119-hr1354

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1354 Introduced in House

    (IH) ]

<DOC>

119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 1354

To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that disparate impacts 
 on certain populations constitute a sufficient basis for rights of 
 action under such Act, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 February 13, 2025

 Ms. Tlaib (for herself, Mr. Cleaver, Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania, Mr. 
 Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Ms. Norton, Ms. Kamlager-
 Dove, Mrs. McIver, Mr. Frost, Ms. Adams, Ms. Pressley, Mr. Jackson of 
 Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, and Mr. Mfume) introduced the following bill; 
 which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition 
 to the Committee on Education and Workforce, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
 of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
 concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

 A BILL

To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that disparate impacts 
 on certain populations constitute a sufficient basis for rights of 
 action under such Act, and for other purposes.

 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

 This Act may be cited as the ``Justice for All Act of 2025''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

 Congress finds the following:

    (1) This Act is made necessary by a decision of the Supreme 
 Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275

    (2001) that 
 significantly impairs statutory protections against 
 discrimination that Congress has erected over a period of 
 almost 4 decades. The Sandoval decision undermines these 
 statutory protections by stripping victims of discrimination 
 (defined under regulations that Congress required Federal 
 departments and agencies to promulgate to implement title VI of 
 the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.)) of the 
 right to bring action in Federal court to redress the 
 discrimination.

    (2) The Sandoval decision contradicts settled expectations 
 created by title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IX 
 of the Education Amendments of 1972 (also known as the ``Patsy 
 Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act'') (20 U.S.C. 
 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 
 6101 et seq.), and 

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) (collectively referred to in this Act as 
 the ``covered civil rights provisions''). The covered civil 
 rights provisions were designed to establish and make effective 
 the rights of persons to be free from discrimination on the 
 part of entities that are subject to 1 or more of the covered 
 civil rights provisions, as appropriate (referred to in this 
 Act as ``covered entities''). In 1964 Congress adopted title VI 
 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ensure that Federal dollars 
 would not be used to subsidize or support programs or 
 activities that discriminated on racial, color, or national 
 origin grounds. In the years that followed, Congress extended 
 these protections by enacting laws barring discrimination in 
 federally funded education activities on the basis of sex in 
 title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and 
 discrimination in federally funded activities on the basis of 
 age in the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and disability in 
 

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

    (3) All of the statutes cited in this section were designed 
 to protect persons subject to discrimination. As Congress has 
 consistently recognized, effective enforcement of the statutes 
 and protection of the rights guaranteed under the statutes 
 depend heavily on the efforts of private attorneys general. 
 Congress acknowledged that it could not secure compliance 
 solely through administrative efforts and enforcement actions 
 initiated by the Attorney General. Newman v. Piggie Park 
 Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400

    (1968) (per curiam).

    (4) The Supreme Court has made it clear that individuals 
 suffering discrimination under these statutes have a private 
 right of action in the Federal courts, and that this is 
 necessary for effective protection of the law, although 
 Congress did not make such a right of action explicit in the 
 statute involved. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677

    (1979) .

    (5) Furthermore, for effective enforcement of the statutes 
 cited in this section, it is necessary that the private right 
 of action include a means to challenge all forms of 
 discrimination that are prohibited by the statutes, including 
 practices that have a disparate impact and are not justified as 
 necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of programs or 
 activities supported by Federal financial assistance.

    (6) By reinstating a private right of action to challenge 
 disparate impact discrimination under title VI of the Civil 
 Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) and confirming 
 that right for other civil rights statutes, Congress is not 
 acting in a manner that would expose covered entities to unfair 
 findings of discrimination. The legal standard for a disparate 
 impact claim has never been structured so that a finding of 
 discrimination could be based on numerical imbalance alone.

    (7) In contrast, a failure to reinstate or confirm a 
 private right of action would leave vindication of the rights 
 to equality of opportunity solely to Federal agencies. Action 
 by Congress to specify a private right of action is necessary 
 to ensure that persons will have a remedy if they are denied 
 equal access to education, housing, health, environmental 
 protection, transportation, and many other programs and 
 services by practices of covered entities that result in 
 discrimination.

    (8) As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in 
 Sandoval, courts have dismissed numerous claims brought under 
 the regulations promulgated pursuant to title VI of the Civil 
 Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) that challenged 
 actions with an unjustified discriminatory effect. Although the 
 Sandoval Court did not address title IX of the Education 
 Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), lower courts have 
 similarly dismissed claims under such title.

    (9) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 
 U.S.C. 794) has received different treatment by the Supreme 
 Court. In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287

    (1985) , the Court 
 proceeded on the assumption that the statute itself prohibited 
 some actions that had a disparate impact on disabled 
 individuals--an assumption borne out by congressional 
 statements made during passage of the Act. In Sandoval, the 
 Court appeared to accept this principle of Alexander. Moreover, 
 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized congressional approval 
 of the regulations promulgated to implement 

section 504 of the 
 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
 Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634

    (1984) . Relying on the validity of 
 the regulations, Congress incorporated the regulations into the 
 statutory requirements of 

section 204 of the Americans with 
 Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12134). Nonetheless, 
 Sandoval creates the potential for uncertainty in the 
 application of critical protections of 

Section 504, 
 particularly in the lower courts.

    (10) The right to maintain a private right of action under 
 a provision added to a statute under this Act will be 
 effectuated by a waiver of sovereign immunity in the same 
 manner as sovereign immunity is waived under the remaining 
 provisions of that statute.

    (11) Numerous provisions of Federal law expressly prohibit 
 discrimination on the basis of sex, and Federal agencies and 
 courts have correctly interpreted these prohibitions on sex 
 discrimination to include discrimination based on sexual 
 orientation, gender identity, and sex stereotypes. In 
 particular, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
 correctly interpreted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 in Macy v. Holder, Baldwin v. Foxx, and Lusardi v. McHugh.

    (12) In forbidding discrimination based on sex, Congress 
 intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
 treatment resulting from sex-related characteristics. The 
 Supreme Court correctly recognized in Price Waterhouse v. 
 Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services that among 
 these characteristics are sex-stereotypes, including 
 masculinity and femininity. Congress reaffirmed in the 
 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 that discrimination on the 
 basis of ``sex'' includes but is not limited to discrimination 
 on the basis of ``pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
 conditions.''.

    (13) The absence of explicit prohibitions of discrimination 
 on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity under 
 Federal statutory law has created uncertainty for employers and 
 other entities covered by Federal nondiscrimination laws and 
 caused unnecessary hardships for LGBTQ individuals.

    (14) The Supreme Court correctly recognized in Hobby Lobby 
 v. Burwell that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

    (RFRA) ``provides no . . . shield'' to those who ``cloak'' 
 discrimination as ``religious practice to escape legal 
 sanction.'' This Act reaffirms that crucial limitation on RFRA, 
 that Congress did not intend for it to be used--and indeed it 
 cannot be used--to provide a defense against allegations of 
 discrimination on the basis of any protected trait.

    (15) Chapter 1 of title 9, United States Code (commonly 
 known as the ``Federal Arbitration Act''), represented an 
 exercise of legislative power that required courts to recognize 
 private voluntary agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes 
 at a time when the courts were refusing to do so on grounds 
 that arbitration represented a usurpation of the authority of 
 the courts to resolve legal disputes.

    (16) The Federal Arbitration Act did not, and should not 
 have been interpreted to, supplant or nullify the legislatively 
 created rights and remedies that Congress, exercising its power 
 under article I of the Constitution of the United States, has 
 granted to the people of the United States for resolving 
 disputes in State and Federal courts.

    (17) Recent court decisions, including AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333

    (2011) and American Express Co. v. 
 Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304

    (2013) , have 
 interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to broadly preempt 
 rights and remedies established under substantive State and 
 Federal law. As a result, these decisions have enabled business 
 entities to avoid or nullify legal duties created by 
 congressional enactment, resulting in millions of people in the 
 United States being unable to vindicate their rights in State 
 and Federal courts.

    (18) States have a compelling interest in enacting rights 
 and remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens, and the 
 Federal Arbitration Act should not be, and should not have 
 been, interpreted to preempt State legislation that enacted 
 rights and remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens.

    (19) The Supreme Court misinterpreted title VII of the 
 Civil Rights Act in establishing the Faragher-Ellerth 
 affirmative defense in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and 
 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. This affirmative 
 defense often leaves victims of sexual harassment with no 
 remedy or recourse after incidence of sexual or other 
 harassment. Violations of the law, and injuries to a victim and 
 their rights, are not cured by the existence of an anti-
 harassment policy or the lack of future harm, and in a hostile 
 work environment taking preventative measures is not a 
 requirement that falls on the victim.

    (20) Bringing a lawsuit to vindicate civil rights is 
 financially risky, and law firms, whether large or small, are 
 unlikely to take such cases on. Congress enacted the Civil 
 Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 in order to make 
 lawsuits to vindicate civil rights more accessible to potential 
 plaintiffs. The Supreme Court correctly recognized in City of 
 Riverside v. Rivera that the effectuation of congressional 
 intent requires viable civil rights lawsuits, which are 
 dependent on the availability of private enforcement mechanisms 
 and the corresponding availability of attorney's fees.

    (21) However, the Supreme Court incorrectly held that the 
 ``catalyst theory'' is not a permissible basis for the award of 
 attorney's fees in Buckhannon v. West Virginia Department of 
 Health & Human Resources. In doing so, the Court deprived 
 plaintiffs who effectively win a lawsuit through a settlement, 
 from receiving pre-trial attorney's fees. Congress enacted fee-
 shifting provisions in civil rights laws to encourage private 
 enforcement of those laws, and fees must be awarded when a 
 lawsuit vindicates the rights Congress sought to secure. In 
 disapproving of the ``catalyst theory'' the Court incentivized 
 potential defendants to draw out the pre-trial process and 
 settle at the last second, making the lawsuit too expensive for 
 the average victim to undertake and too risky for the average 
 attorney to accept a civil rights case.

    (22) The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and other civil rights 
 laws that followed it, were written, in part, to banish rampant 
 disparate treatment on the basis of race from American society. 
 Congress sought to overcome the pervasive, racist ideology that 
 Black traits were inferior by prohibiting discrimination, and 
 intended the Act to be interpreted broadly--encompassing race 
 and all its attributes, especially those traits historically 
 associated with race.

    (23) ``Blackness'' and its associated physical traits, such 
 as dark skin and kinky and curly hair, have too often been 
 equated with inferiority and ``unprofessionalism.'' 
 Professionalism was, and still is, closely linked to European 
 features and mannerisms, which entails that those who do not 
 naturally fall into Eurocentric norms must alter their 
 appearances, sometimes drastically and permanently, in order to 
 be deemed professional. Such norms are, on their face, proxies 
 for race.

    (24) Federal courts have correctly interpreted, e.g. that 
 title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
 discrimination on the basis of race, and thus protect 
 individuals from discrimination against afros. However, the 
 courts have yet to accept that the Act outlaws dress codes and 
 grooming policies that prohibit any natural presentation of 
 Black hair, including afros, braids, twists, and locks. 
 Although purportedly ``race-neutral'', these policies have a 
 disparate impact on Black individuals as they are more likely 
 to deter, burden, or punish Black individuals than any other 
 group. Therefore, hair discrimination targeting hairstyles 
 associated with race is racial discrimination.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION.

    (a) Civil Rights Act of 1964.--

Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``No'' and inserting ``

    (a) No'';

    (2) by inserting ``religion, sex (as such term is defined 
 in 

section 208),'' before ``or national origin''; and

    (3) by adding at the end the following:
 ``

    (b)

    (1)
        (A) Discrimination (including exclusion from participation 
and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact is established under 
this title only if--
 ``
            (i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of 
 race, color, sex (as defined in 

section 208), or national 
 origin (referred to in this title as an `person aggrieved' 
 demonstrates that an entity subject to this title (referred to 
 in this title as a `covered entity') has a policy or practice 
 that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, sex 
 (as such term is defined in 

section 208), or national origin 
 and the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged 
 policy or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the 
 nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity alleged to 
 have been operated in a discriminatory manner; or
 ``
            (ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (consistent with 
 the demonstration required under title VII with respect to an 
 `alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory 
 alternative policy or practice exists, and the covered entity 
 refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.
 ``
        (B)
            (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or 
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph
        (A)
            (i) , 
the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular challenged 
policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the person 
aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered 
entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for 
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or 
practice.
 ``
            (ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or 
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity shall 
not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is 
necessary to achieve the goals of its program or activity.
 ``

    (2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to 
achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used as a defense 
against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.
 ``

    (3) In this subsection, the term `demonstrates' means meets the 
burdens of production and persuasion.''.

    (b) Education Amendments of 1972.--

Section 901 of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating subsection
            (c) as subsection
            (d) ; and

    (2) by inserting after subsection

    (b) the following:
 ``
            (c) (1)
        (A) Subject to the conditions described in paragraphs

    (1) through

    (9) of subsection

    (a) , discrimination (including exclusion from 
participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact is 
established under this title only if--
 ``
            (i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of 
 sex (as such term is defined in 

section 208 of the Civil Rights 
 Act of 1964) (referred to in this title as an `person 
 aggrieved') demonstrates that an entity subject to this title 
 (referred to in this title as a `covered entity') has a policy 
 or practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of sex 
 and the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged 
 policy or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the 
 nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity alleged to 
 have been operated in a discriminatory manner; or
 ``
            (ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (consistent with 
 the demonstration required under title VII of the Civil Rights 
 Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) with respect to an 
 `alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory 
 alternative policy or practice exists, and the covered entity 
 refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.
 ``
        (B)
            (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or 
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph
        (A)
            (i) , 
the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular challenged 
policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the person 
aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered 
entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for 
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or 
practice.
 ``
            (ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or 
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity shall 
not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is 
necessary to achieve the goals of its program or activity.
 ``

    (2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to 
achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used as a defense 
against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.
 ``

    (3) In this subsection, the term `demonstrates' means meets the 
burdens of production and persuasion.''.
            (c) Age Discrimination Act of 1975.--

Section 303 of the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6102) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``Pursuant'' and inserting ``

    (a) Pursuant''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:
 ``

    (b)

    (1)
        (A) Subject to the conditions described in subsections

    (b) and
            (c) of 

section 304, discrimination (including exclusion from 
participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact is 
established under this title only if--
 ``
            (i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of 
 age (referred to in this title as a `person aggrieved') 
 demonstrates that an entity subject to this title (referred to 
 in this title as a `covered entity') has a policy or practice 
 that causes a disparate impact on the basis of age and the 
 covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged policy 
 or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the 
 nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity alleged to 
 have been operated in a discriminatory manner; or
 ``
            (ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (consistent with 
 the demonstration required under title VII of the Civil Rights 
 Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) with respect to an 
 `alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory 
 alternative policy or practice exists, and the covered entity 
 refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.
 ``
        (B)
            (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or 
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph
        (A)
            (i) , 
the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular challenged 
policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the person 
aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered 
entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for 
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or 
practice.
 ``
            (ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or 
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity shall 
not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is 
necessary to achieve the goals of its program or activity.
 ``

    (2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to 
achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used as a defense 
against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.
 ``

    (3) In this subsection, the term `demonstrates' means meets the 
burdens of production and persuasion.''.
            (d) Fair Housing Act.--The Fair Housing Act (title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968; 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended--

    (1) in 

section 802, by adding at the end the following:
 ``

    (p) `Sex' has the meaning given such term in 

section 208 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
 ``

    (q) `Source of income' includes--
 ``

    (1) any income from a profession, occupation, or job;
 ``

    (2) any form of Federal, State, or local housing 
 assistance provided to a family or provided to a housing owner 
 on behalf of a family, or private assistance, grant, loan or 
 rental assistance program, including low-income housing 
 assistance certificates, rental subsidies from nongovernmental 
 organizations, and vouchers issued under the United States 
 Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.);
 ``

    (3) any income received during a taxable year as Social 
 Security benefits, as defined in 

section 86
            (d) of the Internal 
 Revenue Code of 1986, or as supplemental security income 
 benefits under title XVI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
 1381 et seq.);
 ``

    (4) any gift, inheritance, pension, annuity, or other 
 consideration or benefit;
 ``

    (5) any income received pursuant to court order, 
 including spousal support and child support;
 ``

    (6) any payment from a trust, guardian, or conservator;
 ``

    (7) any income from the sale or pledge of property or an 
 interest in property; and
 ``

    (8) any other lawful source of income.
 ``

    (r) `Race', `color', `religion', `sex', `sexual orientation', 
`gender identity', `handicap', `familial status', `source of income', 
or `national origin', used with respect to an individual, includes--
 ``

    (1) the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
 gender identity, handicap, familial status, source of income, 
 or national origin, respectively, of another person with whom 
 the individual is associated or has been associated; and
 ``

    (2) a perception or belief, even if inaccurate, 
 concerning the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
 gender identity, handicap, familial status, source of income, 
 or national origin, respectively, of the individual.'';

    (2) in 

section 804, by inserting ``(as defined in 

section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source of income,'' after 
 ``sex'' each place that term appears;

    (3) in 

section 805, by inserting ``(as defined in 

section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source of income,'' after 
 ``sex'' each place that term appears;

    (4) in 

section 806, by inserting ``(as defined in 

section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source of income,'' after 
 ``sex'';

    (5) in 

section 807 (42 U.S.C. 3607), by adding at the end 
 the following:
 ``
            (c) Nothing in this title shall be construed to--
 ``

    (1) prohibit an entity from providing housing assistance 
 under 

section 8

    (o)

    (19) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 
 (42 U.S.C. 1437f

    (o)

    (19) ) in a nondiscriminatory manner; or
 ``

    (2) limit the ability of the owner of a dwelling to 
 determine, in a commercially reasonable and non-discriminatory 
 manner, the ability of a person to afford to purchase or rent 
 the dwelling.''; and

    (6) in 

section 808

    (e)

    (6) (42 U.S.C. 3608

    (e)

    (6) ), by 
 inserting ``source of income,'' after ``handicap,''.

    (e) Prevention of Intimidation in Fair Housing Cases.--

Section 901 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3631) is amended by 
inserting ``(as such term is defined in 

section 208 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964), source of income (as defined in 

section 802),'' after 
``sex'' each place that term appears.

SEC. 4. RIGHT OF RECOVERY.

    (a) Civil Rights Act of 1964.--Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) is amended by inserting after 

section 602 the following:

``

SEC. 602A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED.

 ``

    (a) Claims Based on Proof of Intentional Discrimination.--In an 
action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a covered 
entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a 
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited 
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the person 
aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief (including 
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert 
fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available 
against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (b) Claims Based on the Disparate Impact Standard of Proof.--In 
an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a 
covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on 
disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its 
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), 
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, government 
agency, or political subdivision.
 ``
            (c) Settlement.--In any settlement agreement or consent decree to 
resolve an action brought or which may be brought under this title, 
attorney's fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.

    (b) Education Amendments of 1972.--Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
after 

section 902 the following:

``

SEC. 902A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED.

 ``

    (a) Claims Based on Proof of Intentional Discrimination.--In an 
action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a covered 
entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a 
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited 
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the person 
aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief (including 
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert 
fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available 
against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (b) Claims Based on the Disparate Impact Standard of Proof.--In 
an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a 
covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on 
disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its 
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), 
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, government 
agency, or political subdivision.
 ``
            (c) Settlement.--In any settlement agreement or consent decree to 
resolve an action brought or which may be brought under this title, 
attorney's fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.
            (c) Age Discrimination Act of 1975.--

    (1) In general.--

Section 305 of the Age Discrimination Act 
 of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104) is amended by adding at the end the 
 following:
 ``

    (g)

    (1) In an action brought by a person aggrieved under this 
title against a covered entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional 
discrimination (not a practice that is unlawful because of its 
disparate impact) prohibited under this title (including its 
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), 
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, government 
agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (2) In an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title 
against a covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination 
based on disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its 
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), 
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, government 
agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (3) In any settlement agreement or consent decree to resolve an 
action brought or which may be brought under this title, attorney's 
fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.

    (2) Conformity of ada with title vi and title ix.--
        (A) Eliminating waiver of right to fees if not 
 requested in complaint.--

Section 305

    (e)

    (1) of the Age 
 Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104

    (e) ) is 
 amended--
            (i) by striking ``to enjoin a violation'' 
 and inserting ``to redress a violation''; and
            (ii) by striking the second sentence and 
 inserting the following: ``The Court shall 
 award the costs of suit, including a reasonable 
 attorney's fee (including expert fees), to the 
 prevailing plaintiff.''.
        (B) Eliminating unnecessary mandates: to exhaust 
 administrative remedies; and to delay suit longer than 
 180 days to obtain agency review.--

Section 305

    (f) of 
 the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104

    (f) ) 
 is amended by striking ``With respect to actions 
 brought for relief based on an alleged violation of the 
 provisions of this title,'' and inserting ``Actions 
 brought for relief based on an alleged violation of the 
 provisions of this title may be initiated in a court of 
 competent jurisdiction, pursuant to 

section 305

    (e) , or 
 before the relevant Federal department or agency. With 
 respect to such actions brought initially before the 
 relevant Federal department or agency,''.
            (C) Eliminating duplicative ``reasonableness'' 
 requirement; clarifying that ``reasonable factors other 
 than age'' is defense to a disparate impact claim, not 
 an exception to ada coverage.--

Section 304

    (b)

    (1) of the 
 Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6103

    (b)

    (1) ) 
 is amended by striking ``involved--'' and all that 
 follows through the period and inserting ``involved 
 such action reasonably takes into account age as a 
 factor necessary to the normal operation or the 
 achievement of any statutory objective of such program 
 or activity.''.
            (d) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
 ``

    (e)

    (1) In an action brought by a person aggrieved by 
discrimination on the basis of disability (referred to in this section 
as an `person aggrieved') under this section against an entity subject 
to this section (referred to in this section as a `covered entity') who 
has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a practice that 
is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under this 
section (including its implementing regulations), the person aggrieved 
may recover equitable and legal relief (including compensatory and 
punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
except that punitive damages are not available against a government, 
government agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (2) In an action brought by a person aggrieved under this section 
against a covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination 
based on disparate impact prohibited under this section (including its 
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), 
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, government 
agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (3) Equitable and legal relief (including compensatory and 
punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs 
shall be available in all cases brought for the failure to provide 
reasonable accommodations or reasonable modifications, or the failure 
to comply with requirements of effective communication, accessible 
design, maintenance of accessible features, or program accessibility.
 ``

    (4) In any settlement agreement or consent decree to resolve an 
action brought or which may be brought under this section, attorney's 
fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.

    (e) Fair Housing Act.--The Fair Housing Act (title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968; 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), as amended by this 
Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

``

SEC. 823. DISPARATE IMPACT.

 ``

    (a) In General.--
 ``

    (1) Establishment.--Discrimination (including exclusion 
 from participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate 
 impact is established under this title only if--
 ``
        (A) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the 
 basis of race, color, sex, or national origin 
 demonstrates that an entity subject to this title 
 (referred to in this title as a `covered entity') has a 
 policy or practice that causes a disparate impact on 
 the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin and 
 the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the 
 challenged policy or practice is related to and 
 necessary to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the 
 program or activity alleged to have been operated in a 
 discriminatory manner; or
 ``
        (B) the person aggrieved demonstrates that a less 
 discriminatory alternative policy or practice exists, 
 and the covered entity refuses to adopt such 
 alternative policy or practice.
 ``

    (2) Demonstration.--
 ``
        (A) Causation.--With respect to demonstrating that a particular 
policy or practice causes a disparate impact as described in subsection

    (a)

    (1) , the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular 
challenged policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if 
the person aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a 
covered entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation 
for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or 
practice.
 ``
        (B) No Requirement To Demonstrate.--If the covered entity 
demonstrates that a specific policy or practice does not cause the 
disparate impact, the covered entity shall not be required to 
demonstrate that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve the 
goals of its program or activity.
 ``

    (b) Necessity of Intentional Discrimination To Achieve Policy 
Goals Not a Defense.--A demonstration that a policy or practice is 
necessary to achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used 
as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this 
title.
 ``
            (c) === Definition. ===
-In this section, the term `demonstrates' means 
meets the burdens of production and persuasion.

``

SEC. 824. RELIEF FOR CLAIMS BASED ON DIFFERING STANDARDS OF PROOF.

 ``

    (a) Claims Based on Proof of Intentional Discrimination.--In an 
action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a covered 
entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a 
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited 
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the person 
aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief (including 
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert 
fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available 
against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.
 ``

    (b) Claims Based on the Disparate Impact Standard of Proof.--In 
an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a 
covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on 
disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its 
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages), 
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, government 
agency, or political subdivision.
 ``
            (c) Relief Available.--Equitable and legal relief (including 
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert 
fees), and costs shall be available in all cases brought for the 
failure to permit reasonable accommodations, make reasonable 
modifications, or design and construct accessible dwellings as required 
by 

section 804

    (f)

    (3)
            (C) .
 ``
            (d) Settlement.--In any settlement agreement or consent decree to 
resolve an action brought or which may be brought under this title, 
attorney's fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.

SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) 

=== Definitions. ===
-In this section--

    (1) The term ``governmental body'' means any department, 
 agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of 
 Federal, State, local, or Indian tribal government.

    (2) The term ``Indian tribe'' has the meaning given the 
 term in 

section 102 of the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe 
 List Act of 1994 (25 U.S.C. 479a).

    (3) The term ``law enforcement agency'' means any Federal, 
 State, local, or Indian tribal governmental body engaged in the 
 prevention, detection, or investigation of violations of 
 criminal, immigration, or customs laws.

    (4) The term ``law enforcement agent'' means any Federal, 
 State, local, or Indian tribal official responsible for 
 enforcing criminal, immigration, or customs laws, including 
 police officers and other agents of a law enforcement agency.

    (5) The term ``profiling'' means the practice of a law 
 enforcement agent or agency relying, to any degree, on actual 
 or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex 
 (as defined in 

section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 
 gender identity, or sexual orientation in selecting which 
 individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory 
 activities or in deciding upon the scope and substance of law 
 enforcement activity following any initial investigatory 
 procedure, except when there is trustworthy information, 
 relevant to the locality and timeframe, that links a person 
 with a particular characteristic described in this paragraph to 
 an identified criminal incident or scheme.

    (6) The term ``routine or spontaneous investigatory 
 activities'' means the following activities by a law 
 enforcement agent:
        (A) Interviews.
        (B) Traffic stops.
            (C) Pedestrian stops.
            (D) Frisks and other types of body searches.
        (E) Consensual or nonconsensual searches of the 
 persons, property, or possessions (including vehicles) 
 of individuals using any form of public or private 
 transportation, including motorists and pedestrians.
        (F) Data collection, analysis, assessments, and 
 predicated investigations.
        (G) Inspections and interviews of entrants into the 
 United States that are more extensive than those 
 customarily carried out.
        (H) Immigration-related workplace investigations.
            (I) Such other types of law enforcement encounters 
 compiled for or by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 or the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice 
 Statistics.

    (7) The term ``State'' means each of the 50 States, the 
 District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any 
 other territory or possession of the United States.

    (8) The term ``unit of local government'' means--
        (A) any city, county, township, town, borough, 
 parish, village, or other general purpose political 
 subdivision of a State;
        (B) any law enforcement district or judicial 
 enforcement district that--
            (i) is established under applicable State 
 law; and
            (ii) has the authority to, in a manner 
 independent of other State entities, establish 
 a budget and impose taxes; or
            (C) any Indian tribe that performs law enforcement 
 functions, as determined by the Secretary of the 
 Interior.

    (b) Prohibition of Profiling.--

    (1) In general.--No law enforcement agent or law 
 enforcement agency shall engage in profiling.

    (2) Enforcement.--
        (A) Remedy.--The United States, or an individual 
 injured by profiling, may enforce this title in a civil 
 action for equitable or legal relief, filed in a State 
 court of general jurisdiction or in a district court of 
 the United States.
        (B) Parties.--In any action brought under this 
 title, relief may be obtained against--
            (i) any governmental body that employed any 
 law enforcement agent who engaged in profiling;
            (ii) any agent of such body who engaged in 
 profiling; and
            (iii) any person with supervisory authority 
 over such agent.
            (C) Nature of proof.--Proof that the routine or 
 spontaneous investigatory activities of law enforcement 
 agents in a jurisdiction have had a disparate impact on 
 individuals with a particular characteristic described 
 in subsection

    (a)

    (5) shall constitute prima facie 
 evidence of a violation of this section.
            (D) Attorney's fees.--In any action or proceeding 
 to enforce this section against any governmental body, 
 the court may allow a prevailing plaintiff, other than 
 the United States, reasonable attorney's fees as part 
 of the costs, and may include expert fees as part of 
 the attorney's fees.

SEC. 6. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.

    (a) Prohibition on Discrimination or Segregation in Public 
Accommodations.--

Section 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000a) is amended--

    (1) in subsection

    (a) , by inserting ``sex,'' before ``or 
 national origin''; and

    (2) in subsection

    (b) --
        (A) in paragraph

    (3) , by striking ``stadium'' and 
 all that follows and inserting ``stadium or other place 
 or establishment that provides exhibition, 
 entertainment, recreation, exercise, amusement, 
 gathering, or display;'';
        (B) by redesignating paragraph

    (4) as paragraph

    (6) ; and
            (C) by inserting after paragraph

    (3) the following:
 ``

    (4) any establishment that provides a good, service, or 
 program, including a store, shopping center, online retailer or 
 service provider, salon, bank, gas station, food bank, service 
 or care center, shelter, travel agency, funeral parlor, or any 
 establishment that provides health care, accounting, or legal 
 services;
 ``

    (5) any train service, bus service, car service, taxi 
 service, airline service, station, depot, or other place of or 
 establishment that provides transportation service; and''.

    (b) Prohibition on Discrimination or Segregation Under Law.--

Section 202 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000a-1) is amended by inserting 
``sex,'' before ``or national origin''.
            (c) Definitions and Rules of Construction.--Title II of such Act 
(42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:

``

SEC. 208. DEFINITIONS AND RULES.

 ``

    (a) 

=== Definitions. ===
-
 ``

    (1) Race; color; religion; sex; sexual orientation; 
 gender identity; national origin.--The term `race', `color', 
 `religion', `sex (including sexual orientation and gender 
 identity)', or `national origin', used with respect to an 
 individual, includes--
 ``
        (A) the race, color, religion, sex (including 
 sexual orientation and gender identity), or national 
 origin, respectively, of another person with whom the 
 individual is associated or has been associated;
 ``
        (B) a perception or belief, even if inaccurate, 
 concerning the race, color, religion, sex (including 
 sexual orientation and gender identity), or national 
 origin, respectively, of the individual; and
 ``
            (C) in the case of race, traits historically 
 associated with race, including natural hair texture 
 and protective hairstyles.
 ``

    (2) Gender identity.--The term `gender identity' means 
 the gender-related identity, appearance, mannerisms, or other 
 gender-related characteristics of an individual, regardless of 
 the individual's designated sex at birth.
 ``

    (3) Including.--The term `including' means including, but 
 not limited to, consistent with the term's standard meaning in 
 Federal law.
 ``

    (4) Natural hairstyles.--The term `natural hair' 
 includes--
 ``
        (A) protective and natural hairstyles, which 
 includes braids, locs, weaves, twists, afros; and
 ``
        (B) natural hair texture, which includes wavy, 
 kinky, curl, and coily, and also the variation of 
 texture in between.
 ``

    (5) Sex.--The term `sex' includes--
 ``
        (A) a sex stereotype;
 ``
        (B) pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical 
 condition;
 ``
            (C) sexual orientation or gender identity; and
 ``
            (D) sex characteristics, including intersex 
 traits.
 ``

    (6) Sexual orientation.--The term `sexual orientation' 
 means an individual's actual or perceived romantic, physical, 
 or sexual attraction to other persons, or lack thereof, that 
 includes heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality.
 ``

    (b) Rules.--In providing a remedy under this Act:
 ``

    (1) In the case of any conduct alleged to be 
 discriminatory on the basis of sex, the remedy under this Act 
 for such conduct, to the extent it pertains to pregnancy, 
 childbirth, or a related medical condition may not result in a 
 less substantial remedy than any other remedy for 
 discrimination on the basis of sex.
 ``

    (2) In the case of any conduct alleged to be 
 discriminatory on the basis of sex (with respect to gender 
 identity), an individual shall not be denied access to a shared 
 facility, including a restroom, a locker room, and a dressing 
 room, that is in accordance with the individual's gender 
 identity.

``

SEC. 209. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

 ``

    (a) Claims and Remedies Not Precluded.--Nothing in this title 
shall be construed to limit the claims or remedies available to any 
individual for an unlawful practice on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin including claims brought pursuant to 

section 1979 or 1980 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985) or 
any other law, including the Federal law amended by the Customer Non-
Discrimination Act, regulation, or policy.
 ``

    (b) No Negative Inference.--Nothing in this title shall be 
construed to support any inference that any Federal law prohibiting a 
practice on the basis of sex does not prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or a sex stereotype.
 ``
            (c) Scope of an Establishment.--A reference in this title to an 
establishment--
 ``

    (1) shall be construed to include an individual whose 
 operations affect commerce and who is a provider of a good, 
 service, or program; and
 ``

    (2) shall not be construed to be limited to a physical 
 facility or place.

``

SEC. 210. CLAIMS.

 ``The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb 
et seq.) shall not provide a claim concerning, or a defense to a claim 
under this title or provide a basis for challenging the application or 
enforcement of this title.''.

SEC. 7. STRICT VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND FARAGHER-ELLERTH 
 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE REMOVED.

 

Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
 ``
            (l) An employer shall be liable for any act of discrimination 
prohibited under this title (including harassment, intimidation, or 
retaliation) committed by any of its employees.
 ``
            (m) It shall not be a defense to a claim under this title or 
provide a basis for challenging the application or enforcement of this 
title--
 ``

    (1) that an employer exercised reasonable care in 
 attempting to prevent or took corrective action regarding any 
 act of discrimination on the basis of sex (including 
 intimidation, harassment, or retaliation);
 ``

    (2) that adverse employment action was not taken by such 
 an employer; or
 ``

    (3) that an employee affected by that act did not take 
 advantage of preventive opportunities to avoid harm.''.

SEC. 8. ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT, CONSUMER, AND CIVIL RIGHTS DISPUTES.

    (a) 

=== Purposes ===
-The purposes of this section are to--

    (1) prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force 
 arbitration of future employment, consumer, or civil rights 
 disputes; and

    (2) prohibit agreements and practices that interfere with 
 the right of individuals, workers, and small businesses to 
 participate in a joint, class, or collective action related to 
 an employment, consumer, or civil rights dispute.

    (b) In General.--Title 9 of the United States Code is amended by 
adding at the end the following:

 ``CHAPTER 4--ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT, CONSUMER, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
 DISPUTES

``

SEC. 401. DEFINITIONS.

 ``In this chapter--
 ``

    (1) the term `civil rights dispute' means a dispute--
 ``
        (A) arising from an alleged violation of--
 ``
            (i) the Constitution of the United States 
 or the constitution of a State; and
 ``
            (ii) any Federal, State, or local law 
 that prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
 race, sex, age, gender identity, sexual 
 orientation, disability, religion, national 
 origin, or any legally protected status in 
 education, employment, credit, housing, public 
 accommodations and facilities, voting, veterans 
 or servicemembers, health care, or a program 
 funded or conducted by the Federal Government 
 or State government, including any law referred 
 to or described in 

section 62

    (e) of the 
 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including parts 
 of such law not explicitly referenced in such 
 section but that relate to protecting 
 individuals on any such basis; and
 ``
        (B) in which at least one party alleging a 
 violation described in subparagraph
        (A) is one or more 
 individuals (or their authorized representative), 
 including one or more individuals seeking certification 
 as a class under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
 Procedure or a comparable rule or provision of State 
 law;
 ``

    (2) the term `consumer dispute' means a dispute between--
 ``
        (A) one or more individuals who seek or acquire 
 real or personal property, services (including services 
 related to digital technology), securities or other 
 investments, money, or credit for personal, family, or 
 household purposes including an individual or 
 individuals who seek certification as a class under 
 rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a 
 comparable rule or provision of State law; and
 ``
        (B)
            (i) the seller or provider of such property, 
 services, securities or other investments, money, or 
 credit; or
 ``
            (ii) a third party involved in the selling, 
 providing of, payment for, receipt or use of 
 information about, or other relationship to any such 
 property, services, securities or other investments, 
 money, or credit;
 ``

    (3) the term `employment dispute' means a dispute between 
 one or more individuals (or their authorized representative) 
 and a person arising out of or related to the work relationship 
 or prospective work relationship between them, including a 
 dispute regarding the terms of or payment for, advertising of, 
 recruiting for, referring of, arranging for, or discipline or 
 discharge in connection with, such work, regardless of whether 
 the individual is or would be classified as an employee or an 
 independent contractor with respect to such work, and including 
 a dispute arising under any law referred to or described in 
 

section 62

    (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including 
 parts of such law not explicitly referenced in such section but 
 that relate to protecting individuals on any such basis, and 
 including a dispute in which an individual or individuals seek 
 certification as a class under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
 Civil Procedure or as a collective action under 

section 16

    (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, or a comparable rule or 
 provision of State law;
 ``

    (4) the term `predispute arbitration agreement' means an 
 agreement to arbitrate a dispute that has not yet arisen at the 
 time of the making of the agreement; and
 ``

    (5) the term `predispute joint-action waiver' means an 
 agreement, whether or not part of a predispute arbitration 
 agreement, that would prohibit, or waive the right of, one of 
 the parties to the agreement to participate in a joint, class, 
 or collective action in a judicial, arbitral, administrative, 
 or other forum, concerning a dispute that has not yet arisen at 
 the time of the making of the agreement.

``

SEC. 402. NO VALIDITY OR ENFORCEABILITY.

 ``

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
title, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action 
waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to an employment 
dispute, consumer dispute, or civil rights dispute.
 ``

    (b) Applicability.--
 ``

    (1) In general.--An issue as to whether this chapter 
 applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under 
 Federal law. The applicability of this chapter to an agreement 
 to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an 
 agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by 
 a court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the 
 party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration 
 agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of 
 the contract containing such agreement, and irrespective of 
 whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations 
 to an arbitrator.
 ``

    (2) Collective bargaining agreements.--Nothing in this 
 chapter shall apply to any arbitration provision in a contract 
 between an employer and a labor organization or between labor 
 organizations, except that no such arbitration provision shall 
 have the effect of waiving the right of a worker to seek 
 judicial enforcement of a right arising under a provision of 
 the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or 
 a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising 
 therefrom.''.
            (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--

    (1) In general.--Title 9 of the United States Code is 
 amended--
        (A) in 

section 1 by striking ``of seamen,'' and all 
 that follows through ``interstate commerce,'' and 
 inserting in its place ``of individuals, regardless of 
 whether such individuals are designated as employees or 
 independent contractors for other purposes'';
        (B) in 

section 2 by inserting ``or as otherwise 
 provided in chapter 4'' before the period at the end;
            (C) in 

section 208--
            (i) in the section heading by striking 
 ``chapter 1; residual application'' and 
 inserting ``application''; and
            (ii) by adding at the end the following: 
 ``This chapter applies to the extent that this 
 chapter is not in conflict with chapter 4.''; 
 and
            (D) in 

section 307--
            (i) in the section heading by striking 
 ``chapter 1; residual application'' and 
 inserting ``application''; and
            (ii) by adding at the end the following: 
 ``This chapter applies to the extent that this 
 chapter is not in conflict with chapter 4.''.

    (2) Table of sections.--
        (A) Chapter 2.--The table of sections of chapter 2 
 of title 9, United States Code, is amended by striking 
 the item relating to 

section 208 and inserting the 
 following:

``208. Application.''.
        (B) Chapter 3.--The table of sections of chapter 3 
 of title 9, United States Code, is amended by striking 
 the item relating to 

section 307 and inserting the 
 following:

``307. Application.''.

    (3) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters of title 9, 
 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
 following:

``4. Arbitration of employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights 
 disputes''.

SEC. 9. LIABILITY OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

    (a) Amendment.--Revised Statute 1979 (42 U.S.C. 1983) is amended by 
inserting ``of the United States or'' before ``of any State''.

    (b) Rules for Application.--In any action under Revised Statute 
1979, the following shall apply:

    (1) Definition of state.--The term ``State'' includes any 
 person or entity that undertakes action under color of any 
 statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
 or Territory or the District of Columbia.

    (2) Action under color of law.--A private person or entity 
 undertakes action under color of any statute, ordinance, 
 regulation, custom, or usage, of the United States or of any 
 State or Territory or the District of Columbia, when--
        (A) undertaking a public function delegated by the 
 United States or by a State or local government;
        (B) voluntarily undertaking a public function;
            (C) acting in concert with the United States or a 
 State or local government or acting in concert with an 
 individual officer, agent, or entity of the United 
 States or a State or local government;
            (D) engaging in joint action towards a common goal 
 or plan with the United States or a State or local 
 government or engaging in joint action towards a common 
 goal or plan with an individual officer, agent, or 
 entity of the United States or of a State or local 
 government;
        (E) engaged in a conspiracy with the United States 
 or a State or local government or engaged in a 
 conspiracy with an individual officer, agent, or entity 
 of the United States or of a State or local government;
        (F) a close nexus exists between the private person 
 or entity and the United States or a State or local 
 government or a close nexus exists between an 
 individual officer, agent, or entity of the United 
 States or a State or local government;
        (G) the activities of the private person or entity 
 is so entwined with the United States or a State or 
 local government or an individual officer, agent, or 
 entity of the United States or of a State or local 
 government such that the private person or entity is 
 fairly considered to be acting under color of law; or
        (H) otherwise exercises powers traditionally 
 reserved to the United States or to State or local 
 government.

    (3) Presumption.--A private person or entity is presumed to 
 be acting under color of law when, pursuant to a contract or 
 other legally binding agreement with the United States or with 
 a State or local government, the private person or entity 
 exercises any power of the United States or of that State or 
 local government or the private person or entity otherwise 
 undertakes the administration, operations, or other activities 
 of: the judiciary, law enforcement, public education, jails or 
 prisons, elections, municipal water services, municipal waste 
 removal, evictions, public parks, or public benefits programs.

    (4) No defense of qualified immunity.--Qualified immunity 
 is not a defense in an action brought against any person who 
 under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
 usage, of the United States or of any State or Territory or the 
 District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
 citizen of the United States or other person within the 
 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.

    (5) Respondeat superior.--In the case of any official of 
 any political subdivision of the United States or of a State, 
 if that official, acting under color of law, violates any 
 provision of this Act, that official shall be amenable to any 
 suit under this Act, and the political subdivision may be held 
 liable for the acts of that official, whether acting in his or 
 her official or individual capacity.

SEC. 10. EXPLICIT INCLUSION OF RULEMAKINGS.

 

Section 1003

    (a)

    (1) of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 (42 
U.S.C. 2000d-7

    (a)

    (1) ) is amended by inserting before the period at the 
end the following: ``(including the provisions of any rule made to 
implement any of the foregoing statutes)''.

SEC. 11. CONSTRUCTION.

    (a) Relief.--Nothing in this Act, including any amendment made by 
this Act, shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief 
available under, 

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 
U.S.C. 794), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
12101 et seq.), or any other provision of law.

    (b) Defendants.--Nothing in this Act, including any amendment made 
by this Act, shall be construed to limit the scope of the class of 
persons who may be subjected to civil actions under the covered civil 
rights provisions.
            (c) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, or the application 
of such a provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be 
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and the application of the 
remaining provisions of this Act to any person or circumstance shall 
not be affected thereby.
            (d) Arbitration.--Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by 
this Act, shall be construed to prohibit the use of arbitration on a 
voluntary basis after a dispute arises.

SEC. 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    (a) In General.--This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, 
take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

    (b) Application.--This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, 
apply to all actions or proceedings pending on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act, and, in the case of 

section 8 and the amendments 
made thereby, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that 
arises or accrues on or after such date.
 <all>