
 practices, jointly facilitate defections, and ensure defectors 
 receive international protection, as needed.
            (c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection

    (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex if 
necessary.
            (d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the 
submission of the strategy, the interagency working group shall submit 
to Congress a detailed implementation plan for the strategy.
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